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ABSTRACT
Two years after the beginning of the Mandela Presidency and the end of
minority rule in South Africa, the emergent model of education and
training provision has still to take on a definite form. This thesis seeks to
explore this emergent model. To do so, it considers the developments of
the two years between the establishment of the Government of National
Unity in May 1994 and the National Party's decision to quit this coalition
in May 1996 within two crucial contexts. First, whilst the focus is squarely
on South Africa, trends within that country are related to those in other
countries. Of particular relevance in this regard is the move in other Old
Commonwealth countries towards the integration of education and
training, a parallel of South African policy debates. Second, the need to
see present policy debates within their historical context is reaffirmed. As
well as providing an overview of the education and training
developments of the past century, there is a detailed focus on the twenty
years since the Soweto Uprising of 1976.
The focus of the thesis is on policy discourses, seen primarily through the
exploration of major reports on education and training and, where
possible, through the background documents that shaped them. Much of
this data has not been subject to widespread analysis and debate in
educational circles, yet is of great importance to an understanding of
current debates. For the period since the 1994 elections this data has been
supplemented by a series of interviews with stakeholders influential in
the development of policy and practice in education and training.
In order to get analytical purchase on these documents and interviews,
and on the broader debates they represent, the focus throughout the
thesis has been on the principal meta-narratives which can be discerned
in such debates. Four such meta-narratives are shown as having become
influential in the policy debates of the last twenty years: the pro-equity
vision of People's Education; the New Right market-oriented approach;
the trade-union driven New Times version of Post Fordism; and Lean
Production, the pro-employer alternative to New Times. An
understanding of the nature of these four meta-narratives allows a
detailed reading of the current, contested policy discourse and points to
the very real possibility of a rather narrow version of the integration of
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AACCF Anglo-American Corporation Chairman's Fund
ABE Adult Basic Education
ABET Adult Basic Education and Training
AEU Amalgamated Engineering Union
AMITB Automobile Manufacturers Industry Training Board
ANC African National Congress
AWB Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging
AZAPO Azanian Peoples Organisation
BITB Building Industry Training Board
CATS Credit Accumulation and Transfer System
CBML Competency Based Modular Learning
CBMT Competency Based Modular Training
CEPD Centre for Education Policy Development
CMESA Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
DE Department of Education
DEPOLL Department of Lifelong Learning
DET Department of Education and Training
DNE Department of National Education
EAP Economically Active Population
ECSA Engineering Council of South Africa
EDUPOL Education Policy Unit (Urban Foundation)
EPU Education Policy Unit (NECC aligned)
ERS Education Renewal Strategy
ESKOM Electricity Supply Commission
ETDP Education, Training and Development Practitioner
ETQA Education and Training Qualifications Authority
FE Further Education
FEDSAL Federation of South African Labour Unions
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNU Government of National Unity
GNVQ General National Vocational Qualification
HE Higher Education
HITB Hospitality Industry Training Board
HLM High Level Manpower
HRD Human Resource Development
HSE High Skill Equilibrium
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council
IDEAL Integrated Department of Education and Labour
IEB Independent Examinations Board
ILO International Labour Office/Organisation1
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMWG Inter-Ministerial Working Group
IPET Implementation Plan for Education and Training
IQ Intelligence Quotient
ITB Industry Training Board
JWG Joint Working Group
1 There is a distintion between the Office, a secretariat based in Geneva which produces
research documents and advises countries, and the Organisation, the body whose meetings
bring together tripartite representatives of countries in order to pass resolutions.
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LSE Low Skill Equilibrium
MEC Member of the Executive Council
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLM Medium Level Manpower
MP Member of Parliament
NACTU National Council of Trade Unions
NAPTOSA National Professional Teachers Organisation of South
Africa
NCVQ National Council for Vocational Qualifications
NECC National Education Crisis Committee (later National
Education Coordinating Committee)
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEPI National Education Policy Investigation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIV New Improved Vocationalism
NP National Party
NQF National Qualifications Framework
NSB National Standards Body
NTB National Training Board
NTS National Training Strategy
NTSI National Training Strategy Initiative
NUM National Union of Mineworkers
NUMSA National Union of Metalworkers, South Africa
NZQA New Zealand Qualifications Authority
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PETA Provincial Education and Training Authority
PETL Paid Education and Training Leave
PITB Plastics Industry Training Board
PRISEC Private Sector Education Council
PRP Participatory Research Programme
PTSA Parent Teacher Student Association
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
RPL Recognition of Prior Learning
RSA Republic of South Africa
SA South Africa
SABN South African Business Network
SABRA South African Bureau for Racial Affairs
SACHED South African Committee for Higher Education
SACLA South African Confederation of Labour
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADTU South African Democratic Teachers Union
SALB South African Labour Bulletin
SAQA South African Qualifications Authority
SCOTVEC Scottish Vocational Education Council
SETO Sector Education and Training Organisation
SGB Standards Generating Body




USA United States of America
USWE Using Spoken and Written English
WC 2 Work Committee 2 (of the NTSI)

















Civilized Labour Policy A policy established in the 1920s which gave
preference to white employment in the public sector and encouraged a
similar preference in the private sector.
Co-determination Wide-ranging cooperation and joint decision-making
between employers and employees. See Employee Involvement and
Employee Participation.
Colour Bar The de facto or de jure prevention of certain racial groupings
becoming employed in a particular job. See Job Reservation, Scheduled
Person.
Competency Based Modular Learning A model of learning in which the
curriculum is built up of modules and where the focus of assessment is
on a measurement of skills through competencies rather than the
traditional educational focus on knowledge.
Corporatism A mode of political and economic organisation in which a
wide range of decisions are based on negotiations or understandings
between organised labour, organised capital and the state. See Strategic
Unionism.
Credit Accumulation and Transfer System A method of assigning
particular values to courses of learning so as to facilitate student
movement between courses and institutions.
Department of Education This came into place on 1st January 1995,
replacing the Department of National Education. The Department of
Education consists of the corps of civil servants employed in the national
education bureaucracy. See Ministry of Education.
Discourse A storyline emerging out of a particular text or group of texts.
See Meta-Narrative.
Dual System A system, especially associated with the German Federal
Republic, which maintains discrete education and training tracks but
offers high quality and status of provision in both and permits limited
movement between the two tracks.
Economic Fordism A stage of South African Fordism during the late
1970s and 1980s in which the economic logic of mass production was
recognised but the political implications, such as universal suffrage were
resisted.
Effluxion of Time The term used to denote that an apprenticeship has
been successfully completed through the passage of the fixed time period
rather than through the passing of a trade test.
Employee Involvement A mode of industrial relations in which workers
are encouraged to provide suggestions for the better functioning of the
firm but are excluded from real decision-making. See Employee
Participation, Co-determination.
Employee Participation A mode of industrial relations in which workers
are widely involved in the management of the firm. See Co-
determination, Employee Involvement.
Fast Capitalism A model of economic organisation which responds to the
crisis of Fordism through the intensification of Fordist production whilst
developing new areas of market penetration and new market niches. See
Lean Production.
Flexibility A stress in the literatures of Fast Capitalism and Lean
Production on the need to make all aspects of economic activity more
adaptable to changing market conditions. In practice, flexibility is often
synonymous with Work Intensification and Multi-Tasking.
Fordism A Regime of Accumulation common across Europe and North
America during the middle part of the twentieth century in which mass
production and mass consumption were in a mutually reinforcing
relationship. Universal suffrage, political bipartism and massified state
education systems were other aspects of this regime. See Economic
Fordism, Mature Fordism, Neo-Fordism, Post-Fordism, Pre-Fordism,
Racial Fordism.
Free Rider The firm which chooses not to train, preferring to poach
trained workers from other firms, thus depressing the amount of training
offered.
Globalisation The notion that national economies are increasingly inter¬
related and that international competitiveness has become centrally
important to economic performance.
Group Rights A phrase used by the National Party to mean the
preservation of white privilege in any new dispensation.
High Skill Equilibrium A self-reinforcing range of institutions, structures
and practices that cause a particular economy to have a predominance of
high skill employment. See Low Skill Equilibrium.
Industrial Education A model of education developed in the Southern
states of the USA in the late nineteenth century based on the assumption
that African Americans would benefit from a predominantly practical
rather than academic education.
Influx Control Policies designed to limit the number of Africans entering
urban South Africa.
Integrated Approach A model of education and training integration in
which sub-systems retain a large degree of autonomy but are subject to an
overall set of guiding principles. See Integrated System, Unified
Education and Training System.
Integrated System A model of education and training in which the
different sub-systems are considered to be only relevant as modes of
delivery within a strongly convergent overall system. See Integrated
Approach, Unified Education and Training System.
Job Reservation The limitation of certain jobs to members of particular
racial groups. See Colour Bar, Scheduled Person.
Just-in-Time A model of production in which buffer stocks are
eliminated at both ends of the process. This means that work is
intensified and kept at a constant high pace. See Work Intensification.
Lean Production A means of production in which more output is
achieved in less time and with less resources. Also used here to denote a
Meta-Narrative which represents the Neo-Fordist ideological position.
See Fast Capitalism.
Legitimation Crisis A situation in which the state has lost the support or
obedience of the bulk of the populace.
Low Skill Equilibrium A self-reinforcing range of institutions, structures
and practices that cause a particular economy to have a predominance of
low skill employment. See High Skill Equilibrium.
Market-Oriented Meta-Narrative The Meta-Narrative stressing the pre¬
eminence of market forces in the allocation of resources. Those decisions
still resting with the state are held to be technical and value-free. See
Technicism, Technocratic Rationality.
Mature Fordism A position not reached in South Africa under the
National Party in which both the political and the economic logic of
Fordism are recognised. See Economic Fordism.
Meta-Narrative An over-arching storyline which draws together the
arguments of a series of individual discourses in a relatively coherent
manner. See Discourse.
Ministry of Education This refers to the Minister, Deputy-Minister and
their special advisors. Such advisors are not civil servants but are
employed as consultants to the Ministerial office holders. See
Department of Education.
Mode of Regulation An inter-related series of institutions and structures
which shape economic and political practices. See Regime of
Accumulation.
Multi-Skilling The increasing of a worker's responsibility and range of
activities through the accretion of additional skilled tasks. A multi-
skilled worker would maintain the level of self-direction of the artisan.
See Multi-Tasking.
Multi-Tasking The increasing of a worker's range of tasks to include low
skilled tasks such as cleaning of the work area or other non-artisanal
activities as directed by superiors. See Multi-Skilling, Work
Intensification.
Native The term officially used to refer to the African element of the
population before the 1950s. See Bantu, Black.
Neo-Fordism A mode of economic and political organisation which seeks
to respond to the crisis of Fordism through the adoption of more flexible
production and marketing techniques but in which control of the
production process and profit allocation remains firmly in the hands of
the employers. See Fast Capitalism, Lean Production, New Times, Post-
Fordism.
New Improved Vocationalism An emergent model of educational
provision in which the mass system of delivery is organised around the
interests of industry through the use of competencies and an integration
of education and training in which training philosophies predominate.
In such a model, the elite system is private and largely aloof from such
pressures. See New Vocationalism, Vocationalism.
New Times The term used here for a Meta-Narrative based in a Post-
Fordist vision of an economic and political system. This replaces the
mass modes of organisation of Fordism with more diverse and niched
systems in which class conflict in the economy and politics has been
overcome. See Fast Capitalism, Lean Production, Neo-Fordism, Post-
Fordism.
New Vocationalism An educational trend which emerged in England in
the late 1970s and which entered South Africa soon after. It stressed the
need to make the school more relevant to the economy and the
importance of vocationally oriented subjects but did not envisage the
abandonment of the education-training division. See New Improved
Vocationalism, Vocationalism.
Old Commonwealth Great Britain and the countries which were settled
by large populations of English speakers and which had Dominion status
in the early twentieth century: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
South Africa.
Paid Education and Training Leave The right of workers, enshrined in
ILO Resolution 140, to attend relevant education and training courses
during work time and whilst being paid to be at work.
People's Education A movement arising in South Africa in the 1980s
which called for a transformation of education. Here used to refer also to
a Meta-Narrative extolling the chief elements of the People's Education
message.
Portability Used in the National Training Strategy Initiative to denote the
degree of ease of movement within a sub-system of education and
training. However, it is more commonly used to refer to all horizontal
movement across both within and between sub-systems, thus
incorporating Articulation. See Progression.
Post-Fordism Used to denote a Regime of Accumulation in which a social
democratic model of economics, politics and society emerges out of the
demise of Fordism. However, the term is also used by some to denote
any model which moves beyond Fordism and thus can be taken to
subsume Neo-Fordism. See New Times.
Pre-Fordism Used here to refer to the structure of the South African
polity prior to the Second World War in which the country had yet to
adopt the logic of mass production and mass consumption across even
the bulk of the white population. See Fordism.
Progression A measure of the ease of movement vertically through
education and training sub-systems. See Articulation, Portability.
Racial Fordism The adaptation of Fordism to South African conditions by
the Nationalist Party after 1948 which sought to limit mass production
and mass consumption to the white population.
Recognition of Prior Learning A method of accrediting learning achieved
by an individual before entrance to a programme of study or to
employment. Typically, but not exclusively, taken to mean informal
learning.
Regime of Accumulation A Mode of Regulation which has achieved
dominance over rival modes in a particular country. Racial Fordism can
be thought to have been such a regime in the 1950s whilst there is no
obvious regime presently.
Scheduled Person A person whose racial classification allows them to
become employed in a reserved job. See Colour Bar, Job Reservation.
Skill-Training-Grade-Wage Nexus The model, pioneered by COSATU,
which views an individual's skill level, training needs and history,
appropriate grade and wage level as tightly inter-connected.
Strategic Unionism An approach proposed by elements of COSATU in
the early 1990s by which trade unions would seek to cooperate more
closely with a future ANC government and employers in order to
develop Post-Fordism. See Corporatism.
Taylorism A mode of training and work organisation intimately
associated with Fordism in which tasks are divided up into simple,
repetitive elements allowing for the minimum of worker intelligence
and self-direction.
Technicism The tendency, associated with the Market-Oriented Meta-
Narrative, to use large number of commissions comprised of experts in
the policy making process. See Technocratic Rationality.
Technocratic Rationality The mode of reasoning under a Market-
Oriented approach which treats all governmental decisions as purely
technical and value-free exercises. See Technicism.
Total Strategy A policy under the Botha government (1978-89) which
sought to use all aspects of daily life and culture as well as external
propaganda and military force to defeat the ANC.
Unified Education and Training System A model in which divisions
between education and training are eradicated and both form part of a
new system. See Integrated Approach, Integrated System.
Vocationalism A mode of education provision in which a number of
technical schools are established in order to provide vocational
preparation for skilled work within the school system. See New
Improved Vocationalism, New Vocationalism.
Work Intensification The increasing of the pace of work and the accretion




THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
Education and training reform is at the centre of the political agenda
internationally. This is particularly true in South Africa. Prior to the
withdrawal of the National Party (NP) from the Government of National
Unity (GNU), Renier Schoeman, the then Deputy-Minister of Education,
had stood out from his NP colleagues in Cabinet as a result of his public
clashes with his minister, Sibusiso Bengu. One of the most contested
elements of the new constitution proposed in May 1996 was the issue of
educational medium of instruction. Even prior to this, both Gauteng
Province and national education policy had been the subject of appeals to
the constitutional court system. The opening of universities in both of
the years since the 1994 elections has been accompanied by student and
staff protests, occasionally turning to rioting and in June 1996 another
spate of unrest hit universities, technikons and teachers' colleges. The
return to school in 1996 saw political, physical and legal conflict as a small
number of Afrikaans-medium schools continue to try to block
admissions of African pupils.1
1 In the time-honoured fashion of writing on South Africa it is necessary to explain the
usage of racial terms, which are still necessary regardless of questions of their broader
validity. I will use African, white, Indian and coloured as the preferred terms to refer to
the four principal groupings in South Africa. Black will be used to refer to "peoples of
colour" collectively. Other terms have been used historically in South Africa, such as
Bantu, Native and Kaffir. These are used here within the context of their contemporary
discourses.
The international and local focus on education and training as a key site
of political struggle arises out of three claims that are conventionally
made about or for education and, to a lesser extent, training. First,
education and training are seen as central to the economic
competitiveness of nations. The belief in links between education and
training and skills and productivity is a long-standing one.2
However, this has become sharpened in recent years due to the
prevalence of notions of globalization. These operate in a dual manner.
On the one hand, the argument that national economies are increasingly
linked into a global economy, characterized by increased competition in
both domestic and foreign markets, leads to a heightened concern with
themes such as skill and productivity. On the other, the belief that
technological change within this global economy is increasingly rapid
leads to a stress on human skills as the most central to national
competitive advantage (Reich 1991). Education and training therefore
become ever more important.
These concerns can be seen to be operating in South Africa. In a
relatively fragile and grossly unequal economy such as South Africa's,
strong economic growth is identified as a necessary element of
redistribution and poverty alleviation. South Africa also has been
heavily influenced by two sets of countries. On the one hand, South
Africa's industrial policy pays reference to the East Asian "tigers" and sees
the challenge in terms of catching up with these strongly growing and
industrializing economies. On the other, white South Africa still sees the
2 However, this was certainly not a linkage that was held to be self-evident in Britain
during the 19th century. Indeed, in the first industrial nation there was a widely-held
belief in the negative effects of education on commerce and industry (Wiener 1980; Barnett
1985). This of course has come down to the present day as a concern about inappropriate
forms of education: a theme that will recur throughout this thesis.
"Old Commonwealth" countries: Australia, New Zealand, Scotland3,
England and to a lesser extent, Canada, as its principal cultural reference
points. As we shall see shortly, elements of South African education and
training policy can be viewed as part of a broader Old Commonwealth
trend.
The second claim commonly made for education is that it is a central
device in the development and protection of cultures. The link between
education and the need to develop national cultures of course has been a
fundamental theme of education across Africa since independence. In
South Africa too the perceived link between education and culture has
been apparent throughout the history of education policy. British
governors such as Somerset and Milner saw Anglicization through the
schools as the way to bring Afrikaners under closer state control. Equally,
Christian National Education arose out of Afrikaner attempts to resist
this continuing legacy and to protect and develop their own culture,
language and religion. Missionary and Bantu Education can be seen at
their heart as schemes to use education to shape indigenous cultures.
This theme of education and culture remains at the root of many of the
current educational contestations in South Africa. All three major
political parties have strong and conflicting views about the ideal
education for the ideal culture and some of the current disputes on this
terrain have already been mentioned above.
3 When considering South Africa's historical and continuing ties with Britain it is very
important to note the distinct Scottish influence. Although for a century South Africa was
governed in the final instance from London, in education, as in law and religion, the system
reflects the often more pervasive impacts of Scots missionaries, teachers and
administrators.
The third central claim regarding education, and increasingly training
too, is that it is a basic human right. In South Africa this has particular
resonance given the legacy of the Apartheid system which systematically
denied this right to large sections of the population on racial grounds.
That denial was not simply passively endured at the grassroots level but
was responded to in a variety of ways in the 46 years of National Party
rule and before. Moreover, the aspirations created by educational
deprivation are also an important factor in current political debates.
What then is the importance of studying the South African education
and training system? Firstly, and most crucially, it is related to the
centrality of that system to the more than 40 million people engaged in a
variety of ways with creating their new South Africa.
The significance of South African policy extends beyond national
boundaries, however. South Africa is a regional and continental force, in
economic, military and political terms. The success or failure of South
African policies thus has likely impacts across Africa (Adedeji 1996).
Finally, South African policy on education and training does show strong
resonances with those of other Old Commonwealth countries,
particularly with regard to this thesis's concern with the interfaces
between education and training, and learning and work. New Zealand
has undergone the most thorough policy implementation in this regard;
Scotland, Australia and England are following broadly similar paths.
South African policy successes and failures, therefore, also have potential
implications for those countries.
5
RESEARCH CONCERNS
The above considerations lead on to a series of research questions that
will be addressed in the course of an exploration of South African
education and training policy from 1976 to 1996, but particularly from the
establishment of the Government of National Unity in May 1994 to the
withdrawal of the National Party from the GNU in May 1996.4
When considering the historical development of education and training
in South Africa between 1976 and 1994 two principal questions emerge.
First, what was the nature of the evolving policy discourse of this period?
Second, what were the origins, both local and global, of this evolving
debate?
Moving on to the two years between the April 1994 elections and the NP
quitting of the GNU, similar concerns are at the heart of the research task.
First, it is important to consider what model of education and training
appears to be evolving for post-Apartheid South Africa. Second, the
factors which explain this emergence must be analysed.
Subsequent to these core concerns, which respond directly to the data
gathered, a series of further questions will be briefly addressed which
reflect back to the discussion above. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of the emergent model? What are the longer term
prospects for the proposed integration of education and training in South
Africa? What alternatives, if any, are likely to emerge at the level of
4 Deciding upon a cut-off point for research with a contemporary focus is difficult,
particularly when there are such rapid changes occurring. I have decided to make the
date of the announcement of the National Party withdrawal from government (9th May
1996) the end-point of this study. This closes a particular chapter in the development of
the South African political system. It also neatly marks two years of post-election
developments in education and training policy ending with the replacement of Renier
Schoeman as Deputy Minister of Education by Smangaliso Mkhatshwa.
policy discourse? What does the experience of South Africa to date
suggest for other Old Commonwealth countries embarked on similar
programme?
Finally, a series of more research-oriented issues will also be addressed. I
will seek to explore what this research tells us about the principal policy
research challenges for the future, at the theoretical and methodological
levels, and in terms of appropriate subjects for research. Before these
issues can be considered, however, a better grasp of what is meant by
policy in this thesis is required.
RESEARCHING POLICY
One of the more striking insights gained from the literature reviews that
underpin this thesis is that for all the thousands of pages written about
education policy, there are very few sentences, let alone paragraphs,
which address the question of what is meant by "Policy". Indeed, it is
typical to find authors launching into long discussions of a particular
policy without ever considering what policy is at the meta-level.
In this thesis I will follow the lead of Britain's principal policy-
sociologists of education in seeing policy as "a set of claims about how the
world should and might be, a matter of 'authoritative allocation of
values'" (Bowe, Ball and Gold 1992: 13).
Such a view of policy highlights two major generic research questions.
First, whose values are authenticated by education (and training) policy?
Second, what ideal picture of education (and training) is being projected
by the policies under study (Ball 1990)?
There has been a long-standing tension in policy research regarding the
question of whether the relevant focus should be on policy-as-
pronouncement or policy-as-practice (Samoff 1995). In the first view,
policy studies should focus on things such as policy statements and
documents, e.g. acts of parliament, rather than on the form the policy
takes when implemented, as in the second view.
The viewing of policy documents as ideological tracts in need of decoding
(Codd 1988) places this thesis firmly within the critical (rather than
functionalist) part of the first camp. Such a location is justified by the
timing of the research (1993-6) in relationship to the post-Apartheid
policy cycle. Given the enormous challenge of restructuring the
Apartheid education bureaucracy, there is still relatively little that can be
said about policy-as-practice two years after the first democratic elections
in South Africa.
If we follow Badat (1991) in seeing policy as a circular process, then the




(after Badat 1991: 21)
In the subsequent discussions of this thesis the focus will be on the stages
from the setting of a policy agenda to the adoption of a particular policy
position. However, as policy is being treated as an iterative process over
an historical period of twenty years, it is of course the case the way in
which earlier policies have been implemented and evaluated does feed
back into such concerns, as the diagram illustrates.
The focus on the ideological domain of policy research, as intended here,
conventionally has resulted in a case study approach in the British
Sociology of Education tradition. One significant exception, however, has
been that of Ball's Politics and Policy Making in Education (1990) which
used a stronger focus on discourses explored through the medium of
interviews with elite stakeholders. A similar approach will, in part, be
followed by this thesis, particularly in its exploration of education and
training policy discourse in the first two years after the 1994 elections.
However, this study is far more grounded in an historical context than
Ball's work. This has resulted in a far greater emphasis on policy
documents as texts to be decoded. Whilst there will be use of both
documents and interviews for the period 1994-6, for the years between
1976 and 1994 the primary focus will be on policy documents.
Much of the critical policy research of education and training in the Old
Commonwealth countries has traditionally been couched in terms of
Marxist political economy.5 By coincidence, the seminal text in this
regard was published in the year with which this study starts (Bowles and
Gintis 1976). Since then there has been considerable effort, not always
successful, to move beyond the rather determinist constraints of the
correspondence theory6 model Bowles and Gintis provided and to
5 However, in international education research there has also been an important strand of
research arising out of historical methodology, e.g. King (1971).
6 In essence correspondence theory argues that the capitalist education system, as part of
the superstructure, is shaped by the economic base in such a way as to reproduce the
capitalist system. In this process the hidden curriculum is as important as the official
curriculum in shaping attitudes and reinforcing class locations. As Willis (1977) shows,
develop positions which take account of factors beyond simple class
locations.
Authors such as Apple in America and Dale in England (and latterly New
Zealand) have shown that the state is not simply a tool of capital and that,
indeed, there is no such thing as the position of capital, labour, etc. (e.g.
Apple 1989; Dale 1989). The use of discourse and meta-narrative in this
thesis is a way of building upon these insights to move beyond the
conventional political economy approach of the left. It builds upon
Apple's arguments that external ideological pressures shaping what can
be said and thought operate both alongside and across materially-based
class positions (Apple 1989). Although class positions strongly influence
which ideological positions are adopted by individuals and how those
individuals mediate them, they do not determine how individuals
respond to prevailing ideological currents.
Therefore, the study in this thesis of the ideological positions presented
by individuals and texts is rooted both in personal, organizational and
class positions and struggles on the one hand and in the impacts of
external ideological trends upon local realities on the other. By focusing
primarily on what in educational policy research terms is the uncharted
methodology of critical hermeneutics7, rather than on the well-mapped
path of political economy, this thesis hopes to illustrate elements of the
even in rebelling against the system, working-class youths come to reproduce their
inherited class positions.
7 Thompson (1981) uses the term critical hermeneutics to describe his attempt to bring
together the philosophical positions of Ricoeur and Habermas. When he talks about the
methodological implications of this synthesis he prefers the term depth hermeneutics, as
we shall see subsequently. I have chosen the former term to refer to an approach which
shares the hermeneutical concern with interpretation through contextualisation but
which allies this to a social science-derived preoccupation with notions such as power
which are absent from the mainstream hermeneutical concern with symbolic forms.
policy process which otherwise would remain opaque to a more
traditional mode of study.
Generating a Reading
At this point it is necessary to clarify two key technical terms that I will
employ in this analysis of ideological positions. The term discourse is
used to signify an ideological story-line that emerges from a particular
text or group of related texts, e.g. an edited collection.8 The second key
term used is meta-narrative. This refers to over-arching ideological
patterns which exist both within and beyond individual documents and
discourses. The discourse found in a particular text may reflect one meta-
narrative in particular but will often be built up from elements of
different meta-narratives.
Whilst I am concerned to explore discourses I wish to move beyond the
methodology of discourse analysis which carries connotations of a Post-
Modernist ultra-relativism. Equally, I have no intention of producing
causal explanations which deny the multiplicity of possible readings of
the discourses and meta-narratives encountered and instead impose a
singular narrative as the only possible reading. Rather, whilst
acknowledging the multiplicity of possible meanings, I will seek to
provide the reading of the data which appears to be the most plausible
and analytically robust. As Thompson argues:
while a text may allow of several interpretations, it does
not follow that all of these interpretations are of equal
8 This could of course lead on to a discussion of what constitutes a text. This would
however be rather tangential to the concerns of this thesis for which such a common-sense
definition suffices. Anyone wishing to explore that issue further could consider Foucault
(1972) as a starting point.
status; and the elimination of inferior interpretations is
not an empirical matter of verification and proof, but a
rational process of argumentation and debate.
(Thompson 1981: 53)
In Thompson's view, such a process of argumentation and debate, which
he terms "depth hermeneutics", requires a three-fold analytical process,
the stages being conceptually rather than sequentially distinct. First,
socio-historical analysis must be carried out in order to locate the
discourses spoken by texts in their specific social, intellectual and
historical contexts. Second, discourse analysis is required to explore the
plausible meanings of the texts being considered. Third, interpretation
and re-interpretation take place in order to move beyond deconstruction
towards an analytical synthesis (Thompson 1990).
Through what I term critical hermeneutics, I will follow a broadly
congruent approach to that of Thompson. However, the decoding of texts
will be in a manner that goes beyond the literary model of discourse
analysis with its focus on symbolic forms. Furthermore, I prefer to see
the three elements of the analytical process as being repeated in a spiral as
readings of socio-historical context, text and synthesis build up iteratively
towards the goals of greater plausibility and rigour.
Socio-Historical Context
The first element of this analysis is central to the contribution of this
thesis. The principal reasons for the study are to understand the present
and to develop a way of conceptualizing the future. Nonetheless, there is
a danger in sociological studies that they freeze reality in a snap shot of a
particular moment in time. This is perhaps impossible to avoid totally.
An historical focus helps to stress the passage of time during the policy
process. Without such a focus, many of the more subtle but vital shifts in
policy can be lost.
A history of South African education and training is also crucial to the
study in a further way. As a transitional state, South Africa is particularly
influenced in its development of current policies by readings of the past.
By providing such a reading, this thesis seeks to provide a vital
dimension absent from much of the contemporary analysis of South
African education and training policy.
An historical focus, grounded as it is in a reading of the South African
past, also provides an important balance to the second element of the
context explored in the thesis: the intellectual. This thesis is not an
attempt to produce an intellectual history of South African education and
training, nor is it concerned with developing a comprehensive story of
the influences which international intellectual trends have had on South
African thinking. However, both these accounts will be drawn upon
throughout the thesis. They are important resources as they stress the
need to see policy as a response to beliefs as well as events.
The critical hermeneutical approach this thesis adopts is grounded in the
contention that the creation of a plausible reading is founded on the
exploration of meta-narratives which both inform and are constructed
from the discourses to be found in texts such as policy reports. These
meta-narratives are used throughout the thesis as heuristic devices
which permit better analytical purchase on what might otherwise quickly
become a morass of documents and interviews, each presenting a
somewhat different perspective.
The meta-narratives exist as ideal types9 which are not perfectly recreated
by any individual text. Rather, they are indicative of trends and
emphases within individual discourses. Furthermore, as intellectual
trends they are largely globalized. That is to say, they are influenced by
formulations from outside South Africa as well as from inside. Indeed,
given the relatively recent emergence in South Africa of some of the
ideas explored, much of the outlining of the nature of these meta-
narratives in the thesis has necessarily relied on the more extensive
literatures of the Old Commonwealth countries and elsewhere.
The exact degree of influence of such meta-narratives and international
versions of them is very difficult to prove. Even citation of a particular
source begs the question of whether it is being used in a way that appears
in keeping with a particular meta-narrative. It is far more typical to come
across an argument that may appear reminiscent of a particular text
without any citation. It is not the concern of the thesis to prove or
disprove such influences. Rather, resemblances to external texts and
arguments are taken as an indicator of the intellectual context within
which a particular piece of data can best be understood. Thus, the many
references to external arguments have a heuristic intent.
External texts and intellectual trends were constructed in different local
contexts than those which pertain in South Africa. Therefore, there is a
danger in reading these accounts into South Africa in an uncritical
manner. As noted earlier, it is the dual use of the historical and the
9 The notion of ideal types derives from the work of Max Weber (e.g. 1968). Weber's
argument in essence appears to be that there are certain concepts which have a general
form but which describe phenomena that do not have all their characteristics strictly in
common. For example, it is possible to have a concept of bureaucracy, which is useful in
analysing the operations of various governments but which does not perfectly capture all
the characteristics of any single case nor imply that all cases are perfectly identical.
intellectual context which helps to reduce this danger, bringing together
as it does the global and the local, the real and the constructed.
Textual Analysis
The second element in the generation of a reading is the analysis of the
data itself. In order to produce a plausible reading I have employed two
major types of data resource. First, I have made use of a series of texts,
primarily the findings of official commissions and other policy-related
documents. Second, I have made use of interviews and comments by a
variety of individuals.
The use of texts raises a number of methodological issues. Their selection
was not a question of collection of all possibly relevant data nor of
construction of a random sample. These techniques are simply not
relevant to such a study. In reality selection was shaped by both choice
and circumstance.
First, decisions regarding relevance, arising both out of reading the texts
and the contextualization process, discussed earlier, led to the privileging
of some texts over others. Thus, as the research developed and the
spiralling of the three stages of analysis progressed, the exploration of
some texts was dropped from the thesis and that of others included.
Second, it would probably be impossible to know either the whole list of
relevant texts or to acquire access to them. Thus, selection was also
dependent on the availability of texts. As Scott (1990) reminds us, it is
impossible to be certain how representative a collection of texts really is.
Those documents acquired may have become available to the researcher
by chance. This is difficult to ascertain in a situation in which many were
in fact acquired second-hand through resource centres, as is the case here.
Equally, there is generally no way of knowing conclusively whether the
documents considered are the most important or the least sensitive.
This is of course the case with much of the grey material acquired, both
via secondary sources and direct from organizations contacted. However,
most of the key documents considered in this thesis are official reports in
the public domain to which such arguments do not apply. Moreover,
through the use of official, publicly available documents, grey material
and secondary accounts, it is possible to produce a plausible reading,
notwithstanding any such problems.
The reading of texts, even recent ones, brings the further danger that an
inappropriate present reading is being placed on a text from the past.
This, however, is a danger the contextualization process is designed to
address. Moreover, some cross-checking was possible through interviews
and conversations with several of the authors of texts considered in the
thesis. Nonetheless, such cross-referencing in itself does not totally solve
the problem of being ahistorical as individuals are prone to both selective
and defective memory.
These problems make textual analysis difficult. However, it remains a
vital analytical tool. In the context of research on South African
education and training policy there is quite a large and respectable
tradition of textual analysis (e.g. Buckland 1982; Kraak 1993b; Christie
1994). However, there are large gaps in this research field which I am
seeking to fill in.
Such analysis hitherto has been almost entirely of education policy rather
than training policy, Kraak's (1993b) consideration of the National
Training Strategy report being a rare exception. Given the focus on
vocationalism in the 1980s and the recent preoccupation with the
integration of education and training policy, it is essential that a reading
of major training policy documents be attempted, as is the case in this
thesis. Moreover, the reluctance of intellectuals from the left to engage
with official documents in the 1980s, lest they be accused of giving them
legitimacy (Bennell et al. 1992), has resulted in a large gap in historical
analysis. Thus, for the Wiehahn Report in Chapter Three I can find no
evidence of any critical analysis from an education and training
perspective.
Even in the case of African National Congress (ANC)-aligned documents
there has been little analysis. For instance, the documents through which
the policy of integrating education and training was developed, as far as I
am aware, have not yet been submitted to a critical and dynamic
reading.10
Textual analysis is also used to refer to utterances and even acts (Bleicher
1980). Here I will use it as referring both to the documents explored
above and to a series of interviews and discussions held in South Africa
during 1995.
The first element of these oral texts is a series of 40 interviews conducted
with individuals employed in stakeholder organizations or key projects.
These included the national Departments of Education and Labour; the
National Training Board and a number of Industry Training Boards; a
10 Kraak (1993b) refers to them but uses them to develop a composite picture of ANC-
COSATU policy rather then treating them sequentially in order to critique that policy.
provincial education department and a Presidential Lead Project;
representatives of federations of labour and capital, and of individual
companies and trade unions.
Again, issues of representativeness arise. Selection was based upon
notions of which organizations, and in some cases individuals, were
important in shaping policy. Such a process is of course subjective. It was
also influenced by the comments of others, both academics and some of
those interviewed, who made suggestions as to suitable informants.
Often eloquence rather than influence appeared to be behind
recommendations.
Unwillingness to be interviewed can also affect representativeness.
Three of those approached were not interviewed. In each case this was
the result of an arranged meeting being cancelled and an alternative time
proving impossible to arrange. In two cases some evidence of the
individual's viewpoint could in any case be constructed from documents
they had written.11
The reliability of data gathered from interviews is also often subjected to
criticism. The interviews were designed to be semi-structured, based
around the contextual understanding already gleaned, and there was no
attempt to ensure that data from different interviews was perfectly
comparable. In reality the structure of each interview depended on a
variety of factors, such as time available, location, personality and areas of
interest and expertise. Data gathered at one interview helped to shape
subsequent interviews, thus providing some degree of cross-checking.
11 The exception was the training officer of the National Council of Trade Unions
(NACTU).
This is in part a response to the other major question to be asked of such a
technique: can the data collected be trusted? The validity of data given by
interviewees is difficult to establish and this is especially the case with
elite respondents, more skilled at dominating interviews. However,
these interviews were intended to explore discourses not facts and are less
prone, though not immune, to such problems. As with the documentary
analysis, such an approach precludes scientific proofs, but it does facilitate
the production of a complex and sophisticated reading.
The concern with discourses rather than with more concrete data also
makes it less important to consider whether those interviewed are
speaking as individuals or as representatives of their organizations. This,
however, is a question which needs to be kept in mind when the focus is
on explaining rather than analysing shifts within and between the meta-
narratives.
At certain points in the text some individuals appear to loom large. The
focus on meta-narrative also makes the question of whether these
individuals gain their influence from individual charisma or
organizational authority relatively unimportant. Equally, it does not
lend itself to a great person view of history and the references to
individuals should not be read in such a way. As with the choice of
documents examined, the focus on individuals is essentially a heuristic
aid to telling the overall story.
In addition to the interviews with stakeholder representatives, oral data
was also gathered from a variety of other commentators, largely from
academia and journalism. Some of the former group have also been
involved directly in the policy process as consultants and task team
members. However, here they were reflecting primarily on the broader
picture as commentators. The nature of these interactions was
particularly varied. Some were fairly formal interviews; others were
spread over a number of occasions and organized around social
interactions such as coffee or dinner.
The data collected cannot be viewed as scientifically rigorous.
Nevertheless, the wealth and variety of information gathered permits
great insight into the topic being considered and provides a rich resource
for the generation of a plausible and arguably unique reading through the
use of meta-narratives. It is the creation of such a reading through a
hermeneutical process and its heuristic power that is at the heart of the
methodological approach of this thesis.
Synthesis
The reading generated is shaped then by historical, ideological and textual
elements which have been woven together to provide an overall account
of shifts in education and training policy. The relationship between these
three elements is complex and influences do not simply run mono-
directionally. Just as a reading of the historical context, for instance,
shapes the understanding of a particular text, so the understanding of that
text can itself shape the reading of the historical context. Neither element
of analysis is sufficient in itself for the generation of a plausible reading.
As already noted the methodology employed here is quite unusual for a
work of educational sociology. Equally, the use of education and training
documents is also rare. Nonetheless, the thesis is more in keeping with
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convention, in Britain at least, in its treatment of the balance between
providing critique and policy intervention.
Critique and Policy
The focus throughout the thesis will be on laying bare the ideological
underpinnings of policy-as-pronouncement in its various manifestations
during the period being studied. There has been something of a rush
away from such critique in South African education and training circles
in the context of the very pressing needs of the present to construct policy.
It is true that South Africa has a massive negative legacy in education and
training which necessitates prompt remedial and transformatory action.
However, it is equally true that such action must be based on a thorough
understanding of the realities and possibilities of past, present and future.
Moreover, in so far as South Africa is a society pledged to participatory
and transparent governance, it is essential that a vibrant and informed
debate on policy takes place. This thesis is intended to be a contribution
to these vital processes through the provision of important analysis with
which to inform the debate.
A consideration of the current stage of education and training policy
development in South Africa also reinforces the need to focus on doing
critique. As policy moves increasingly into the implementational phase,
and as that leads to greater interaction between policy-as-pronouncement
and policy-as-practice, so the contours of policy will be re-formed. That
will be the moment at which broad participation in policy and practice
development will be most vital. However, even then there will continue
to be an important role for the exploration of meta-narratives and other
tools of critique.
Before proceeding to consider the organization of the thesis, there is one
further issue that must be referred to. The use of meta-narratives as a
heuristic device and the selection of the documents and interviews as
data sources leads to considerable selectivity of both themes and voices in
the rest of the thesis. Together the documents and interviews reflect the
voices of the powerful in South African society: employers, bureaucrats,
politicians, and, relatively speaking in the context of that particular
society, trade unionists.
Conversely the voices of rural, female, informal sector and disabled
populations, to name but four, often overlapping, groupings are rarely
present. Moreover, teachers, parents and pupils: three groups of
traditional subjects and/or objects of research in the sociology of
education, are likewise excluded, a function of their relative
unimportance for policy-as-pronouncement.12
Any attempt to get at policy-as-pronouncement inevitably brings the
researcher towards the major documents, such as official commissions,
explored in the subsequent chapters. Equally, in the context of a study of
the post-election period, it necessitated the focusing of interviews on
those stakeholders who, through their positions of power and influence,
have most impact on the emergent policy debate.
12 Such an absence is necessary for the focus of this thesis. However, as Chapter Six will




As was already noted (page 13), this thesis makes considerable use of the
international debates which the specific debate of South Africa is a part of.
The intention, however, is not to produce a work of comparative
educational analysis, although some consideration of cross-national
issues will be provided in the final chapter. Rather, the intention is to
point to the importance of international trends (as well as local realities)
in shaping the dynamics of the South African policy debate.
As these international influences appear at various points in the text, it is
perhaps worth foregrounding them here in order to provide a sense of
their range. As will be noted in Chapter Two, the South African
education and training systems were influenced by external systems from
the first. White education and training bore the imprint of British
practice, a Scottish influence being particularly apparent in the education
sphere. African education too showed external influences as a result of
the vital missionary role in early formal education developments. In the
first half of the Twentieth Century American influences became
particularly important in the system of African education. As Chapter
Two again indicates, this came through the general influence of the
American model of industrial education, but more specifically through
the role of Charles Loram and the Phelps-Stokes Commission in
spreading knowledge of such a model.
The period of the National Party ascendancy resulted in increasing, but
never complete, South African isolation from the rest of the world. In
education and training policy too there was a strong sense in which
South African policy sought to ignore the lessons of international
developments. The crisis of the early to mid 1970s (discussed in Chapters
Two and Three), however, brought education policy in particular back
into a closer relationship with international trends, albeit in a uniquely
South African way. Large elements of the de Lange Report (1981),
discussed at length in Chapter Three, reflected on the one hand the donor
fascination with non-formal education and, on the other, the English
stress on policies of New Vocationalism (see page xiv). Official education
policy thus looked to both the developed and the developing world for
models to draw upon.
Oppositional thinking too was influenced by external debates. Academics
drew extensively on Northern critiques of capitalist education and
training whilst activists looked to Latin America in particular for
alternative practices.
As Chapter Four indicates, in the 1990s borrowing continued apace with
new Northern developments on the left in the light of the collapse of
state socialism, and industrial responses to the crisis of the 1970s and
1980s, also beginning to shape policy formulations in the run up to the
1994 elections. With the current plethora of international donor visits to
South Africa and international fact-finding missions from Pretoria, such
international influences continue to be of importance, as Chapter Five
will indicate.
As is argued frequently in this thesis, those international influences with
which I am primarily concerned are caught up with notions of how the
education system can be altered or transformed in order to better reflect
the needs of the economy. As the above paragraphs illustrate, this was a
major concern of policy makers in the Old Commonwealth throughout
this period. In Britain, and particularly England, the "Great Debate" on
education-economy links is conventionally dated to 1976, the same year
as the Soweto Uprising. Emerging out of the crisis of Western European
Fordism of the early 1970s, this debate was concerned both to blame
education for economic failings and to look to education for solutions to
the collapse of the golden era of post-war affluence. Under the model of
New Vocationalism, an attempt was made to strengthen school-industry
links and to make education "more relevant".
In the 1980s, continued economic weakness across the Old
Commonwealth led to attempts by increasingly conservative
governments to strengthen still further the education-economy
relationship. By the end of the decade, competency-based approaches had
spread from training to further education and were beginning to
encroach into both secondary and higher education.
A more radical reading of the same problems was also emerging on the
political left in these same countries as the 1980s reached their close.
Perceiving a reorganisation of the economy from its previous Fordist
trajectory to a new Post-Fordist path, researchers and trade unionists, in
particular, began to develop notions of a unified education and training
system, which echoed some of the governmental concerns but had a
broader vision of learning.
As subsequent discussions in this thesis will show, these debates have
been central to the broader South African education and training policy
debate of the past two decades.
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THESIS STRUCTURE
As noted already, this thesis is concerned with the understanding of
current and future policy properly located in its historical context. This
contextualization will begin in Chapter Two which seeks to provide a
brief account of South African education and training policy over the last
one hundred years. Although historically focused, this chapter is not
intended to be a work of mainstream academic history; This is illustrated
in particular by two characteristics of the chapter. First, it will make some
use of primary sources but far less than would be expected in a historian's
account. Second, the intention is very explicitly that of using the past as a
heuristic device for understanding the present.
The chapter will focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the first
eighty of those hundred years, the last twenty being covered in far greater
detail in subsequent chapters. The concern will be to show the changing
nature of thinking at the level of policy about the proper form and focus
of education and training. Through it, important themes of subsequent
chapters, such as instrumentalism and vocationalism, and the
hermeneutical use of external meta-narratives will be introduced.
Chapter Three is vitally important as it marks the beginning of the
central methodological and heuristic task of the thesis: the detailed
analysis of policy documents. This chapter opens with the Soweto
Uprising of June 1976 and ends with the unbanning of the African
National Congress, and other organizations, in February 1990.
It charts the growing perception amongst sections of the Afrikaner elite,
mirroring longer held views of sections of English-speaking capital and
its allies, that Apartheid was an unworkable ideological system. The
reinforcement of such arguments by the international economic crisis of
the mid-1970s and the concomitant ideological concerns with
accumulation and legitimation crises will also be considered.
The South African response to the crisis of the mid-1970s came first in
training rather than education, and that will be where the first sustained
discourse analysis will be directed. The text in question will be the
Wiehahn Report, commissioned in 1977. At the start of the 1980s
attention shifted to education and the de Lange Report was
commissioned. This will be the second focus of this chapter. Its
exploration will chart the movement from contestation amongst the
stakeholder members of a highly politicized commission (Wiehahn) to
contestation between the technocratic views of a commission of experts
(de Lange) and the more politically concerned state. As well as this
beginning of technocratic policy making, exploration of the de Lange
Report will also introduce important themes related to the ever more
direct influence of industrial views on education policy debates.
The development of a new market-oriented meta-narrative, which was
to eventually bring together large sections of capital, technocrats and the
dominant group in the ruling party, continued through the 1980s and
will be explored further through three reports produced jointly by the
Human Sciences Research Council (the key organ of Afrikaner
technicism in the social sciences) and the National Training Board.
Through the developments from the Wiehahn Commission to the third
of these reports, the National Training Strategy, a powerful pro-market
account of education and training had emerged, which continues to have
major impacts and influences on the policy debate in the mid-1990s.
The 1980s also saw the emergence of a new and influential strand of
oppositional thinking regarding education. At the height of the state of
emergency and school boycotts of the mid-1980s when seizure of state
power appeared genuinely possible, the People's Education movement
appeared from black communities. This too will be explored as a central
intellectual and practical home of the second major meta-narrative
(which I term People's Education) present in current education and
training policy debates. Its concerns were with the transformation of
education, including radical notions of shifts towards greater access and
equity, democratic governance and curriculum overhaul.
Chapter Four considers the radically different climate of the 1990s,
transformed by the process of negotiations towards the elections of 1994
(the terminal point of the chapter), but also by changes in international
ideological trends associated primarily with the collapse of state socialism,
on the one hand, and the growth of globalization, on the other.
Although there was a new domestic and international political and
ideological climate, Chapter Four will also point to the continuities with
the past and the survival of the two meta-narratives introduced in
Chapter Three. The further evolution of the meta-narrative of the
market will be charted through an analysis of the major state policy
documents of the early 1990s: the Education Renewal Strategy and the
Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa, which further
developed vocationalist notions whilst greatly expanding the vision for
marketization of the education system, in ways parallel to trends in
countries such as England and New Zealand.
However, the period also saw the emergence of new meta-narratives.
The need for the ANC alliance to move towards policy rather than
critique resulted in the development of a vision (which I term New
Times13) which sought to transform education and training, industry and
the linkages amongst them and which claimed to offer a more thorough,
global reading of the crisis of the mid-1970s than previously provided.
Central to this account was a call for the integration of education and
training.
This new meta-narrative will be encountered initially in an exploration
of the National Education Policy Investigation, in which these new ideas
appeared alongside People's Education traditions in a process of
developing policy options.
This development of options naturally led into the creation of a tighter
policy agenda as the ANC sought to move towards manifesto positions.
The Post-Fordist credentials of this process will be considered through a
reading of a series of documents, several of which point to the emergence
at the centre of the policy stage of a new major player: the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
A fourth meta-narrative also emerged towards the election period as
elements of business began to re-work the Post-Fordist model to develop
a more business-friendly version of integration of education and training:
Lean Production. The origins of this will be considered before the four
13 There are several variants of Utopian Post-Fordism that could be selected as
emblematic. I have decided to choose New Times, the title of a book arising out of
attempts at the end of 1980s by the Communist Party of Great Britain to develop a post-
soviet model of an ideal future political economy. Perhaps the other most influential
version of Post-Fordism is the early account of Piore and Sabel (1984) which uses the term
Flexible Specialisation. This, however, is a model which is weaker in its focus on cultural
and political dimensions of Post-Fordism than on the economic domain.
meta-narratives are brought together for a reading of the crucial National
Training Strategy Initiative, the document that most clearly sets out the
education and training compromise that was envisaged for the
Government of National Unity.
In Chapter Five the focus changes from the past to the present, and,
subsequently, to a consideration of the probable future trajectory of
education and training. Whilst some documents such as the draft and
final versions of the Education and Training White Paper (Department of
National Education 1994; Department of Education 1995a) are important,
the principal data for this chapter comes from the series of stakeholder
interviews, supplemented by conversations and interviews with
academic and journalistic commentators. This chapter will show the
balance of power between the meta-narratives at the point at which the
National Party left the Government of National Unity and will suggest
ways of reading the new system so as to chart future developments.
Such future developments will be considered in Chapter Six. A concern
of this chapter will be with the crucial shift in the policy phase from a
focus on pronouncement towards the development of practice. The
implications of the evolving constitutional settlement regarding national
and provincial powers will also be dealt with here.
Such concerns lead naturally on to certain issues pertaining to further
research. Most notable here will be issues surrounding questions of
implementation and the likely growth of provincial educational studies
in South Africa in the late 1990s.
Finally, this chapter will also consider the lessons which the South
African attempt to integrate education and training provides for other
countries embarked upon such policies, for example Scotland,
countries contemplating them, as is the case for England and Wales.
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CHAPTER TWO
A CENTURY OF SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION AND
TRAINING
INTRODUCTION
The current and future dynamics of the South African education and
training system cannot be understood without a prior understanding of
that system's history. The centrality of this historical focus is reflected in
the essentially chronological structure of this thesis, as outlined in the
previous chapter. Chapters Three to Six are concerned with
developments in education and training policy over the past two decades.
In this chapter that focus will be broadened to consider the longer
trajectory of education and training in South Africa.
There are three reasons for embarking on such a survey in the context of
this thesis. First, just as the present cannot be understood without
reference to developments since 1976, so those developments themselves
must be put in a broader historical framework. Second, when the policy
documents and meta-narratives of the past two decades are discussed
subsequently, the prior development of a chronological frame of
reference will greatly assist the argument.
Third, there have been few contributions to the development of a critical
history of South African education and training since the volume
Apartheid and Education (Kallaway 1984a) over a decade ago. That was
produced in the context of a crisis in the Apartheid system. Today's
context is very different both politically and in terms of the focus on
viewing education and training collectively. The need to produce a new
history of education and training is as pressing as the need which has
already been noted in other areas of South African history (Beinart and
Dubow 1995a; Marks 1996). This chapter is intended to be a contribution
to the development of that new history of South African education and
training.
The framework of this chapter is shaped by the heuristic use of
Regulation Theory. This school of thought is concerned with viewing
the economic, political and social systems as being intimately interlinked
through an overall organizing principle, or mode of regulation (Boyer
1989). When one such mode is operating in a dominant manner, a
regime of accumulation is said to exist (ibid.). It is argued that for much
of the twentieth century the regime of accumulation across the
industrialized world was that of Fordism. Although mass production is a
central part of this notion, Fordism is far more than that. Under
Fordism, the mass production system was mutually reinforcing with a
system of mass consumption, built largely on the higher wages offered to
workers in compensation for submitting themselves to the working
practices of the assembly plant. In the political sphere, Fordism was also
associated with universal suffrage and national parties, largely
differentiated by their class positions.
This chapter postulates a number of variants to Fordism resulting out of
the particular dynamics of the South African political economy and a
variety of paths subsequent to the crisis of Fordism which began towards
the beginning of the 1970s. Before these are considered, it is necessary to
consider first what form the South African system took prior to Fordism.
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PRE-FORDISM AND SEGREGATION: BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD
WAR
For over half a century after Britain seized control of the Cape,1 the South
African economy remained largely insulated from the great tide of
industrialization in the metropole. This began to change in the second
half of the nineteenth century as the discovery of, first, diamonds and
then gold sparked the Mineral Revolution.
The new mining industries developed their own labour system. Large
numbers of skilled and experienced miners were imported from areas in
Britain such as Cornwall and Lanarkshire. Unskilled labour was
provided by Africans who were brought to the mines both from distant
areas of the four provinces and the broader region. These migrants were
seen as temporary and homogenous.
Although the balance was to shift towards a greater use of local white
labour, this essentially Pre-Fordist system of skilled white labour and
unskilled, short-contract African labour was to stand at the centre of work
organization in South Africa for decades to come.
The need for local white skilled labour soon became apparent as mining
and related industries expanded. The apprenticeship scheme of the Natal
Railways started in 1884 and spread to South African Railways by 1890
(HSRC/NTB 1984: 14; Behr 1988: 139). Tertiary level training of mine
engineers was instituted in Cape Town in 1894 (Behr 1988: 139). The
following year, technical/practical education for whites began to be
provided formally in schools (Behr 1988). The need for locally-produced
skilled white labour became even more pressing after 1914 when new
1 Captured from the Dutch 1795; ceded formally 1806.
supplies of British miners dried up. Whereas in 1914 Afrikaners made
up 40% of the white mine labour force, by the end of the First World War
they accounted for 75% (Rafel 1987: 267).
This replacement of highly skilled British miners with lower skilled but
still relatively expensive Afrikaners led mine owners to rethink the
efficacy of keeping Africans unskilled. This can be seen by their actions
after the First World War in attempting to overthrow the pre-war
codification of the colour bar, limiting certain occupations to whites. In
1920 the Native Recruiting Corporation, the internal recruiting agency of
the Chamber of Mines, argued for the training of some African workers
to semi-skilled positions and their eventual use to replace white workers
(Innes 1984).
In 1922 a concerted attempt was begun by the mines to substitute Africans
for whites, even in skilled jobs "reserved" for whites under the 1911
Mines and Works Act (Rafel 1987; Stadler 1987). The following year, Mr.
Hildick-Smith, the manager of Crown Mines, was taken to court by the
Department of Mines for allowing an African to drive an electric
locomotive underground. He was acquitted, the court ruling that job
reservation was ultra vires. This judgement was upheld on appeal by the
Supreme Court (Rafel 1987).
Tension between white mine management and white mine workers,
exacerbated by this attempt to subvert the colour bar, exploded soon after
into the bloody Rand Rising, during which the United Party (UP)
government used aeroplanes to bomb the defensive positions of the
white strikers.2 Although they quelled the rising, the government and
2 Although led by Afrikaners such as Smuts, the United Party was generally sympathetic
to the views of large, predominantly English-speaking big business.
the mine owners quickly lost any advantage so gained as the 1924
elections removed the UP government. In their place, the electorate
returned a coalition government with the mineworkers'-dominated
Labour Party as the junior partner of the Afrikaner-dominated National
Party.3 The scene was set for a retreat from the limited reformism of the
United Party since the end of the war.
The new government quickly began work on legislation that would
subvert the Hildick-Smith Judgement and reflect the views of the white
miners as an important political constituency. This resulted in the
Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926 which introduced the concept
of a "scheduled person": one permitted to carry out jobs reserved for
specified races. As well as whites, such persons included "Cape
Coloureds or Malays, Mauritian Creoles or St. Helenas (or their
descendants born in South Africa)" (cited in Rafel 1987: 269).4
The previous government had introduced the Apprenticeship Act in
1922. This did not specifically exclude Africans from apprenticeships.
However, few Africans had the necessary qualifications for entry (Lever
1986). The Apprenticeship Act's role in developing the colour bar was
strengthened by the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924. This legislated
for the registration of trade unions but excluded "pass bearing natives"
from the definition of employee (ibid.). The two acts, together with the
post-1924 political climate, gave white unions a strong representation on,
and considerable influence over, the Industrial and Apprenticeship
boards. This power was used to create de facto racially closed shops
(Lipton 1985).
3 This was largely anti-English and anti-big business.
4 All these "racial" groupings would normally be subsumed under the heading of coloured.
From 1924 the state also embarked upon a "civilized labour policy". This
gave whites preferential access to jobs, and higher wages for the same
work as other population groups. Statutory colour bars did not yet extend
to manufacturing and commerce. However, under the 1925 Customs
Tariff Act the benefits of protectionism were made subject to, inter alia,
"the employment of a reasonable number of civilized workers" (cited in
Lipton 1985: 19).
This policy must be seen in the context of the rapid urbanization of
Afrikaners and their difficulties in competing in the labour market
against either higher skilled and educated immigrants or cheaper
Africans. The need to address this issue became a huge political
imperative in the face of the emergence of the "poor white problem"
which resulted from the living conditions experienced by many of the
new Afrikaner city dwellers. Racist beliefs (see below) and political
necessity thus reinforced and extended a policy which was to set the
terrain for many of the political and economic contestations of the post-
Second World War era.
The response to the poor white problem operated in two ways. First,
African labour was consigned to cheap, unskilled work whilst white
labour was protected from competition for better skilled and paid jobs.
Second, a huge bureaucracy, staffed primarily by Afrikaners, was
developed as a job creation scheme of mammoth proportions.
This huge growth in urban, formal sector employment for whites
required a concomitant rise in the provision of vocational preparation.
In the second half of the 1920s alone, the post-secondary level saw six new
technical colleges for whites opened to add to those in Cape Town and
Durban (Chisholm 1992: 7). This expansion was linked to a focus on
improving the training of apprentices, a concern reflected in four pieces
of apprenticeship-related legislation between 1918 and 1930 (HSRC/NTB
1984)5
These economic and political trends also had major impacts on the
education and training of Africans. Prior to the Mineral Revolution,
what little formal education there was provided for Africans had come
from missionaries and was modelled on the European academic
curriculum. In the latter part of the nineteenth century this came to be
increasingly challenged by white South Africans who felt that it was
inappropriate for what they perceived to be the needs and aptitudes of
Africans. An alternative model of industrial education began to be
developed in a number of schools.6
The greatest popularity of this idea was in the 1920s. Towards the end of
the First World War the doctoral thesis of C. T. Loram, a young inspector
of native education in Natal, was published (Loram 1917).7 The
arguments of this thesis were also given powerful reinforcement by the
publication in 1922 of the report, Education in Africa (Phelps Stokes Fund
1922). This was the first of two hugely influential reports by the Fund in
the 1920s and was based on visits to a number of West and Southern
African countries by a group of experts in what constituted an appropriate
5 Regulation of Wages, Apprenticeships and Improvers Act (1918); Apprenticeship Act
(1922); Wages Act (1925); Apprenticeship Amendment Act (1930).
6 This was modelled on a version of education provision for Negroes in the Southern States
of the USA. For American industrial training and its broader influence on Africa, see King
(1971).
7 In 1918 he was promoted to Chief Inspector.
education for American Negroes and Africans.8 For the South African
leg of the Commission's tour, Loram was made a member.
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Both Loram and the Education in Africa report argued that the European
academic curriculum favoured by the missionaries should be adapted to
African needs. This adapted curriculum should be constructed around
the skills and knowledge essential to operate within African society.
Sanitation, home management and agricultural improvement would be
central elements of the new syllabus along with the most rudimentary
level of basic academic education.
Such notions were very much in keeping with a long-standing concern
amongst white South Africans, many of whom held that academic
education for Africans brought with it the potential problem of the
"educated kaffir":
apeing the European, they were yet without the manners or
the traditions of the white man. They had lost their own
tribal traditions and had not been able to replace them with
any others. Soon the term "an educated kaffir" stank in the
nostrils of the European. They were a tragic achievement.
(Pells 1938: 140)9
This notion of "educated kaffir" can be read as indicating a belief that
Africans were culturally backward rather than inherently racially inferior
in a biological sense. This is in essence the South African liberal position
of the time which sought a middle position between assimilation (as for
example in the Portuguese colonies) and the strict segregationist position
(the theoretical formulation of Apartheid) [Loram 1917; Dubow 1995].
Whilst such a notion would bring with it the long-term potential for
8 As with South African racial terms, Negroes is employed here simply to reflect a
contemporary usage.
9 Here it was clear that South Africa was paying little heed to earlier debates in the
Indian sub-continent on the subject of "native" education.
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uplift and even assimilation, it was the alleged current inferiority of
Africans that was stressed by Loram and many other liberals. In practice
their stance seemed to come close to the biological position they
criticized.10
This racialized notion of difference was reflected particularly sharply in
the skills component of industrial education. The technical skills offered
in Loram's vision were hardly industrial in the artisanal sense that we
might expect. Instead, they were geared towards a predominantly rural
focus. The main offerings included carpentry, cooking, gardening and
housework (Loram 1917).
The craft skills were taught at pre-artisanal level and had almost no
theoretical component (Hunt Davis 1984). This was justified by a belief in
the incapacity of Africans for artisanal level training:
it will take many generations before the African artisan can
become skilled in the European sense. He lacks initiative,
persistence of purpose, sense of fitness, and what may be
called an industrial conscience; and these qualities cannot be
rapidly evolved.11 (Dr. Willoughby, Principal of Tigerkloof12,
cited in Loram 1917: 158)
Other factors were used to justify this adapted education for Africans. At
the heart of these was the belief, part of the South Africa Liberal meta-
10 There was a great deal of interest in liberal circles surrounding the question of IQ and
race. Loram saw IQ differences as being very great at present whilst Hoernle (after whom
an annual lecture of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations was to be named)
argued that they were small enough to invalidate any claim regarding fundamental
racial difference (Hoernle 1937). Interestingly, Professor Eiselen, later to be a founder
member of the strict segregationist South African Bureau for Racial Affairs and the
architect of Bantu Education, was of the opinion that the evidence was inconclusive
(Dubow 1995).
11 Given the powerful influence of Social Darwinist thinking on South African
intellectual currents at the time (Dubow 1995), the use of the word evolution here is
perhaps significant. I am grateful to Rodney Orr (New College, Edinburgh) for this point.
12 Tigerkloof was one of the earliest and most famous missionary schools to offer
industrial education alongside academic schooling (Gustafsson 1987).
narrative, of which this vision of education formed part, that racial
segregation was desirable. It was argued by Loram that it would have
been better if the races had never come into contact. As this had not been
avoided, it was now essential that cross-contamination be minimized.
Here the liberal position often blurred into the more populist fear of
miscegenation and concerns with racial purity that highlight its
continuities with the biological notion of race (Dubow 1995).
Loram believed that Africans should be educated for service in their own
communities. The technical component of industrial education was not
intended to lead graduates into urban employment. Such employment
was not only undesirable on the grounds of increasing racial interaction.
Conscious of the poor white problem,13 Loram foresaw the potential for
conflict with white workers if there was inter-racial competition for
employment: "it would be highly undesirable to flood the towns with
numbers of black skilled workmen. Such a proceeding would only
precipitate race conflict" (Loram: 155).
Loram believed that the South African economy was likely to remain
predominantly agricultural for the foreseeable future.14 This provided
another justification for the rural emphasis of his proposed model of
African education, which he argued was in the economic interest of both
Africans and whites (ibid: 234). This assumption about the economy's
trajectory was the core of Loram's Pre-Fordist understanding. Although
he had been based in New York for his doctoral studies, Loram's
conception of the United States seemed to owe more to his research visits
13 Although the poor white problem is most strongly associated with the 1920s, it had
already been the subject of a Transvaal Commission in 1908 (Legassick 1995).
14 Beinart and Dubow (1995b) argue that segregation was in part a response to the
perceived dangers of modernity. One element of this response was a romanticised
ruralism. This perhaps helps explain Loram's position.
to the Southern states for examples of industrial education in action.
This influenced him to postulate a future in which limited industrial
production would be based on white artisanal labour, with Africans only
entering the white core economy as "hewers of wood and drawers of
water"15: unskilled temporary labour on the mines and farms of white
South Africa. Otherwise they would remain in native reserves where
even the agricultural and mineral revolutions would have little direct
impact.
This characterization of the South African economies, white and African,
seemed to suggest that the tension in white thinking between a desire for
segregation and a willingness to use Africans to service the white
economy as domestics and labourers could be reconciled. However, in
spite of the drive towards the civilized labour policy under the National
Party, by the early 1930s there were those such as Senator Edgar Brookes
who argued that the future of South Africa lay in what amounted to
Fordism.16 This Fordism could only hope to succeed if it was built upon
the development of an African working class:
industrially, the only hope of South Africa lies in the
civilisation of the native proletariat, whose increasing wants
would provide the economic stimulus for the development
of our secondary industries. Where lies the market for our
manufactured goods? Do we imagine that we shall be able to
compete in Europe against Germany, in Asia against Japan,
in America against the United States? Our only hope of
considerable industrial expansion lies in the black masses of
South, Central and East Africa. Those masses will not
purchase our goods while they remain in the lethargic and
15 Although this biblical phrase is more commonly associated with Hendrik Verwoerd,
Loram used it in his 1917 book in such a way as to imply that it was already a well-used
phrase.
16 He did not express it in those terms but the quotation makes clear the Fordist nature of
his comments.
unambitious contentment of savagery; and the best means to
bring them out of it is education (Brookes 1930: 15).17
This argument appears more in keeping with the overall stress of the
most important education conference held in South Africa during the
1930s, on "Educational Adaptations in a Changing Society".18 There it
was argued that Africans were in a changing society and education would
have to adapt to help them cope with change rather than help them
(against their wishes) to resist it.
Such a view came more clearly onto the political agenda after 1939 as
Smuts and the United Party sought to develop an economy which would
both help to win the war and provide for a prosperous peace time.
However, Smuts and the South African liberals still seemed largely
wedded to their previous segregationist stance and certainly did not see
Africans as anything like equal partners either in the economic or the
political spheres. Nonetheless, a series of commissions set up by the new
government pointed towards a Fordist future and a consequent
reordering of race relations. The Fagan Commission (Union of South
Africa 1948), for instance, was concerned with influx control19, the pass
laws and migrant labour. It argued that South Africa could not be
insulated from global trends towards industrialization and urbanization.
The migrant labour system was held to be uneconomic and it was
17 According to Dubow (1995), Brookes had previously closely followed the Loram line in
his own doctoral thesis of 1924: "The history of native policy in South Africa from 1830 to
the present day".
18 This conference, organised by the New Education Fellowship, was held in 1934 and the
speakers included John Dewey, A.V. Murray, the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski
and the psychoanalyst Fritz Perls, as well as a host of the leading figures in South
African education, including Welsh (head of the Cape Education Department), Verwoerd
and Eiselen (Malherbe 1937).
19 The controlling of African access to urban areas through mechanisms such as the pass
laws.
recommended that the new goldfields in the Orange Free State should be
allowed to stabilize their African labour force if they so desired.20
However, the report maintained the argument that it was possible to
balance segregation and African involvement in the economy. Those
Africans to whom it would allow the rights of urban residence were to be
kept in their own segregated suburbs. African political involvement in
the running of South Africa was to remain almost non-existent.21
How far the Smuts government would have been able and prepared to
act on these and other proposals is unclear given the huge ideological
challenge involved in successfully reconciling segregation and
industrialization. Before much progress could be made in turning
pronouncement into practice, the 1948 elections saw a surprise victory for
the National Party, which had its own views on how these two impulses
should be managed.
APARTHEID AND RACIAL FORDISM
Rather than develop an African urban proletariat as suggested by Fagan,
the new National Party government restrengthened many of the
obstacles to African urban settlement and employment. The civilized
labour policy was reaffirmed for the public service and hundreds of
Africans were replaced by more expensive whites (Lipton 1985).
20 These arguments very closely prefigure those of the East Africa Royal Commission a
few years later (Colonial Office 1955).
21 Until 1960 there was indirect representation of Africans in parliament by white Native
Representatives (Ballinger 1969: 13).
Influx control regulations were enforced more rigorously. The new
Group Areas and Population Regulation Acts (both 1950) not only
reiterated past practice but reinforced it. They were followed by a sharp
increase in prosecutions under the pass laws. In 1952 the requirement to
carry a pass was extended to women. Influx control was also
strengthened through the establishment of a series of labour bureaux in
recruiting areas through which potential new workers would be expected
to apply for urban employment.22
The colour bar was also extended, although serious opposition made this
a slower process. In 1951 it was applied to the construction industry and
in 1956 to manufacturing and commerce. Opposition from industrial
councils led to further legislation in 1959 to ensure better enforcement
(Lipton 1985).
Whilst it was obvious that industrialization was accelerating in South
Africa, the National Party seemed convinced that a model of Racial
Fordism could be developed (Gelb 1991). Helped by the huge post-war
influx of white immigrants and by high economic growth rates, the
government pursued a policy by which mass consumption/production
was extended across the white population. Though African labour was
used increasingly in industry, African wages were not intended to allow
this still limited working class to enjoy the benefits of mass consumption.
Since the beginning of commercial mining it had been argued that
African male wages could be kept below subsistence levels as workers and
their families acquired supplementary subsistence through agricultural
plots held in the native reserves. This argument was behind the
22 This practice had long existed in the mining industry.
Chamber of Mines' failure to raise African wages over a sixty year period
(Stadler 1987: 40). Thus, the regime of accumulation remained partially,
but crucially, based on cheap African male labour (Wolpe 1972).
In the political sphere, Fordism is associated with universal suffrage and
mass parties which largely reflect class locations (Rustin 1989). In this
South African form there was no intention of giving the franchise to
Africans (or coloureds and Indians for that matter). What was proposed
instead was a transformation of the native reserves into a series of
independent homelands. However, the Tomlinson Report which
investigated the feasibility of this proposal made it appear rather
expensive. As a result, greater self-government rather than full
independence seemed to be what the policy amounted to in practice.
The attempt to achieve both segregation and industrialization naturally
had an impact upon education and training. In 1951 the Native
Education Commission produced what is more commonly known as the
Eiselen Report (Department of Native Affairs 1951). This was to be the
basis of education policy towards Africans for another thirty years.
In many ways the Eiselen Commission's recommendations amounted to
little more than a restatement of Loram's ideas. The latter had only been
partially implemented by a government reluctant to reform African
education if it meant bearing the costs.23 The earlier stress on adaptation
of education to meet African needs was equally at the centre of the new
proposals. This theme of adaptation was reflected in the establishment of
a new national Department of Bantu Education which centralized control
of schools at the expense of both the missions, which had largely run
23 This was of course in keeping with the norm in the British colonies to the north.
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them, and the provinces, which had largely supervized them. This time
the increased financial burden of greater state involvement was to be
lightened by a reliance on community funding for a large proportion of
any new expenditure (Verwoerd 1954).
Bantu Education stressed the need for cultural appropriateness in the
context of the continued segregation of the economic and political system.
It was designed to fit Africans for service to their own communities in
the homelands (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs [SABRA] 1955).
This meant a reiteration of the Loram stress on education for rural
community development, now focused and crystallized by the
homelands policy:
The main motive behind the Government's vocational and
technical training programme for bantu was to make its
policy of separate development viable in the homelands.
(Malherbe 1977: 196)
As in the 1920s, such "vocational and technical training" amounted to
little in the way of real skills. It was at sub-artisanal levels and directed
specifically at rural needs. The undesirability of preparation for urban
employment was restressed by the Minister for Native Affairs:
Education [of Africans] should stand with both feet in the
reserves There is no place for him [sic] in the European
community above the level of certain forms of labour.
Within his own community, however, all doors are open.
For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training
which has as its aim absorption in the European
community, where he cannot be absorbed. (Verwoerd 1954:
23-4)
Verwoerd also reiterated the earlier critique of the excessively academic
nature of missionary education provision:
By blindly producing pupils trained on a European model,
the vain hope was created among Natives that they could
occupy posts within the European community despite the
country's policy of "apartheid". This is what is meant by the
creation of unhealthy "White collar ideals" and the
causation of widespread frustration among the so-called
educated Natives, (ibid: 7)
The principal focus of both the Eiselen Report and the statements of
Verwoerd was on practical education for rural community development.
However, the continuing and expanding African role in the white
industrial economy could not be ignored.24 As a result it is possible to
find a greater stress on literacy and numeracy in Bantu Education than in
Loram's writings (Kallaway 1990). Such skills were deemed to be of
limited importance in a rural context but were seen as crucial for
industrial or commercial employment, even at unskilled levels.
The state's stress on the benefits of increased education for rural
development (and hence the homelands strategy) was reinforced by
industrial demand for more and higher educated workers. The demand
for more education was also heard from the African population. All
these forces combined to increase primary provision and this in turn led
to greater demand for secondary education.
In increasing secondary provision the state was reluctant to see over-
academicization. This dove-tailed neatly with industrial concerns and,
thus, secondary education was primarily directed at meeting perceived
needs for African manpower. The increasing use of Africans as industrial
workers also led secondary provision to stress better socialization towards
the workplace. According to a former senior figure in the African
24 Afrikaner organisations were divided over the practical implications of apartheid.
The pragmatic position of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the representative of
Afrikaner business, that segregation should not be extended to the point at which it would
have a negative effect on the economy, was the de facto stance of the government. This
contrasted strongly with the absolutist position of cultural organisations and the
theoreticians of SABRA (Posel 1995).
education bureaucracy, this stress was reflected in the 1957 junior
secondary syllabus with its emphasis on
correct behaviour when employed; loyalty to the employer;
the importance of punctuality, neatness, strict honesty,
courtesy, modest demeanour, etc. (cited in Hartshorne 1992:
72)
In spite of Verwoerd's association with the phrase, Africans were not in
practice viewed simply as "hewers of wood" in the Apartheid meta-
narrative. Rather, there was a realization that large numbers of Africans
were needed as the factory hands of an increasingly industrialized
economy.25 The education system came to reflect this emphasis
alongside the more explicit focus on rural development. This led it to
stress the need to integrate Africans into the capitalist ideological system.
The success of this integration was judged by Kallaway (1990) to be the
most significant legacy of Bantu Education.
In the white education system the concept of Christian National
Education was stressed. Moral and ideological control seemed more
important than vocationalism. As white prosperity increased, so
university education became the norm for whites. The service sector also
expanded so that academic education was indeed more vocationally
rewarding than the pursuit of technical subjects.
There were changes in the training system, but these were piecemeal and
reformist. In 1951 day release was extended across a wider range of
occupations (HSRC/NTB 1984: 17). Apprenticeships were still time
bound and graduation was dependent on the "effluxion of time" rather
than any competency criteria. However, in 1955 optional trade tests were
25 Even where they were classed as unskilled, such factory workers required literacy,
numeracy and work discipline at levels previously not required under an agrarian system.
introduced (ibid.)- In 1963 their importance was enhanced by new
legislation, the Apprenticeship Amendment Act, which allowed a trade
test to be taken in the penultimate year of the apprenticeship, thus
permitting those who passed to qualify ahead of time (Hutt 1964: 74). It
was also required that those who failed a trade test at the end of their time
should spend a further year at 70% wages before achieving artisan status
(ibid.). The Registrar of the National Apprenticeship Board was given the
power by the act to grant certification to those who had not had artisanal
training but who, through their experience or through passing a trade
test, could prove their competence to work at the artisanal level
(HSRC/NTB 1984: 18).
The economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s was part of a global "golden
age" of Fordism. In South Africa this was reinforced by the continued
inflow of skilled labour from Europe. The combination of economic
growth and immigration growth seemed to show that the Racial Fordist
regime was sustainable. However, as the 1960s progressed, so the earlier
arguments that a broader base for Fordism was required began to
resurface.
Through pass laws, influx control, denial of trade union rights and access
to inferior education, the Apartheid state had helped to create and
maintain a large and predominantly docile surplus army of African
labour. However, whilst the cheap labour system so produced might
have been in the interest of employers individually, it was not
unequivocally in their interest when viewed collectively.
As technologies developed and economic growth outstripped the
importation or development of new white skilled labour, so a number of
employers began to view the labour of the other races as more than a
simple undifferentiated mass and a cost of production. Increasingly
Indian and coloured labour was allowed into previously exclusively
white occupational domains.
As early as the opening of the new Orange Free State goldfields at the
beginning of the 1950s there had also been the stirrings of a renewed
questioning of the efficacy of the migrant labour system. The geological
difficulties present in exploiting this field had led to new technologies
and labour processes. These resulted in a new division of labour with a
larger emphasis on semi-skilled African labour (Innes 1984).26 Such
semi-skilled labour was not viewed as an undifferentiated mass in the
same way as unskilled labour. Therefore, mine management sought to
reduce labour turnover and, hence, overthrow the migrant labour system
(as had been foreseen by Fagan).
The increasing development of the tertiary sector also highlighted
problems with the migrant labour system. As white collar employment
opportunities grew so whites abandoned heavy industrial work in ever
larger numbers. Over the course of the 1960s the mines saw a 15% fall in
the number of white artisans and a 46% decline in white semi-skilled
workers (James 1992: 129). The fewer whites left in heavy industry
became concentrated at the top of the occupational ladder. Coloureds,
Indians and, increasingly, Africans were brought into more skilled
positions.
26 The designation of a worker's skill level is a reflection of far more than their repertoire
of relevant techniques. All workers have skills and often those who are "semi-skilled"
may have far greater workplace-related skill and knowledge than those at higher levels.
This appears to be particularly true in the case of South African mining.
In the face of white trade union opposition, the more skilled parts of
artisanal jobs were kept for white workers with the more routinized
elements being allocated to Africans. There were also several agreements
in which it was promised that Africans would be retrenched first in the
advent of a recession (Lipton 1985). Nonetheless, by the start of the 1970s
many employers had gone further and were employing Africans in
traditionally artisanal posts whilst officially designating them "artisans'
aides" (James 1992). The employment of such labour further
undermined the basis of the migrant labour system.
This increased importance of African labour in the economy at higher
skill levels was reflected in business concerns about African education. In
1961 a group of academics, headmasters, professionals, business leaders
and scientists was convened by the Witwatersrand Council of Education
(Hartshorne 1985). This Education Panel, as it came to be known, had
Michael O'Dowd, later to serve on the de Lange and first HSRC/NTB
Commissions, as its secretary and Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of
Anglo-American, as its most famous member.
It produced two reports, the first in 1963 and the second in 1966
(Education Panel 1963 and 1966). These argued that the transformation
from a primary producing to an increasingly mature industrial economy
had brought about great changes in skill needs; changes which could not
be satisfied through increased utilization of white labour as this was
already near capacity. Instead, it would be necessary to rely increasingly
on African labour and this would require African access to technical
education (Education Panel 1963).
This was still essentially a view which saw Africans in terms of their
service to the white economy. There was no consideration of African
rights to the same education as whites, nor were more fundamental
questions about the legal and political contexts of the changes in the
economy.
The trends of the 1960s continued and intensified in the 1970s. Indeed,
before the latter decade was over, many South Africans, of all races, were
talking of a crisis of the Apartheid state. The cheap labour/racial Fordism
regime of accumulation appeared to be no longer tenable (Cassim 1987).
FORDISM AND APARTHEID: THE INTERSECTION OF GLOBAL AND
LOCAL CRISES
In the early 1970s Fordism in the developed world went into crisis and
South Africa began to feel the pressures of the global recession, albeit in
nationally specific ways. For 1975 and 1976 gross domestic product
showed negative growth. The balance of payments also became
progressively unfavourable in the early 1970s as export growth failed to
keep pace with increases in the imports of ever more expensive
machinery, parts and fuel (Price 1991). Domestic consumption was still
on too narrow a base to make up for poor export performance.
Unemployment rose dramatically, particularly in the homeland labour
reserves where the level grew by 252% between 1972 and 1976 (Price 1991:
53).27
27 Such a figure for unemployment is highly problematic on at least two grounds. First,
the population statistics for the homelands were hugely inaccurate. Second, the meaning
of the term unemployment in rural society with no social security system is questionable.
However, in so far as the figure indicates a sharp increase in those unsuccessfully applying
The African urban population was particularly badly hit as organizational
changes in township administration led to sharp rent increases. In the
West Rand, for instance, rents rose by 25% in 1972 alone (ibid: 56).
Coupled with the massive shortage of township housing due to influx
control measures, such increases greatly increased urban unrest.
Unrest was evident in the first half of the 1970s in the industrial relations
field. In 1973 the most serious African labour militancy for a generation28
broke out as a wave of strikes hit the Durban area. In contrast with
previous disputes, the end of the strikes did not result in serious reverses
for African labour. Instead, the militancy marked the beginning of a new
wave of labour organization, largely because the new breed of more
highly skilled African worker was less dispensable than those of earlier
generations.29
As well as economic and industrial relations crises, the state also found
itself facing new and serious political challenges. Changing economic
circumstances and occupational patterns amongst Afrikaners were
putting increasing strain on Afrikaner unity as the bedrock of National
Party power (Charney 1984).
As "independence" of the first homeland, Transkei, neared in 1976,
African political unrest became more pronounced (Hartshorne 1992). At
the same time, the Portuguese Revolution further inflamed the
situation.
to labour bureaux in the homelands it is indicative of the greater difficulty in securing
employment at this time.
28 Since the miners' strike of 1946.
29 The role of whites, coloureds and Indians in helping build the fledgling unions should
not be forgotten. Alec Erwin, now Minister of Trade and Industry, is one prominent example
of these activists. Equally, the influence of the Black Consciousness Movement, led by
Steve Biko, should not be underestimated.
In 1974 the Portuguese military, weary of their colonial wars, staged a
coup in Lisbon. By the end of 1975, Angola and Mozambique, part of the
colonial cordon sanitaire to the North (with Rhodesia and South West
Africa), were both independent and pro-Marxist states. The Angolan
situation was particularly serious as South African interference and
invasion had resulted in Cuban troops coming to the new government's
aid. Instead of defeating communism, South Africa had strengthened the
Marxist presence in Southern Africa.30 The example was a dangerous
one, as we are about to see.
It was in the education system that the crisis finally erupted. The
increased need for better educated African labour, along with continued
parental pressure, was to result in a major expansion of African
secondary and tertiary education at the beginning of the 1970s (Price 1991).
The new students were inspired by the Black Consciousness Movement
which was a major influence on the emergent African intelligentsia at
the time (Wolpe 1988). In 1976 two government decisions were to turn
this growing intellectual rejection of Bantu Education into open revolt,
followed by repression.
In what seemingly represented a further stage of the Afrikaner struggle to
free themselves from perceived English cultural domination, it was
decreed that English would no longer be the dominant medium of
instruction in the township schools of the Department of Education and
Training (DET). Instead, Afrikaans would be given equal status and
would become the medium of instruction for mathematics, social studies,
30 The fear of communism had long exercised the official and popular white imaginations
in South Africa. This seems to be due to a number of factors including the presence of
Africa's only communist party, which raised the spectre of a multi-racial and class-based
attack on the political economy.
history and geography (Brooks and Brickhill 1980).31 To African parents
and students, however, Afrikaans was seen as politically and
economically less acceptable than English, and opposition to this policy
began.
The situation was made worse by the decision to reduce DET schooling
from 13 to 12 years (Brooks and Brickhill 1980; Hartshorne 1992). This led
to a bulge of two years of students entering junior secondary school at the
same time. Between 1974 and 1976 the number of students entering
junior secondary rose from 82 351 to 214 454, a 160% increase (Hartshorne
1992: 75). This huge expansion in intake brought with it overcrowding,
temporary classrooms and the use of primary teachers in secondary
schools.
Finally on June 16th 1976 violence erupted. A peaceful march by
secondary students to Orlando Stadium in Soweto for a protest rally was
fired upon by police, killing two students. Three days of rioting followed
as the protests spread beyond the medium of instruction and the
shootings to the broader structures of oppression experienced by the
students and their communities.32 This uprising against the Apartheid
state was to spread across the country and was to keep smouldering for
the rest of the year (Brooks and Brickhill 1980).
31 Equal status of Afrikaans and English had been the official policy position
theoretically since the start of Bantu Education, but had neither been stressed in policy
statements not enforced in practice.
32 Lodge puts the death toll of the whole Soweto Uprising at 515 (Lodge 1983: 330).
REFORMING APARTHEID AND BROADENING FORDISM: THE RISE
OF MARKET FORCES
As Chapter Three will show in greater detail, in the face of the global
crisis of Fordism and the triple crisis in accumulation, education and
legitimation (Moyo 1995) of its racialized manifestation in South Africa,
the state responded by appointing a series of official commissions. The
most important of these were the Commission of Inquiry into Labour
Legislation [Wiehahn Commission] (Wiehahn 1982) and the
Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of
Manpower [Riekert Commission] (Republic of South Africa 1979).
Riekert reported in 1979 and the first of the six volumes of the Wiehahn
Report appeared in May of the same year. Both reports marked the
stirrings of a new official recognition that a paradigm shift in thinking
was required. They were concerned primarily with providing the
enabling environment in the labour market and industrial relations that
would allow transformation of training and hence the economy.
Although it was not explicitly stated, it was also recognized by leading
elements of the Afrikaner establishment that these changes would
ultimately affect the political system (Wiehahn OI 199533).
Riekert recommended increased freedom of movement and security of
status for those Africans who possessed Section 10 rights permitting them
to stay in urban areas (Republic of South Africa 1979: 168). On the other
hand, the report reaffirmed influx control and recommended increased
fines against illegal entrants to urban areas (ibid: 155).
33 OI will be used in this and subsequent chapters to denote data from oral interviews.
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Essentially, this was another attempt to reconcile the tensions between
segregation and industrialization. The recommendations sought to better
incorporate already urbanized Africans into the core economy, so as to
utilize them more effectively for industrial purposes, whilst reinforcing
separate development for those still in the homelands. Indeed, a reading
of this report must place it in the context of the government's continued
adherence to the strategy of homeland independence.
Amongst the key recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission were
the legalization of African trade unions, the ending of job reservation
and the indenturing of African apprentices (Wiehahn 1983). These six
reports are significant not just for their recommendations, but for the
insights they provide into the rationales for reform and the counter¬
arguments used by more conservative elements.
The Wiehahn Report stressed the importance of skills shortages34,
training failure and structural and technological change in driving the
34 There has been a long debate on the South African left regarding the reality of skills
shortage arguments. This appears to have begun in 1979 with a disagreement between
Davies and Meth; the former arguing for the reality of skills shortage and the latter
maintaining that the skills shortage argument was an ideological tool of employers. De
Clerq (1980) showed that white unions followed the Meth line (and we shall see this
repeated when the Wiehahn Commission is considered in Chapter Three), quoting an
official of the Iron Moulders Society: "We believe that the argument of an economic
recession and shortage of skilled labour is a kind of psychological warfare waged by
employers against all workers to frighten them and make them work harder if they want
to keep their jobs" (de Clerq 1980: 34). Chisholm (1984) pointed to the endemic problem of
misclassification of skills in South African industry and employers' emphasis on attitudes
not skills in their training programmes as further evidence to back up the Meth position.
Kraak (1989b) attempted to produce a corrective which maintained that there were both
real and ideologically-driven elements to the skills shortage arguments. However,
Webster and Leger (1992) returned to the theme of misclassification and stressed the tacit
skills possessed by all workers. It appears that Kraak is correct on one level that skills
shortages, as commonly defined, have at times been present. Nonetheless, as will become
evident in the next chapter, the data upon which claims have been based has frequently
been spurious or even totally absent. Moreover, the counter argument about the social and
ideological construction of skills (which Kraak does acknowledge) is valid at a more
fundamental level, and should be emphasised as a crucial element of the rethinking of
both learning and work currently taking place in South Africa.
policy rethink. It was argued that the old system was no longer relevant
and a new approach was necessary (Wiehahn 1982: 30-2). The threat to
stability from inaction and the need to control African trade unions were
used as further justifications for change in an attempt to convince more
conservative elements.
Strikingly, the report made very great use of pro-market arguments.
Whilst these were somewhat offset by use of "group rights"35 rhetoric at
the other points in the report, this marked a highly significant shift in
emphasis from previous usages. Economic rationales were seen as more
important than ideological and racial ones. This shift was indicative of
the increasing adoption by the state of the market-oriented meta-
narrative of big business.
Many large business corporations moved swiftly to put the Wiehahn
Commission's recommendations into practice.36 The legalization of
African apprenticeship was accompanied by a wave of corporate
investment in technical and vocational education and training
(Chisholm and Christie 1983; Swainson 1991). Many corporations
accompanied this with affirmative action programmes to bring Africans
into managerial posts (Smollan 1988).
The state's education policy also witnessed a major re-evaluation at the
hands of a new commission. Convened in 1980 after another wave of
unrest in the schools, the HSRC Investigation into Education [de Lange
Commission] (HSRC 1981a) was the first major report to address African
education since the Eiselen Commission's three decades earlier.
35 The favoured National Party code for white minority rights which would have to
remain inviolate in any constitutional reform.
36 I can find no evidence of a similar trend amongst smaller enterprises. This would be in
keeping with the international trend for "progressive" to mean large in the business world.
In keeping with the Wiehahn Report, race and culture were played down
and the role of the market emphasized. This was evident in both of the
two principal strands of the report's recommendations: privatization and
vocationalization.
The primacy of the market was upheld through a series of
recommendations calling for greater private sector funding, increased
parental choice and a thorough-going decentralization of power to school
boards. All of these recommendations served to lessen the amount of
control the state could exert on schooling. They also reflected the market-
oriented meta-narrative's preoccupation with the primacy of market
forces. As many decisions as possible were to be taken out of the control
of the state. Such market-led decisions were then portrayed as value-free.
Similarly, those decisions which the state would still make would be
based on the technical advice of experts and would also be claimed as
value-free (Buckland 1982).
The increased corporate interest in the vocational aspects of education
was mirrored in the de Lange Commission's recommendations regarding
the "proper" educational focus. The traditional model of vocationalism
internationally has been one in which large and costly technical high
schools or technical departments within mainstream schools have been
developed. De Lange called for a new emphasis on this form of education
and big business showed itself willing to fund its provision, particularly
for Africans previously excluded from this mode of delivery (Chisholm
and Christie 1983; Swainson 1991). The Report supported this but also
concentrated on a position reminiscent of the New Vocationalist
approach of England (Kallaway 1989). This English approach, as adopted
in South Africa, was focused on attitudinal preparation for the workplace
within all elements of education and closer links between school and
work, but had a reduced emphasis on technical preparation.
Loram, Verwoerd and the Eiselen Commission all criticized educational
provision for Africans because of its alleged academic bias. In arguing
that education was failing to prepare children of all races for the
workplace as a consequence of its excessive focus on the matriculation
examination and university entrance, the de Lange Report appeared to be
extending this analysis to the education of all races. The Report argued
that this problem had to be tackled through a greater concentration on
orientation, preparation and socialization for the world-of-work.
By stressing the market over race and through its criticism of academic
education for all races, the de Lange Report appeared to be advocating a
non-racial, Fordized education system and economy. However, this
deracialization was limited and the class divisions of the Fordist system
reinforced the racial differentiation of Apartheid.
In the first place, the Commission noted that educational expansion to
achieve universal provision at historical white standards would not be
financially feasible.37 Therefore, much of the proposed expansion of
provision would be through cheaper (and lower status) non-formal
education. Secondly, it recommended that the academic route should be
limited to the small number going to university, the rest of students
being given a more vocational provision. Thirdly, "environmentally
handicapped" students (a euphemism for those still "tribalised") would
be the first to be guided down vocationally-oriented paths. Fourthly, the
system would not be desegregated at the school level and a
37 A problem that still haunts post-apartheid attempts at educational expansion (see the
1994 draft white paper and the 1995 white paper for this debate).
recommendation that a single national department for all races be
established was dropped before the resultant White Paper (Republic of
South Africa 1983).
Taken together, these elements of the new dispensation suggested that
educational provision was likely to remain highly segmented. Whilst
the majority of white students would still proceed down the academic
route to tertiary education, the majority of Africans would continue to
find themselves either out of schooling or channelled down
vocationally-oriented tracks.38
Following on from the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission,
a National Training Board (NTB) was established. Between 1984 and 1991
it also produced a trilogy of reports which built upon the analysis of the
Wiehahn and de Lange Reports and showed the ever-greater influence of
market-oriented thinking on the official discourse.
The new policy of the 1980s seemed to recognize the integral role of urban
Africans in the Fordist economy. Advertising agency interest in African
consumption increased and ever larger numbers of Africans accessed
skilled and even professional employment. However, the class
stratification of Fordism was reflected in and reinforced by continuing
racial disparities in the school and the workplace that ensured that
Africans remained predominantly at the bottom of the pile.39 At the
same time, the political logic of Fordism was still rejected by the white
38 As in other countries, vocational education was strongly perceived as being inferior to
academic education.
39 The additional impact of segmentation by gender ensured that African women were at
the very bottom of the occupational pile.
polity, even as the parliamentary involvement of Asians and Coloureds
was addressed (however inadequately) by the National Party.40
This Economic Fordism was also limited to the extent that it was still
only intended to apply to "white" South Africa. The permanent African
proletariat of the metropolitan areas were now accepted as part of the
Fordist core economically, but the homelands policy was still on the
agenda. This policy would essentially fordize South Africa by virtue of
redrawing its boundaries.
The growing dominance of official discourse by the market-oriented
paradigm did not go unchallenged. Conservative white elements still
clung to the old thinking and the National Party lost a significant
percentage of its support to parties on its right as the 1980s progressed. Of
greater long-term significance, however, was the growing challenge to the
marketized vision from those who opposed both Apartheid and
capitalism. This challenge was to develop around the notion of People's
Education.
PEOPLE'S EDUCATION
In the mid 1980s radical critiques of the existing education system
emerged from academic and community-based sources. From academic
sources came a powerful argument about the ways in which the existing
education system was functional to the interests of capital. From the
grassroots, the establishment of the National Education Crisis Committee
40 In 1983 a tricameral parliament was proposed by the government and approved by a
whites-only referendum. Under this system a coloured and an Indian chamber would be
added to parliament and these would have jurisdiction over certain areas of legislation
deemed "own affairs".
(NECC) in 1985 led to a debate on the nature of alternative schooling.
The NECC saw the need to develop critical thinking, to see learning as a
collective exercise and to break down the divide between the mental and
the manual aspects of learning (NECC 1985).
The meta-narrative which emerged from this phase of radical reflection
also emphasized the importance of transforming school governance. In
particular, the importance of Parent-Teacher-Student Associations
(PTSAs) was stressed as a means of bringing the relevant constituencies
together to discuss school management. Given the legacy of limited
access to schooling of many communities, People's Education also
stressed the need to "open the doors of learning to all".41 Related to this
was the issue of equity. Not only had black students experienced lower
levels of access to schooling than whites,42 but the quality of their
education, measured in terms of expenditure per capita, was also far
inferior. In order to overcome the legacy of this, People's Education was
also about redress of past inequalities.
By international standards, Bantu Education, Christian National
Education43 and the schooling provided to Indians and coloureds were
particularly ideologically laden and this was reflected very strongly in the
syllabi of individual subjects. An important strand of People's Education,
therefore, was curriculum transformation. English and History were
subjects which received particular attention.
41 This widely used slogan was a paraphrasing of the Freedom Charter. A readily
available source for the Freedom Charter is Lodge and Nasson (1992).
42 Indian access was typically good but coloured access to schooling was in some cases as
poor as African.
43 CNE stood for the reaffirmation in white education of Christian (Calvinist) values; of
morality; and of a strong sense of loyalty to folk and fatherland.
The People's Education vision of educational transformation was
predicated on the assumption of political transformation arising out of
the overthrow of the South African state. At the start of the 1990s it
became apparent that such an overthrow was not about to happen.
Instead the National Party had decided on negotiations, a strategy
symbolized by the release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and
other organizations in February 1990. Negotiated reform rather than
forced transformation now became the order of the day.
INTO THE 1990s: REFORMING OR TRANSFORMING FORDISM?
Mature Fordism
The new era of negotiations saw the National Party attempt to continue
down their path of extending the reach of Fordism. The incorporation of
all racial groups into the political system was now acknowledged as
inevitable. However, the challenge was to manage this in such a way as
to maintain the privileged position of the white elite within the new
Mature Fordist regime.
In education policy this was reflected in two further important
documents, the Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa
(Department of National Education 1991a) and the Education Renewal
Strategy (Department of National Education 1992). These were essentially




For the ANC-aligned opposition, the development of policy strategies
was more problematic. Whilst critique of the existing system and slogans
about a revolutionary future were in abundance there was a paucity of
analysis of policy options for education subsequent to a negotiated
settlement. There was also a huge lack of policy-related capacity. An
attempt to overcome these dual impediments was undertaken by the
NECC,44 with the help of major external funding.45 The National
Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) brought together over 300
researchers to engage in a discussion of possible policy options.
Although the Framework Report (NEPI 1993) and the twelve thematic
reports reflected a strong legacy of the People's Education meta-narrative,
a new paradigm was emerging, particularly in the Human Resource
Development thematic report (NEPI 1992b).
This report showed a more strongly Social Democratic stance which
seemed heavily influenced by trends within Australian and Northern
European socialism. In particular, through the role of Andre Kraak as
one of the three authors,46 the report was influenced by popularizing
versions of the Regulationist account which saw a model of Post-Fordism
as the answer to the global crisis being experienced since the early 1970s.
It was argued that the cheap labour strategy of Racial Fordism had led to a
44 Now a "coordinating" rather than "crisis" committee.
45 The Canadian Embassy, Interfund, the Swedish International Development Agency and
the United States Agency for International Development were all principal funders (NEPI
1993: 64).
46 As part of his doctoral studies, Kraak spent time attached to the London research unit
headed by Michael Young, co-author of the British Baccalaureat and leading expert on
Post-Fordist models of education and training. Kraak's thesis (Kraak 1993b) is replete
with references to Post-Fordist literature.
situation of Low Skill Equilibrium47 which entrenched South Africa in a
globally uncompetitive position.
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This cheap labour strategy could not be sustained in the face of the
increased competitive pressures of the global economy and the legacy of
Apartheid. A Post-Fordist strategy, however, could answer both these
challenges and deliver on economic development and equity
simultaneously (NEPI 1992b). This new paradigm would be built upon
the transformation of the workplace, towards a system of flexible
specialization (Piore and Sabel 1984); and the education and training
system, through the overthrow of the divide between academic and
vocational (Finegold et al. 1990). The divisive, conflictual, class-based
model of Fordist capitalism would thus be replaced by a consensual
model: the New Times thesis (Hall and Jacques 1989).48
Although only one strand of the NEPI deliberations, this new meta-
narrative was to become ever more prominent in ANC-aligned thinking
as the pre-election period progressed. The adoption of this paradigm by
key elements of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
was crucial in this regard. The research efforts of the National Union of
Metalworkers (NUMSA) and the COSATU Participatory Research
Programme (PRP) fed into ANC deliberations on education manifesto
positions during 1993 and helped shape the final ANC position of early
1994 along Post-Fordist lines. In the ANC's education policy document,
47 Finegold has developed the notions of Low Skill Equilibrium (LSE) and High Skill
Equilibrium (HSE) to characterise the nexus of institutional cultures and relationships
which combine either to make an economy one in which skill is held in low esteem or
valued (e.g. Finegold and Soskice 1988). A Post-Fordist economy would be one in which a
HSE would be present. South Africa, like Britain, is characterised as an LSE economy
(Kraak 1993b).
48 This will be explored at greater length in Chapter Four.
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known as the "Yellow Book", education and training were to be
integrated through a National Qualifications Framework (ANC 1994a).49
Neo-Fordism
Between the state position which sought to expand Fordism and the
ANC-COSATU vision of Post-Fordist transformation, a middle way
began to emerge not long before the 1994 elections. This arose out of
business circles and, like the other two approaches, owed much to
external influences. From the mid-1980s a number of management
theorists had talked of transformations which paralleled the New Times,
except that they were managerially controlled (e.g. Peters 1987). Another
group of more academic commentators also began looking at the ways in
which Japanese business was out-performing competitors and postulated
a model of workplace reform, from which I take the term Lean
Production50 (Dertouzos et al. 1989) to describe the emergent meta-
narrative. As far as education and training were concerned, this meta-
narrative was also informed by the shift towards Competency-Based
Modular Learning (CBML) taking place in countries such as England,
New Zealand and Scotland.
Mainstream regulationist thinking suggests that the transformation from
Fordism to a model of Post-Fordism, in which class conflict is dead,
cannot be assumed. The term Neo-Fordism is used to describe the
possibility of an intermediate model such as Lean Production. Although
49 The origins of the notion of integration in earlier ANC and COSATU documents will be
discussed further in Chapter Four.
50 Gee (1994) and Lankshear (1996) use the term Fast Capitalism to refer to similar
phenomena.
it uses much of the progressive language of New Times, it is argued by
critics that this is a model in which managers still manage in their own
interests: "Neo-Fordism, like Fordism itself, is based on an organizing
principle of the forces of production dictated by the needs of capitalist
management" (Aglietta 1979: 122). Workers, not employers, bear the
brunt of being flexible. This flexibility does not amount in practice to the
ability of the multi-skilled artisan to move from one meaningful task to
another as in the COSATU vision. Rather, it is about semi-skilled
workers being moved between routinized tasks and subjected to ever-
greater surveillance and work intensification as the need to compete in
the global market squeezes profits ever further (Lloyd 1994).
THE POST-ELECTION CONSENSUS: FORDING THE WATERS OF
DIVISION?
Immediately prior to the elections of April 1994 the National Training
Board published a document which appeared to represent a consensus
between the conflicting meta-narratives. This National Training Strategy
Initiative [NTSI] (NTB 1994) is the basis on which the policies of the first
two years of the post-election period have been constructed. An
integration of education and training was proposed in this document.
However, the NTSI document was very short on important details about
the nature of the proposed integration, whether it would be competency-
based and whether it would be voluntary.
The presence of the four meta-narratives which have achieved
prominence over the last two decades and the contested nature of the
transitional period have meant that this broad consensual position has
been the subject of constant re-working by a variety of forces and
constituencies. That re-working is the heart of the story of this thesis and
will be the focus from Chapter Five. However, to understand the
contestations of the present it is necessary to explore the four meta-
narratives and the policy developments of the past two decades in far
greater depth than has been possible in this chapter. That will be the task
of the next two chapters. However, before turning to them a brief
summary of what has been a very quick overview of the past century is in
order.
SUMMARY
In the period before the Second World War, South Africa was an
essentially Pre-Fordist society with mining and agriculture predominant.
There was a dual economy with Africans involved in the white economy
as migrant labourers and in the native reserves in small scale, and often
subsistence, agriculture. The predominant Liberal view was that
education should be adapted to the needs and abilities of Africans. In
essence this meant a focus on low-level practical education for rural
activities.
There was an inherent tension, however, between the rural focus of this
education and the demand for African labour in the urban areas. In the
1920s and 1930s the Apartheid position of stressing white employment in
manufacturing, commerce and the public service and seeking to exclude
Africans from such work was adopted by Afrikaner-dominated
governments. However, the coming of the Second World War and the
return to power of Smuts at the head of a business-friendly government
led to a strong stress from liberals on the need to bring African workers
into the mainstream economy whilst limiting their political role.
After 1948, however, an Afrikaner ascendancy was established under the
National Party. Although the policy of Bantu Education restated the
focus on rural development for Africans, the government proved unable
to deal with the growing industrial demand for African labour. As the
1970s began, African political opposition to the state began to acquire
renewed dynamism. First in the wave of industrial unrest centred on
Durban in 1973/4 and then in the student protests of 1976, the system
seemed to be faced by challenges which pointed, with the economic
pressures noted above, to multiple underlying crises. It is the response to
these crises in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising that will be the focus

































































REFORM, CRITIQUE AND CHALLENGE:
EDUCATION AND TRAINING FROM THE SOWETO
UPRISING TO THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter I sketched out an overview of South African
education and training policy in the century since the beginning of
industrialization. In this and the subsequent chapter the intention is to
explore the developments and policy debates of the period between 1976
and 1994 in order to better historicise the current policy debate discussed
in Chapter Five.
This chapter is bounded by two of the most important events in South
African history. It starts in the aftermath of June 16th 1976, the first day of
the Soweto Uprising. These events, chronicled in the previous chapter,
sparked a transformation of South Africa across a wide range of spheres,
including education and training. This transformation was itself
reordered by the unbanning of the African National Congress on
February 2nd 1990 and this date marks the other boundary of the chapter.
The chapter's first major focus will be on a series of official texts. These
have been previewed in the previous chapter: the Wiehahn, Riekert and
de Lange Reports and the HSRC/NTB trilogy. The last part of this trilogy
was commissioned in 1989 but did not report till 1991. It would not make
sense, however, to separate it from its two predecessors or from the
earlier reports. This reminds us that such boundaries as those of this
chapter are of course permeable as history is not so easily
compartmentalized. Where particularly pertinent, the resultant
legislation and other state responses will be considered.
The chapter will go on to consider the views of employers, both through
influential texts and through important programmes sponsored out of
corporate funds. The voices of opposition also will be explored, both
those of academics and of the broader community.
After a description of the changing nature of the policy debate, the focus
will shift to explanation. Three elements will be evident. First, there will
be an exploration of external discourses. Second, there will follow a
discussion of the crisis facing South Africa during the period under
scrutiny. Third, the focus will shift to a brief consideration of the impact
of wider South African social actors on the formulation of policy.
REFORMING AND TRANSFORMING BANTU EDUCATION: THE
OFFICIAL RESPONSE
The Initial Response: Wiehahn and Riekert
The economic, educational and industrial climate after Soweto appeared
to have been transformed and responses to the perceived new challenges
became imperative. The first major official response to these challenges
came in 1977 with the commissioning of two reports which looked at the
future of the economy and, more particularly, the role therein of African
workers. The Riekert Commission (Republic of South Africa 1979) was
charged with the task of investigating manpower utilization and the role
of influx control in its operation. The Wiehahn Commission was given
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the broader task of looking at labour legislation, including that relating to
training (Wiehahn 1982).
Influx Control: Riekert
The Riekert Commission actually was comprised of a single person, the
Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister.1 He proposed greater freedom
of movement and security of status for those who already had urban
rights. However, this was coupled to a reaffirmation of the need for
influx control, with new Africans only to be allowed into urban areas
when appropriate housing was available and when there was a shortage
of suitable labour in the area. Moreover, it was recommended that the
penalties for infringement of influx control legislation be made steeper.
The probability of a long-term dependence on commuter populations
from the homelands also was acknowledged.2 In short, a controlled
number of urban Africans were to be made insiders of the system, whilst
the vast majority, primarily those in the rural areas, were to be kept
outside the Fordist core economy.3
1 He did have the support of Professor van der Merwe, a Wiehahn commissioner, as
Secretary.
2 For an insight into the realities of the commuter system see Lelyveld (1986) or Badsha
and Wilson (1986)
3 This amounted to the acceptance of a position proposed some forty years before and till
this point rejected by the Nationalists.
Labour Legislation and Training: Wiehahn
Recommendations
To consider the wider question of labour policy and legislation, the
government appointed a commission of civil servants, trade unionists,
employers and academics headed by Professor Wiehahn of the University
of South Africa, a leading industrial relations theorist. Although the
Wiehahn Commission was concerned with the broader issue of labour
legislation, in the course of its six volumes its deliberations covered
several areas pertaining to training policy. The debate over the issue of
work reservation4 clearly was one such area. The decision whether or
not to scrap work reservation inevitably shaped future training policy
and provision. An abandonment of the policy implied a massive shift in
training provision towards the black population, particularly Africans.
Such a decision also implied the possibility of radical shifts in the
division of labour with increased job fragmentation being used as a
means to maintain a de facto colour bar.
Part Two of the Report was concerned explicitly with training. In
particular, African apprenticeship was addressed. However, the
commission had a much wider training mandate than this:
The Commission's terms of reference, in so far as training
is concerned, cover a very wide field, and in fact extend
over the whole spectrum of human resources
development outside the system of formal education.
(Wiehahn 1982: 99)5
4 Work reservation refers to the statutory limitation of access to particular occupations on
the basis of race. Only scheduled persons, i.e. whites and coloureds, could be employed in
an occupation for which a reservation order was in place. See Chapter Two for further
discussion of this.
5 All subsequent references in this section of the chapter will be to the Wiehahn Report,
unless otherwise stated, and will be in the form of page number alone.
The Report decided that job reservation should go. It also recommended
action to eradicate racial discrimination by law and the segregation of
workplace facilities. The principle of equal pay for work of equal value
was upheld. Non-racial trade unions were to be recognized in law and
brought into the industrial council system. In the field of training,
African apprentices were to be allowed and a new National Manpower
Commission was to be appointed to address the problems inherent in the
existing training system.
All the above changes pointed to a new emphasis, in the official sphere,
on the need to embrace reforms. Whilst this reflected a shift away from
an Apartheid mentality, the Report also restated more conservative
views. Indeed, as the series of minority recommendations made clear,
there was a very clear ideological struggle going on between the
commissioners.
The more conservative views were reflected in the decision to retain the
closed shop, thus increasing the power of white trade unions to block
African entry to the workplace in practice. Moreover, whilst job
reservation was to be scrapped, in the case of the mining industry this
would only take place through agreement between unions and
employers. Given the Mineworkers Union's (MWU) reputation for
extreme conservatism, such an agreement looked far off.6
Obstacles were still placed in the path of the new trade unions.
Registration was subject to a wide range of conditions and was at the
discretion of the state, which was still reluctant to allow multi-racial
6 The ultra-conservative Mineworkers Union (MWU) should not be confused with the
COSATU-affiliated National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which was to emerge in the
1980s as the largest trade union in South Africa.
unions. Moreover, existing unions sitting on industrial councils had the
right of veto over new membership. Although the Wiehahn Report was
painted as a response to the need to train Africans, it amounted to
legalization rather than active and concrete encouragement of such a
shift.
Notwithstanding the conservative elements of the Wiehahn Report, the
overall findings should be seen as representing the beginnings of a
fundamental shift in the official discourse of training. Therefore, the key
elements of the Report's rationale for change should be explored in some
detail.
Skills Shortage
The argument that past legislation and practice had led to increasingly
severe constraints upon economic development was one of the most
important themes of the Report as a whole. This message had an even
wider significance as it was possible to infer that such an analysis could be
extended to wider areas of Apartheid legislation. Indeed this appears to
be the central, coded message of the Wiehahn Report: that Apartheid was
causing severe economic constraints which, together with related
legitimation problems, were threatening the future of the existing South
African system of political economy.7 To this extent, the Report seems to
reflect some degree of capture of official discourse by business discourse, a
theme that will be explored in greater detail later in this chapter.
7 This was acknowledged by Professor Wiehahn in an interview (Wiehahn OI 1995).
However, it is possible that hindsight is operating here.
In the text of the Wiehahn Report, the notion of economic constraints
was linked intimately to that of skills shortage. In keeping with business
arguments of the 1960s (see the previous chapter), it was argued that the
rapid economic development of the post-war period brought about such
shortages which now threatened future economic progress (1). This
argument, strengthened by the series of exemptions to and relaxations of
job reservation seen in Chapter Two, was a central plank in the case for
African apprenticeship (101-3), the end of job reservation (76-7) and the
abolition of scheduled status in the mines (709-22).
The related argument of skills shortage, the principal one used to justify
reforms, was used from the very first page of the Report. It was argued
that economic development, particularly in the late 1960s, had led to
increased industrialization. This in turn had led to a greater demand for
skilled labour. This had been met in the main by using whites (including
a large number of immigrants), but demand was also experienced at semi-
and un-skilled levels for African labour (1).
The economic downturn of the 1970s seemed to indicate that the
shortages were worsening. In Part One of the Report they were seen as
being both a current and a future threat (101). In this part of the Report
the concern was primarily with shortages at artisanal levels. Such
shortages, the Commission argued, were most acute in certain key sectors:
metal, electrical, building and motor (102). Skills shortages were seen as
extending across white South Africa, and into the townships and
homelands and were advanced by the commissioners as the prime reason
for allowing Africans to be indentured into real apprenticeships, rather
than simply into the inferior training to which they already had access
(101).
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In the White Paper responding to this part of the Report, the government
also showed its belief in such arguments. Indeed, it used skills shortage
arguments to justify its acceptance of the minority rather than the
majority recommendation on the issue of the closed shop (Department of
Labour and Mines 1979).8
Skills shortage was introduced as a key concept at the beginning of Part
Two also (159). It was argued that this was a problem that South Africa
shared with other developing countries:
South Africa, in common with many industrialising and
developing countries, is confronted with two major
manpower problems, namely a shortage of skilled
manpower in the modern sector of the economy and a
surplus of unskilled manpower in both the modern and
the traditional sectors of the economy. (171)
Whereas Part One pointed to skills shortage at artisanal levels in certain
sectors, the second part argued that there were shortages across the
economy at both high and medium levels of personnel requirements
(178). It was also admitted that discrimination in the provision of
training had been at the heart of the problem:
The industrial training system has up to now, in many
instances, differentiated between population groups,
affecting in particular the position of Blacks.9 Often this
has not been as a result of training legislation itself, but of
policy, precedent and peripheral measures. The most
serious consequence has been an increasing shortfall in
the country's manpower resources. (231)
The theme of skills shortage was returned to in Part Six of the Report.
Indeed, it formed the central terrain upon which the fight over work
8 In its most readily available form the Wiehahn Report's six volumes are reprinted
together with an introduction by Nic Wiehahn and the resultant five White Papers.
Subsequent references to the White Papers will be to page numbers in Wiehahn (1982)
9 In the Wiehahn Report Blacks has replaced Bantu as the term used for Africans.
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reservation in the mines was waged between the more progressive and
the more conservative elements of the commission. Whilst it was
admitted that there was insufficient statistical evidence to back it up, the
majority view on the commission maintained that there were both
current and future acute skills shortage problems (722). Indeed, it was
claimed that such shortages would worsen over time unless remedial
action was taken.
There is already a serious shortage of suitably qualified
workers in the industry which cannot be met from the
ranks of available Whites. Although available statistics in
this regard are not entirely instructive, it is clear that total
demand will undoubtedly increase as technology advances,
and that, although temporary balances between supply and
demand may occur, the skill shortage is eventually most
likely to become a severely limiting obstacle to increased
production and growth. (721-2)
In particular, the majority view regarding the mining industry was that
there was a shortage of blasters and that this could only be tackled by the
ending of scheduled status (709). The existence of a wide number of
exemptions to scheduled status that had arisen over the past decade (and
which were included in annexes to the Report on pages 725-33) was taken
as evidence that such skills shortages were occurring, and that the current
legislation was inadequate for dealing with the problem.
In essence the exemptions entailed that suitably trained
and reliable non-scheduled Black persons10 could, subject
to certain conditions, perform certain tasks under the
supervision of a certificated miner. The exemptions,
which were granted for one year with the proviso that
they might, if necessary, be withdrawn or amended,
covered the preparation of explosives charges; the
conveyancing, handling and temporary supervision of
explosives; the disconnection of firing cables and the
examination and making safe of work places; the
10 As already stated, Africans were necessarily non-scheduled as a result of their racial
classification.
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examination of misfired holes and sockets; the marking of
drilling or blast holes and other types of holes; and the
driving of locomotives for the conveyancing of scheduled
persons.11 (709)
As this list makes clear, exemptions were already striking at the very
heart of the scheduling system. The majority view was that the existing
legislation, therefore, was unworkable and harmful.
The fact that improved utilisation was achievable only by
exemption from the regulations also demonstrates the
adverse effect these have on productivity and the
organisation of work. (711)
The minority view, however, rejected this skills shortage justification.
Contrary to the majority of their colleagues, Commissioners Neethling
and Nieuwoudt maintained that there was no skills shortage in the
mines and that there were sufficient white workers who were either
trained or trainable.12 They argued that it was a shortage of training
facilities rather than suitable people to train that was at the heart of the
problem (723).
The twin concepts of structural and technological change underpinned
the argument that South Africa was experiencing a skills shortage.
Although both were referred to in passing by both the Report (159) and
the second White Paper (283), they were not subject to further
development, nor was their significance explored. This is suggestive of
11 This last exemption was a de facto return to the Hildick-Smith Judgement over half a
century earlier (see Chapter Two).
12 Arthur Nieuwoudt, as the president of the South African Confederation of Labour
(SACLA), was the representative of the most conservative section of white trade
unionism. He was the most outspoken critic of the majority view of the commission and
threatened to resign from it during its deliberations (Friedman 1987: 163). Townsend
Neethling was from the Confederation of Metal and Building Unions. As was noted in the
previous chapter, there was a perception amongst white trade unionists that skills
shortage arguments were an excuse by employers to force unwelcomed changes in working
practices upon their members.
the fact that technological change was for the present seen as a relatively
gradual process. This can be contrasted with the more dramatic view of
technological change in the 1960s (Education Panel 1963), which was
returned to in the 1980s, as I shall demonstrate subsequently.
A related theme to that of skills shortage was the argument that the
training system was suffering from considerable weaknesses. This
argument formed a significant element of the analysis in Part Two of the
Report. The need to improve both the quantity and the quality of
apprentices was highlighted (221). The existing provision for African
training under the Black Building Workers Act, 1952, was held to be even
worse, particularly in terms of its theoretical input (225). The
Commission dwelt at length on the advantages of trade testing13 (221)
and contrasted this with the "lack of formal procedures for the
assessment of training needs at industry and national level" (231). In
particular, the presence of "effluxion of time" procedures next to trade
testing was seen as leading to a confused system (231).14
In the mines the problems of the scheduling system had led to severe
problems of misarticulation between training and employment, which
even the formal system of exemptions had failed to tackle.
The Commission in fact found that the regulations are
often violated with non-scheduled, and hence non-
certificated, workers doing certified work. This reduces
safety and overall productivity because these people are
not formally trained, officially examined and certificated
and are not accountable in terms of the Act. (709)
13 The differences in the racial composition of the artisanal class between South Africa
and other British colonies such as Kenya may explain the long time gap from compulsory
trade testing in the other colonies and its introduction in South Africa.
14 As noted elsewhere in this thesis, "effluxion of time" refers to the principle adhered to
in South African apprenticeship training that qualification as an artisan was dependent
upon completing a specified training period and not on success in a trade test.
The Unworkable Existing System
Another major theme of the Report was that the old ways of organizing
the workplace were no longer relevant, but that new realities required a
new dispensation. The Report treated past legislation and the rationales
for it sympathetically. Considerable space, for instance, was taken up by
an examination of the arguments used by the Botha Commission of 1948
to find against African trade unionism (30-2). The Wiehahn
Commission noted that such sentiments were still held by many white
South Africans but maintained that they were now outdated:
The Commission is indeed prepared to accept that the line
of reasoning submitted by the aforementioned witnesses
may have had some justification at earlier stages in South
Africa's industrial history, but is of the opinion that many
points of argument recorded by the Botha Commission
have been invalidated by developments in the
intervening three decades. (31)
Similar arguments were advanced against the retention of work
reservation: "its existence is no longer tenable in view of the
developments on the labour front affecting black workers" (77).
The Commission went further than this in arguing that there were some
pieces of legislation which were not only outdated but were in fact now
unworkable. This was particularly true in the mines with the system of
exemptions, as seen above. As a result, a dichotomy between legislation
and practice was argued to have been emerging at several points in the
industrial system. A further argument advanced in the Report was that
certain elements of the existing legislation were doing more harm than
good and were in need of urgent replacement.
It was held that the system had become too complex due to the
discrimination inherent in its treatment of the different population
groups. Early in the Report the dualistic system of labour legislation
which separated Africans from other population groups was highlighted
(2). With the increasing use of higher skilled African labour, the
Commission pointed to the anomalous nature of a dispensation in which
two workers employed in the same job in the same factory could be
subject to different systems of wage determination (33).
The provision of training under existing legislation was also argued to
have been affected adversely by differentiated legislation. As a result of
the separation of training by population group, training provision had
become highly fragmented in the view of the Commission (231). In
keeping with the case of collective bargaining and union rights, here the
Report recommended that an attempt be made to harmonize existing
legislation so as to build on best practice (226).
A significant element of the Report's argument that the old dispensation
was no longer tenable was the claim that there had been major advances
in African education levels over the preceding years.15 This advance, it
was maintained, meant that Africans were now able to perform the
skilled tasks for which the economy was experiencing a shortage of
suitable workers. Moreover, higher African education levels meant that
the new generation of African labour market entrants would increasingly
expect such training and employment. African educational advancement
was also used explicitly as a justification for the abandonment of the
Botha Commission's opposition to non-racial trade unions (30-1).
15 Although Bantu Education was criticised in the previous chapter on the grounds of its
inferiority to white education, it is true that African access to education rose rapidly
under state control.
Implicit in the Commission's arguments seems to be a rejection of any-
fundamental right of African workers to have equal access to skilled
employment. Instead it appears that it is their recent "rapid
development" which has made them suitable to be employed in such
areas.16 Indeed, the report at times hints that issues of legitimation were
at the heart of the reform agenda.17 The growing numbers of educated
African youth appeared to be a particular concern of the Commission
(102). Such a concern in the immediate aftermath of the Soweto Uprising
was not coincidental (Wiehahn OI 1995).
Nonetheless, taken in the light of the Verwoerdian vision of Apartheid
and the intention that Africans should receive "appropriate" education
for employment "suitable" for them, the sentiments of the commission
can be seen as a radical departure from the grand Apartheid vision.
Although it was argued that much of the existing legislation was either
outdated, unworkable or dangerous, the Report maintained that change
should be slow and evolutionary (5) and this point was accepted by the
government (125). This fitted well with the argument, seen above, that
the aim should be to harmonize the existing legislation so as to base the
new dispensation on existing best practice.
Such an argument can be read as part of the Report's concern with the
need to placate white opposition, particularly amongst the trade unions
and the bureaucracy. Equally, however, it can be seen as in keeping with
the calls of English-speaking business for incremental change as a largely
16 In the context of the debates of the inter-war years discussed earlier, it appears that a
view of cultural rather than biological difference is operating here in the economic
sphere. Whilst some Africans may now be advanced enough to do skilled work there is
still no sign of a wish to assimilate them into the white polity.
17 The theme of legitimation crisis will be dealt with at greater length later in this
chapter.
technical solution to South Africa's problem, a point that will be returned
to subsequently.
Threats to Stability
The threat to the stability of the South African political and economic
systems of a failure to reform was a third major element of the Report.
This appeared to arise out of the realization that the previous arguments
could be strengthened significantly by the proposition that the very
existence of white rule was threatened if reform was not attempted. In
particular, this was a powerful argument against the resistance of white
trade unions who could be portrayed as both selfish and unpatriotic as a
result of their opposition to reform.
A key element of this argument was that the dangers inherent in reform
were considerably less than those present in a maintenance of the status
quo (32). It was concluded also that the threat of African unrest was likely
to be as great as the dangers posed by a potential white reaction. Indeed
"the frustration of Black career ambitions could pose as much of a threat
to industrial peace as the prospect of a 'White backlash'" (712).
The Commission made a direct link between labour unrest and township
unrest (2). They also argued that both would continue to grow if non-
racial trade unions were not unbanned (36). Furthermore, the dangers
inherent in the increasingly high levels of African youth unemployment
were seen as a significant reason for the introduction of African
apprenticeships (77). The Report also saw the success of homeland and
township policy as largely dependent on the successful reorientation of
labour legislation (101-2).
The Commission appears to have found itself in a dilemma. It was
convinced of the need to reform labour legislation to reflect the
increasing African industrial presence, but equally was concerned with
the potential power that this would give to the predominantly African,
non-racial trade unions and their members.18 Such a concern must have
been greatly strengthened by the Durban strikes of 1973 and the Soweto
Uprising of 1976. These fears led to a perceived need to encourage
capitalist principles amongst the African workforce and to expose their
trade unions
more directly to South Africa's trade union traditions and
the existing institutions, thus inculcating a sense of
responsibility and loyalty towards the free market system.
(35)
The Commission thus recommended an increased emphasis on
industrial relations training (115).
The concern that a new breed of politicized workers and union officials
were shaping the new unions into a formidable political force in
opposition to the state was another element of growing white fears
regarding the dangers of a failure to reform. This concern seems to have
been generated primarily by the events of 1973 and 1976. The need to
control the non-racial unions for security reasons also complemented the
need to appear to be strict with them in order to defuse the opposition of
white unions to the Commission's proposals.
18 Those new unions which came together as first the Federation and then the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (FOSATU/COSATU) were open to all races. Fiowever, their
membership tended to be predominantly African, although many officials were white or
Indian. In official parlance they were described as Black unions, although occasionally
the focus was on their unregistered status.
The theme of the need to control non-registered trade unions thus
became a recurrent one throughout the Report. It was argued that these
unions were able to act in a political nature as a result of their non¬
registration:
Black trade unions are subject to neither the protective
and stabilising elements of the system nor its essential
discipline and control; they in fact enjoy greater freedom
than registered unions, to the extent that they are free if
they so wished to participate in politics and to utilise their
funds for whatever purposes they see fit. (33)
These trade unions were also argued to have been subject to external
political interference which was held to have increased after 1973 (29-30).
Non-registered unions were not subject to financial scrutiny and could
receive income from external sources (33).
They were also claimed to be enjoying unfair advantage due to their non-
registered status, although there was little attempt to advance evidence in
favour of this proposition. Nonetheless, it formed part of the broader
argument that the power of non-racial unions would be successfully kept
in check if they were brought within the registration system. This again
appears to have been an attempt, in part, to sell the reforms to white
conservatives, particularly in the trade unions.
The argument that it was better to have Africans within the system
where they could be controlled can also be found in the debate over the
elements of the African population to which union rights should be
accorded. Whilst the minority view, consistent with the Apartheid
fiction of the homeland system, was that only permanent residents of
(white) South Africa were entitled to union rights, the majority view was
that migrants and commuters should also be brought within the system.
The argument here was clear: such workers could be more easily
controlled within the system.
The Commission does not accept that, even if there were
any justification for the fear that migrants might disrupt
industrial peace, the problem could be forestalled or
solved by barring them from unions. On the contrary, it is
strongly felt that workers from elsewhere who might pose
a threat to industrial peace should be subjected to the
disciplines of the country's industrial laws, not exempted
from them. (39)
The majority view also found against the likelihood that migrants would
swamp the new unions, arguing plausibly that they would be harder to
unionize than more stabilized workers (47).
The Commission seemed intent on pressurizing the non-racial unions to
register. Non-registration was to be made unattractive and, if possible,
untenable. Non-registered unions would not be recognized for the
purposes of collective bargaining. Moreover, they would be disallowed
from using stop orders (72). The right of unions to have employers
subtract union dues from wages through such orders was seen by the
Commission as being central to the financial well-being of a union.
However, this was but one element of a flawed policy of control which
stemmed from a failure to either consult or understand non-registered
trade unionism, which differed significantly from its established
counterpart. The non-registered unions did not use the stop order system
and, therefore, could not be hurt through it (Friedman 1987).
Registration was also hampered by the industrial council veto and the
retention of the closed shop, referred to above. Moreover, there was
widespread union expectation that registration would be refused in any
case (ibid.)
Free Market Principles
The Wiehahn Report has been identified as marking the start of a shift in
the official South African discourse towards a market ideology (Kraak
1993b) and a reduced state role in the economy. It is possible to overstress
such arguments. Nonetheless, adherence to free market principles was a
frequently rehearsed theme of the Report and the accompanying White
Papers. It also can be found in Wiehahn's own introductory notes to the
Report (xxv-xxvi). Moreover, Part Two, the report on training, invoked
the memory of Adam Smith as the founder of human capital theory in
its very first sentence (159).
Throughout the Report, free market principles were advanced as a
measure of whether a particular policy was justified. Indeed, several
policies and proposals were criticized for their non-adherence to such
market principles. These included the proposal to ban the non-registered
trade unions (36) and the policy of work reservation in non-mining
sectors (77-8). The market forces argument was also advanced by the
recommendation that training should be primarily the responsibility of
employers rather than the state (228).
This did not mean that there should be no role for the state. Rather, the
Report argued that the state should have a responsibility for overcoming
any barriers to the market and for the amelioration of the negative effects
caused by any distortions (6). This would allow, for example, a
complementary training role for the state, an argument which received
support in the second White Paper (227; 278).19
19 This view was to become internationally orthodox during the 1980s, largely through
the efforts of the World Bank.
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The majority view on the Commission showed a greater emphasis on
market principles than had previously been represented in official
discourse in South Africa. However, the argument that the Wiehahn
Report was a thorough-going pro-market tract easily can be overstated.
Certainly, the serious limitations of the Report's pro-market sentiments
and recommendations should not be overlooked.
It is significant, for example, that a recommendation to end the closed
shop received only minority support from the commissioners. Indeed,
the minority recommendation of Botes, Du Toit, Mokoatle, Steenkamp
and Sutton20 on this matter contained a strong denunciation of the anti-
market stance of the majority:
Perpetuation of the closed shop practice and its statutory
sanctioning stands in direct contradiction to principles
stated as being fundamental in this Part of the report. It
derogates from the notion of minimal state intervention
in a private relationship; it constitutes an intrusion on
freedom of association (with its corollary of the freedom
not to associate, which is an essential part of the
Commission's recommendations in regard to trade union
membership and trade union structure); and it conflicts
with the principles of a free-enterprise economy. (70)
The state was often even more reticent than the Commission and White
Paper 2 in particular suggested that the role of the state was to continue to
be much greater than that consistent with a strong pro-market stance:
The Government again wishes to state clearly that the
manpower objectives mentioned are pursued within the
broad framework of a free market system but with due
regard to other national objectives, the special
circumstances in South Africa and events and
developments that make it necessary for the Government
to influence the system. (274)
20 This group amounted to the business lobby on the Commission.
The claim that the Report led to a decline in the state's role in the
industrial relations system is hard to sustain. The new discretionary
powers given to the Minister and the Industrial Registrar, and the
introduction of the National Manpower Commission and the Industrial
Court, served to increase the scope that the state and its proxies had for
intervention in the system. It was possible, for instance, that a political
appointee, the Industrial Registrar, would be able to decide which unions
would and would not be accorded bargaining rights regardless of any
agreement that employers and trade unions might make. Such a decision
would inevitably be open to charges of political motivation.
The Report itself qualified its adherence to market principles with a
continued preoccupation with the maintenance of "group interests" (87;
105). At several points in the Report this had the effect of undermining
pro-market, anti-discrimination sentiments. The Report claimed that
equal access was the fundamental principle in deciding to end job
reservation. Nonetheless, the subsequent qualification of this point
largely negated this argument:
However, the frequently stated fear of the displacement of
Whites by "cheap labour" cannot be dismissed as sheer
wilfulness or obstinate protection of privilege by White
unions .... [Therefore] the Commission is firmly of the
opinion that it would be in the interests of orderly and
peaceful industrial relations reform if adequate provision
were made for feelings of insecurity evidently being
experienced by white workers. (713)
This reticence about the market and continued adherence to group
rights/interests was a result of the Report's contested nature and the
political climate of uncertainty within which the Commission was
located. The Commission was positioned so as both to have to advance
solutions to crucial elements of an apparent crisis of the South African
system of political economy and to satisfy conservative opinion. Both the
presence of conservative trade unionists on the Commission and the
government's attempt to keep the Report at arm's length appear to have
tempered the more free market preferences of Wiehahn and the
employer commissioners. Nonetheless, the Report should be read as
marking the beginning of a fundamental shift in the dominant official
meta-narrative from an Apartheid ideology to a market-oriented
ideology.
The Educational Response: de Lange
It had been judged better to start the reform process in training rather
than education. This in part was due to the economic nature of the
challenge faced, as a result of the accumulation crisis that was at the heart
of the breakdown of Fordism.21 It was also influenced by the perception
that reform would be easier to start in the training sector rather than the
education sector, as the former was less politically and culturally sensitive
(Wiehahn OI 1995). However, both the underlying ideological shift and
the specific recommendations of Wiehahn had inevitable implications
for education. For, as the racialized organization of work changed, so that
of education had to change also in order to respond. Moreover, the
educational crisis, reflected in the Soweto Uprising of 1976 and reinforced
by the renewed wave of school boycotts in 1980, required a systematic
official response. As noted in Chapter Two, it was at the height of this
latter boycott that the de Lange Commission was established under the
21 This accumulation crisis will be discussed later in this chapter.
auspices of the Human Sciences Research Council [HSRC] (Nasson
1989).22
As with the Wiehahn Commission a chairman was found from the
Afrikaner academic community, in this case the Rector of the Rand
Afrikaanse Universiteit. This Commission differed from that of
Wiehahn, however, in that it was comprised more of experts than
stakeholders. Moreover, it was decided that individual members would
have a veto over recommendations. This had the effect of eliminating
the plethora of minority recommendation which infested the Wiehahn
Report. The use of the HSRC, a parastatal research institute, and a
number of technical working committees also furthered the feel of the de
Lange Report as a scientific, technical, value-free document based on
research rather than vested interests.
Recommendations
Chapter Two noted that the HSRC Investigation into Education (HSRC
1981a) was the first major government-sponsored examination of
education since the Eiselen Report almost thirty years earlier. Given the
huge changes, politically and economically, during that period, the de
Lange Commission's recommendations were for a massive overhaul of
existing education objectives and organization.
The principal thrust of the Report was that a more explicitly vocational
focus should be introduced throughout the education system. This is
most clearly seen in the first recommendation of the technical and
22 Thus the Wiehahn and de Lange Commissions can be seen in large part as responses to
black pressure manifested in protests.
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vocational education sub-committee, later endorsed by the main
committee, that
the system for the provision of education be urgently and
drastically changed to establish a differentiated system for the
provision of education in which 50 to 80% of the pupils will
receive vocational education before Standard 10. (HSRC
1981b: 35)23
This target was to be achieved through two principal methods. First,
through the introduction of senior vocational high schools, allied to
increased use of technical colleges. Second, for "environmentally
handicapped" (and the rest of the text makes clear this means African24)
students such canalization could take place as early as the primary school.
Such students could hope for a semi-skilled occupation at best (HSRC
1981b: 20).
Even in "academic" streams, vocational subjects would be introduced at
junior secondary level (HSRC 1981b: 25). The process of vocationalizing
education also was to operate at tertiary level where quotas for less
vocational subjects were proposed (HSRC 1981b: 27).
It was recommended further that all education should come under a
single ministry, although this did not amount to an explicit call for
desegregation of schools. The key focus here was on the equalization of
educational quality across the diverse sub-systems. This is indicative of a
marketized view of equity rather than a radical one.
23 Many of the recommendations of the technical and vocational education sub-committee
were in fact repeated verbatim in the Main Report. Thus, citation here of the sub-report
simply reflects the original source.
24 The text stresses South Africa's nature as a developing country and the particular
problems of those populations which are not Westernised in becoming part of the
Westernised economy and culture. Students from a non-Westernised background are not
genetically backward but suffer from environmental handicaps. Thus, we see a reworking
of the debates of the inter-war years (see Chapter Two) regarding race and culture.
Such an equalization of quality implied a huge resource increase for
African education in particular. This was seen as impractical within the
existing state-driven formal education structures. Therefore, the de
Lange Commission made two further key proposals. First, non-formal
education should be the route to increased educational access for an
expanding number of learners. Here again it is evident that this meant
primarily Africans, given that they were the population most likely to be
impacted upon by an educational expansion. Second, the private sector
should be encouraged to contribute to the financing of education. Linked
to the drive towards greater vocationalization, one element of this call
was directed at the establishment of private vocational schools (HSRC
1981b: 32).25 State assistance for existing private schools was also
recommended.
Skills Shortage
The de Lange Report agreed with the Wiehahn Commission in seeing a
skills shortage as a fundamental reason for addressing the transition
between learning and work. The technical and vocational education sub¬
committee's research showed a shortage of skilled workers at artisan,
technician and engineer levels (HSRC 1981b: 8-9). This was seen as
leading to problems of international competitiveness as it raised the cost
of production. Even the widespread reliance on fragmentation of skilled
jobs was held to be an inadequate solution, there being too few skilled
workers even to cope under such a system. This emphasis on education
25 The development of such schools is highly expensive. As noted in Chapter Two, it was
possible for the state to privatise much of this expenditure given the interest of several
major corporations in funding such provision.
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as a response to economic imperatives is again indicative of the growing
power of the market-oriented meta-narrative.
Educational Failure
The Wiehahn Report, with its focus on training, had located the origins
of the alleged skills crisis in Apartheid legislation and outmoded work
practices. From its educational perspective, the de Lange Report shifted
the focus of blame onto the education system, arguing that "the neglect of
vocational education at the secondary level .... is singled out as the direct
cause of the labour shortage" (HSRC 1981b: 36).
This forms part of a wider critique of education as failing industry that
seems to have been influenced by New Vocationalism from England.26
De Lange's 1980 visit to the Manpower Services Commission in England
provides some evidence of such an influence (Kallaway 1995).
There had been a tradition of criticizing academic bias in the education of
Africans in the past. The de Lange Commission, however, appeared to
extend such a criticism to the education of all races:
The South African system for the provision of education
has always been aimed mainly at the preparation of pupils
for university study, regardless of whether or not pupils
will continue their academic training after Standard 10. A
large part of the white population consequently enters the
world of work without any occupational qualifications,
skills or appropriate value systems. (HSRC 1981b: 36)
26 It is worth reiterating Chapter Two's explanation that New Vocationalism was more
concerned with developing better school-industry links and ideological preparation for
industry than with the technical preparation characterised by technical high schools. In
its critique of present provision, the de Lange report was strongly reminiscent of New
Vocationalist arguments. The recommendations contained both Vocationalist and New
Vocationalist elements, although the privatisation strand meant that much of the former
focus was to be left to industry to fund.
The inappropriateness of an academic-oriented education system could be
seen as operating in terms of the three themes of orientation, preparation
and socialization. In the Commission's view, the focus on attending
university, which was at the centre of the system, oriented students away
from productive occupations and vocational subjects. The academic
skills provided by the school system and the universities were not the
same skills that the economy required for productivity and international
competitiveness. Moreover, as the last quotation indicates, the school
system failed to socialize students to the workplace. Students were held
to lack a "sound value system" (HSRC 1981b: 39). In the technical and
vocational education sub-committee's opinion, such a system would
include "high morals, a religious concept and a vocational code
incorporating diligence, accuracy, promptness, etc." (ibid.). These
arguments implied that education for all races should better reflect
economic needs, in keeping with Market-Oriented thinking.
Free market Principles
The de Lange Report also took the pro-market sentiments of the
Wiehahn Commission further by extending them into education, a more
integral and extensive state function than training. It was recommended
that "the greatest possible degree of autonomy should be given to the
institution that is 'closest' to both parents and teachers- 'the school'"
(HSRC 1981a: 201).
School governing bodies would be able to influence staffing and to
localize the curriculum, subject to broad criteria.27 The importance of
parental choice was also acknowledged, although this too would have to
be bounded by other considerations (ibid.). As noted earlier, private
sector initiatives in schooling, and particularly in technical and
vocational education, were encouraged.
The subsidization of private schools by the state represented a break from
past practice as the Afrikaner-dominated state had a history of opposition
to these institutions which traditionally had been predominantly
English-speaking (whether white or black).
The Government's Response to de Lange: The Interim Memorandum
and the White Paper
The official response to the recommendations of the de Lange
Commission was indicative of the highly sensitive nature of education
policy. Instead of allowing the publication of the Report and then
responding to it, the Report was released by the government at the same
press conference as a well-prepared rebuttal of several of its key
recommendations: The Interim Memorandum on the Report of the
Main Committee on the HSRC's Inquiry into Education (RSA 1981). This
memorandum amounted to a reaffirmation of several of the most dearly
cherished tenets of Apartheid education: Christian National principles in
white education, separate departments of education and segregated
schools. It also highlighted the extent to which the discourse of the
27 This positioning of the South African debate in favour of some degree of localization of
curriculum is still of relevance in the contemporary context of debates both around
provincialization and a national curriculum.
100
National Party attempted to reflect simultaneously both the old
Apartheid and the new market-oriented meta-narratives.
Rejection of the proposal for a single department of education was
reinforced by the new tri-cameral constitution, approved by a whites-only
referendum in 1983. Under its provisions, education was an "own affair"
for whites, Indians and coloureds, African education still being subject to
the white-controlled Department of Education and Training in "white"
South Africa and to homeland authorities elsewhere.
De Lange was asked to continue work on his proposals and in 1983 a bill
was presented to parliament, becoming law the following year. This
legislation reflected the recommendations of the Commission regarding
greater devolution of power to lower level education authorities and
communities, and greater private sector involvement in education.
As regards the vocational aspects of the de Lange Report, a subtle
reshaping of the recommendations was effected. The Report had implied
that a more strongly vocational orientation of education would be
introduced for all racial groups, whether through canalization into non-
formal or vocational education for the (overwhelmingly black) majority
or through a greater vocational orientation of academic education for the
(predominantly white) elite. In response, the White Paper argued against
tilting the balance too far towards vocational rather than general
education. Moreover, it reiterated the need to have elite academic
education for some:
Just as career-oriented technical and vocational education
is the most suitable path for a large number of learners
and the way in which they can best develop their abilities,
aptitudes and interest, academic education, which is
directed mainly at university entrance, is the ideal path for
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an important, if smaller, group of learners. (RSA 1983:
para. 7.10.2.b.)
The subsequent paragraph shifted to a consideration of the paucity of
vocational education for Africans. As a result, it is possible to argue that a
highly racially segregated model was being proposed, particularly in the
light of the rejection of the other de Lange Commission
recommendations. The vision here seemed to be one of academic
education for all whites, with the majority of Africans (and to a lesser
extent coloureds and Asians) being consigned to a narrow form of
vocational education and training.
The parallel strand of privatization permitted white schools to have
greater autonomy. As a result it furthered this new segregation which
can be seen as reflecting a more sophisticated attempt on the behalf of the
state to unite both market forces and the maintenance of race and class
privilege into a single discourse.
Training Through the 1980s: The HSRC/NTB Trilogy
Recommendations
Whilst the implementation of many of the specific recommendations of
the de Lange Commission was avoided by the state, many of the
Wiehahn Commission's recommendations showed a greater direct
impact. One of these recommendations had been for an investigation
into the training of artisans. This was taken up by the newly formed
National Training Board (NTB), which commissioned the HSRC to
produce The HSRC/NTB Investigation into the Training of Artisans in
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the RSA in 1982 (HSRC/NTB 1984). This in turn recommended a broader
HSRC/NTB Investigation into Skills Training in the RSA commissioned
in 1986 and reporting in 1989 (HSRC/NTB 1989). This was followed
immediately by a third report, The HSRC/NTB Investigation into a
National Training Strategy for the RSA. which was published in 1991
(HSRC/NTB 1991).28'29 Like the de Lange Report, these were very much
technocratic documents, dominated by bureaucrats and experts and
supported by a large number of work committees.30 This belief in experts
itself is often seen as an aspect of the market-oriented meta-narrative.
Whether through the market or through such expert deliberations,
decision-making and resource allocation are portrayed as value-free.
This trilogy of reports should be seen as marking the further evolution of
the ideas that appeared in the Wiehahn Report. They should also be seen
in conjunction with the de Lange investigation.31 Although they are
reports which are about training and not education, a strong element of
critique of education can be detected, as will become clear presently.
The principal recommendation arising out of these reports was for a
decentralized system of accredited industry training boards. The second
investigation also stressed the notion of industry-based levies to fund
their operation in the search for increased training provision. The state
role in funding was clarified in the same report as being principally
28 All three investigations were chaired by Alan Pittendrigh, Director of Natal
Technikon.
29 Subsequent references to these three reports will be to abbreviated names without dates
for convenience. The first report will be called "Artisans", the second "Skills" and the
third "NTS".
30 In keeping with the left's relative lack of interest in training during the 1980s
(discussed below), this section contains only one reference to a critique of the reports, and
that to the third alone. No other critical commentaries were identified.
31 The first two reports indeed were described as part of the on-going de Lange research
project.
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directed at the problem of youth unemployment. The third investigation
explored this further, calling for a training partnership with even greater
private sector responsibility for funding.
Training methodology was also addressed. The first report recommended
the universal adoption of competency-based modular training (CBMT).
Effluxion of time was finally abolished by the Manpower Training
Amendment Act of 1990, the legislative response to the first two reports.
Here again, I am more concerned with the evolution of official discourse
apparent in the reports rather than in the actual provisions. In these
reports we see a continuation of the Wiehahn Commission's argument
as regards skill shortage and the related issues of technological and
structural change and training failure. However, its concerns with
irrelevant legislation and threats to stability have largely disappeared. In
their place comes the de Lange Report's concern with educational failure.
The three reports also mark the further evolution of official attitudes
towards free market principles.
Skills Shortage
The perceived significance of this theme was clear from references in the
prefaces of the first two reports and on the first page of the third. Indeed
the very first sentence of this trilogy highlighted skills shortage as one of
South Africa's most serious problems.
As we approach the end of the twentieth century, one of
the most pressing needs in the RSA, plagued by many
large economic, monetary and political problems, is a
reasonable supply of trained manpower from all
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population groups in order to improve productivity.
(Artisans xi)
Skills shortage, resulting from technological change and the failures of
the education and training systems to cope with such change, was the
fundamental reason suggested for why reforms were necessary. The
concept, moreover, was linked to notions of competitiveness, efficiency
and productivity, all major concerns in a marketized ideology.
The importance of the theme of skills shortage to the overall argument of
the reports is illustrated through the reporting of evidence contrary to the
conclusions in such a manner that it appeared to become supportive. For
example, the data provided in the NTS investigation to show the relative
levels of manpower supply and demand according to level of training
contradicted the argument that skills shortages were increasing at High
Level Manpower (HLM) and Medium Level Manpower (MLM) levels.
From a 47% shortfall of HLM in 1970, the shortfall had been reduced to
30% in 1980 and was projected to fall to 15% by 2000. The case of MLM is a
more serious rebuff to the arguments of the text. From a deficit in 1970 of
46%, the deficit stood at 26% by 1980. Significantly, by 2000 there was to be
a projected surplus of 2% (calculated from table 5.15, page 165). Thus the
data appears consistent with existing skills shortages but not with the
claim that skills shortages were accelerating.32
It is important to note that the second report showed signs of a new view
about skills. In a brief section it argued that there was a need to think of
skills as being broader than the usual technical dimension. This may
have been more indicative of a continued influence from England, now
32 Previous discussion (see especially the footnote on page 54) has already pointed to the
theoretical problems with the notion of skills shortage which make such measurements as
these hugely problematic.
105
through the National Council for Vocational Qualifications33, rather
than widely spread local concerns. For the moment, however, it
remained only partially developed.
Employer Attitudes and Training Failures
As in the case of the Wiehahn Report, notions of skills shortage were
closely related to a reading which saw inadequacies in the existing
training system. The first report in particular seems to have been
influenced by a perception that industry had not made enough progress
in the training arena since the Wiehahn Commission had reported.
Indeed early in the report there was a coded attack on the persistence of
racist attitudes among employers which was having a negative effect on
the number and type of people applying for and receiving apprenticeship
places (Artisans 3). This report also criticized the failure to provide
facilities for blacks and women (Artisans 159).
All three reports contained a series of criticisms of the training system
arguing that "training in all its facets is generally not satisfactory in a large
group of industries" (Skills 103). It was alleged that many employers of
all sizes lacked adequate training facilities (NTS 114). Smaller employers
were seen to be particularly poor at providing a full range of learning
experiences for their trainees (Artisans 108).
The methods of training used were also criticized. Most employers, in
the eyes of the investigation, still depended largely upon lecture and
observation as the means by which trainees learned (Skills 190). This was
33 The NCVQ was referred to in both this and the third report.
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held to be a consequence, at least in part, of a shortage in numbers of
trainers (Skills 91; NTS 114). Moreover, many of those trainers who were
employed were found to be lacking in academic, trade and teaching
qualifications (Skills 189).
Trade tests in accredited centres were not yet compulsory and little testing
of trainees took place in the work environment (Skills 190). Indeed, it
was argued that there was rarely any real objective basis for evaluation of
either the performance of individual trainees or of training programmes
as a whole:
Too little attention is given to evaluation of training in
terms of better work performance after training. Training
should set clear goals such as higher productivity and
increased profitability. (Skills 193)
Decisions over the final structure and content of training courses were
found to be rarely in the hands of training managers (Skills 190). This
was exacerbated by a "communications gap between trainers and top
management" (Skills 220). Moreover, managers were seen typically to
lack trade training or technical knowledge (Skills 89). Even some
employers acknowledged negative managerial attitudes to training (Skills
191). It was complained that many managers were unwilling and/or
unable to motivate their staff regarding training (Skills 191).
The second report complained that training was too often treated as a cost
rather than an investment: "employers still see training in relation to
short-term profit goals and not as a long-term investment in human
capital" (Skills 218). Most companies lacked formal training policies or
systematic career structures (Skills 190). The investigation was led to
conclude that
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It seems that employers give a low priority to training and
particularly skills training in their budgets. In the RSA on
average less than 2% of expenditure is allocated to
training, while the average allocation in other countries is
5%. (Skills 197).
The reports also found that the problems were not just at the level of
individual companies but existed at industry level too. Here again, it
appeared to the HSRC/NTB investigators that the recommendations of
the Wiehahn Commission had not been carried out with any rigour. The
Industrial Council system had only achieved patchy operation by the late
1980s (Skills 189). Similarly, neither Industry Training Boards nor
training funds had been set up in most industries (Skills 189). Equally,
few industries had a system of grants for training (Skills 189). Lack of
cooperation characterized a system where rivalry and fear of free rider
problems34 were considered to be more important than the potential
economies of scale to be gained from joint action (Skills 189; NTS 114-5).
The fragmentary nature of the system was made even more serious by
the failure of most training programmes to register with the state (Skills
188).
The NTS document made clear the seriousness with which the failings of
industry were viewed.
(a) There was a lack of commitment to training by
employers.
(b) Many employers were production orientated. They felt
that training employees meant that less production would
take place.
(c) A lack of awareness among employers of the benefits of
training made them reluctant to send workers for training.
34 The free rider is the company which lets others do the training and then poaches their
newly trained workers. Such behaviour leads other employers to be more reluctant to
train.
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(d) Employers had trouble in identifying the actual
training needs in their companies.
(e) When employers evaluated training, they often
thought it had been ineffective because they confused
training and what it was worth with issues related to poor
management, supervision and planning.
(f) It was possible to poach trained workers from other
companies, thus making some employers reluctant to
train their workers.
(g) It seemed to some respondents that in many companies
the development of human resources enjoyed a low
priority. (NTS 111-2)
These criticisms are indicative of an important point. Although
employers and managers tend to operate within a market-oriented
paradigm at a theoretical level, their practices are often inconsistent with
such a stance. Moreover, the above criticisms illustrate the Fordist
thinking of many employers for whom labour remained a cost to be
minimized rather than an investment to be maximized.
Educational Failure
I have already noted that the first two reports were designated as part of
the de Lange research programme and made considerable use of the de
Lange Commission's analysis. The focus on the failures of the education
system as a principal constraint upon training and, hence, economic
performance, however, was most pronounced in the final report. This
was influenced no doubt by the concurrent research for an Education
Renewal Strategy35 (see Chapter Four) and the growing recognition of the
fact that much of the de Lange recommendations had not yet been
35 Work on the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) was commissioned in May 1990.
Therefore there is a degree of overlap with the NTS process.
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implemented by either a National Party mindful through the 1980s of
vote loss to the right or by a highly conservative educational bureaucracy
(Hartshorne OI 1995).
The first report made it clear that a mismatch between the education
system and the needs of industry was at the root of the problems of the
economy:
One of the most important reasons for the acute shortage
of technically and technologically trained workers in the
RSA can be attributed to the present education systems. It
is contended that education does not succeed in creating
harmony between the pupils that it educates on the one
hand, and society's needs for manpower on the other.
(Artisans 178).
In keeping with the views of the de Lange Report, the school system was
seen as being too academically focused and uninterested in the world of
work. As a result of this, pupils were channelled towards further
academic study rather than useful work. The education system was also
criticized for its alleged failure to prepare students adequately with the
skills and knowledge that employers expected. A frequent complaint of
employers was that education standards were too low (Skills 190). The
system was criticized by them for being deficient in both quality and
quantity of output (NTS 46; NTS 47; NTS 112).
In particular, the reports focused on the low literacy levels of many
students and workers. It noted that "complaints about blue-collar
workers being functionally illiterate and about the lack of a command of
language among clerical workers are commonplace" (Skills 192).
The school system was held to have failed in preparing students with
functional literacy in the "commercial languages" of English and
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Afrikaans (Skills 178).36 Levels of numeracy were also seen as inadequate
(NTS 112). As a result of these deficiencies, school leavers were
characterized as having little ability to communicate in the workplace
(NTS 235).
The quality of education in the other priority areas of the curriculum,
mathematics and science, was also criticized, it being claimed that
"mathematics and science education is absent or not of the required
standard" (NTS 234).
The combined effects of the poor access of certain population groups and
poor quality across the system were seen as major obstacles to effective
training (NTS 235). Indeed, it was argued that "mainly on the account of
educational shortcomings, employees do not generally have the potential
to be trained in the relevant skills" (Skills 103). The shortcomings of the
education system were also held responsible for the high rate of failure of
trade tests (Artisans 140).37
As well as failing to encourage students to follow vocational paths and to
provide them with the necessary skills and knowledge for effective
performance in the work place, the education system was also charged
with an inability to inculcate students with the necessary attitudes and
values for participation in the world of work.
The second investigation reported that employers were complaining
about the "little interest" and "antisocial conduct" of trainees (Skills 190).
36 Throughout this critique of education it was presumably African education that was the
primary focus of complaints. This, however, was not made explicit.
37 Although not compulsory until the Manpower Training Act of 1990, trade tests had been
taken (and up to half of them failed) by many artisans in the fifty years prior to that.
The more common reason advanced for trade test failure was that success or failure made
no apparent difference to wages.
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In response to this, the third report showed a strong stress on social and
personal skills and work ethics (NTS 263). Again, this argument is
striking. Although a reading of the earlier critique of training suggests
that employers and managers have to shoulder much of the blame for
poor skills levels, here the blame is transferred to, rather than shared
with, workers and the education system.
Free Market Principles
The NTS has been described by Kraak (1992: 1) as "the triumph of market
ideology". Several strands of pro-market argument can be found across
all the reports. The need for industry based systems of accreditation for
training has already been identified as the principal recommendation of
the reports. This can be set firmly within a context of shifting hitherto
state responsibilities onto the private sector.
This was true equally of the recommendation that training policy should
be set at industry level (Skills 179). Decentralization, privatization and
voluntarism were also recurrent themes (e.g. Skills 245-6). An over-large
state role was identified as a principal factor in the failures of the existing
system.
This antagonism towards a significant state role in training could be seen
most clearly in the third report with its stress on the "training
partnership" (NTS 9; NTS 67). It was argued that the private sector and
the state should participate in training as equal partners, cooperating on a
voluntary basis (NTS 9). Significantly, the stress on tripartism and the
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importance of the role of trade unions was much reduced in comparison
to Wiehahn.
An increased market focus can also be seen in the "discovery" of the
informal sector in the second report. In the light of the South African
state's traditional animosity to the informal sector,38 the decision to
devote a chapter of this report to the informal sector was significant.39
This was linked explicitly to concerns with deregulation and the
promotion of entrepreneurship, further elements of the market-oriented
meta-narrative.
The effects of cyclical fluctuations on levels of training is a theme of all
the reports which stands against an excessively libertarian view, however
(Artisans 70; Skills 176; NTS 128). This concern was particularly acute in
the case of the second report:
It has often been stated that training is the responsibility of
the employers and that financial assistance by the state
should only be seen as a temporary measure. This view
cannot, however, be supported as the state cannot divest
itself of responsibility to sponsor training in order to
achieve national goals such as higher productivity,
universal literacy and full employment. It cannot distance
itself from the problems arising in the work situation
owing to the inadequacies and inequalities of the
education system. (Skills 178)
This suggested a continued state role, especially due to educational
failure. Unemployment was also seen as requiring state action towards
retraining (Skills 180).
38 The impossibility of owning urban property, including shops, pushed many Africans
towards the informal sector. However, in combining usual international tactics to keep the
informal sector off the streets with the full force of apartheid repression, the South
African state made progress in the sector particularly difficult.
39 A further HSRC/NTB investigation was subsequently carried out which was solely
concerned with the informal sector (Hirschowitz, Acutt and Koch 1991).
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The critical importance of training to economic well-being, the
inequalities and inadequacies of education, and the shortcomings of the
training system were all seen as necessitating state intervention:
It has been stated that the economy of a country depends to
a large extent on the skill of its labour force and
consequently it can be anticipated that an increase in the
skills level of the labour should heighten the chances of
development of the economy. In view of this fact it can be
claimed that the state has a responsibility with regards to
the training of its citizens even when an ideal educational
system exists. In the RSA with its inequalities in
education, the state has an additional compensatory role to
play in skills training. (Skills 172)
As suggested above, the concern with unemployment at the time of the
second report, and its focus on the failures of training, led it to be
pessimistic about the role of the private sector. Such fears do not appear
to impinge overly on the NTS report. Rather its whole tone was one of
business and managerial science in particular. Schools were compared to
strategic business units (NTS 30) and the nation was held to be a profit
maximizer like private enterprises (NTS 18). The shift towards a
dominant position for the pro-market meta-narrative seems to have been
largely realised.
UPGRADING BLACK EDUCATION AND TRAINING: THE
EMPLOYERS' RESPONSE
Although employers' representatives had an important role in shaping
official policy directly through participation on and submissions to these
investigations, they also increasingly used other methods to advance
their interests regarding education and training. As this section will
show there was a major increase in corporate investment in this field
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both as a means of developing human resources to satisfy business needs
directly, and as a way of influencing state policy through best practice.
Corporate Educational Investment
The concern some employers had been showing with regard to the
education system in the 1960s (see Chapter Two) was heightened by the
events of 1976 in Soweto. Education became seen increasingly as a crucial
arena in the struggle to continue capital accumulation. In the aftermath
of the Soweto Uprising, Anglo-American (the largest English-owned40
company) and Rembrandt (the largest Afrikaner-owned) came together
with other business interests to form the Urban Foundation (UF) as a
means of channelling corporate social investment into African (and, to a
lesser extent, other black) communities.
The central focus of this expenditure, at least in the case of the largest
corporation, Anglo-American, was on education. Along with the other
mining houses, Anglo-American invested heavily in literacy and
numeracy of workers (Chisholm 1984).
There was also major corporate investment in formal vocational
education. From 1977 the Jabulani Technical High School in Soweto was
funded by the Anglo-American Corporation Chairman's Fund (AACCF)
and the UF (Swainson 1991). In 1980 the PACE Commercial College was
established, also in Soweto, with funding from the United States, in order
40 The "English" in South Africa refers primarily to language of business. The
Oppenheimers, founding family of Anglo-American, were originally German. As the name
of the corporation indicates, American interests were also a significant element of the
group's resources (Innes 1984).
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to produce African managers (Danaher 1984).41 In 1981 the Mangosuthu
Technikon, the first for Africans, was opened in Kwa-Zulu with AACCF
as the principal funders (Swainson 1991). On the East Rand, the Isidingo
Technical College was opened two years later after donations amounting
to R13 million from the same source (Swainson 1991).
Investment in institutions was coupled to other corporate strategies. In
many leading companies programmes of African advancement began to
bring Africans into managerial positions for the first time.42 These built
on the human resource development investments noted above, but also
entailed further in-house training expenditures.
Concern with in-house training of blacks also reached the lower rungs of
the corporate ladder. In addition to expenditure on basic education noted
above, companies increasingly began to spend money on programmes
that would better socialize their workforces. The most prominent of such
programmes was the 6M scheme of the National Institute for Personnel
Research, a widely used attempt to educate workers about the beneficent
operation of capitalism (Chisholm and Christie 1983; Kraak 1991).
Policy Interventions
Swainson (1991) argues that companies such as Anglo-American tried to
use these projects as a way of levering policy changes. Certainly, the
business community continued the tradition of the Education Panel
41 See Kraak (1991) for an account of the failure of this experiment.
42 Smollan (1988) contains a discussion of such programmes and company evaluations of
their own efforts.
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through think tanks which produced policy papers. In the 1980s the most
prominent of these was SYNCOM.43
SYNCOM placed great stress on the need to increase the market's
penetration of education. Vouchers and local negotiation of salaries were
two elements of such an approach (SYNCOM 1986). A more
instrumentalist view of education was also in evidence. It was argued
that universities should become solely training institutions for the
professions and should be reorganized to have sandwich courses as the
basic degree structure (ibid.). This instrumentalist view was also present
in Anglo-American and UF calls for greater expenditure by the state on
technical and vocational education (Swainson 1991). These two principal
employer themes of privatization and vocationalization largely mirror
government policy as represented by the de Lange Report and the 1987
Privatization and Deregulation White Paper [Republic of South Africa
1987] (Kallaway 1989).
Reasons for Concern
The employers' concern with educational provision and performance
also paralleled that of the state. Kraak (1989a) has identified a perception
of skills shortage as being behind this concern with African vocational
education. This of course was tied to a reading of educational failure.
Orientation and preparation failures were parts of the SYNCOM critique,
whilst programmes such as 6M pointed to a concern with socialization.
43 SYNCOM was a futurist think-tank chaired by the Niko Stutterheim, Chairman of the
University of Witwatersrand Council. It was at the forefront of advocacy for
privatization at the time of National Party's shift in that direction during the mid-1980s
(Benade 1988).
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Indeed, as the following quote from a leading trainer makes clear, for
some, attitudes rather than technical skills were the most pressing
problem:
It is quite true to say that our black workers need better
education and training. If, however, they are to play a
meaningful role as members of industrial society, they
will need much more than purely technical ability. They
will have to accept the value systems of this society and
must be willing and, indeed, eager to contribute socially to
the formal and informal organisation in a company. This
means learning a range of social skills. Management must
thus ensure that the climate is encouraging so that it
develops workers who are technically able, want to
achieve well, and want to participate in the industrial
society and have the skills to do this. (Horner 1980 cited in
Kraak 1991: 416-7)
In the 1960s, companies such as Anglo-American had sought to
overcome the dominant Apartheid meta-narrative. Now in the 1980s
they acted to reinforce the state's often tentative moves towards replacing
it with big business's preferred pro-market ideology.
CRITIQUING AND CHALLENGING THE OFFICIAL PROJECT: THE
OPPOSITION RESPONSE
The focus of this chapter so far has been on the increasingly harmonized
discourses of state and capital. However, the post-Soweto period marked
the growth in volume and clarity of other discourses: notably from left
leaning (predominantly white) academics and, more significantly, from
black communities. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, it is
important to see these oppositional responses to the programmes of state
and capital during the 1980s as having two phases with somewhat
different ideological and practical characteristics. The first to gain some
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degree of prominence was located principally in academic circles and
drew heavily on Northern intellectual trends in order to critique policy.
The second arose more out of grassroots experiences and concerns and
sought to construct a pro-active educational response to official policy. I
will now look at these in turn.
Critique: the Apartheid and Education Debate
The critique of Apartheid education, and the de Lange era attempts to
change it, was most notably contained in the edited volume: Apartheid
and Education (Kallaway 1984a). However, this discourse has a much
wider provenance.
It responded critically to the two major elements of the discourses seen
above: skills shortage and educational failure. Skills shortage, as noted in
Chapter Two, was seen as being ideologically driven (Meth 1979;
Chisholm 1984). Such a view was based in part on Braverman's (1974)
argument, and South African evidence, that job fragmentation was
taking place resulting in many skilled jobs being either divided into semi¬
skilled ones or automated. Moreover, as skill was seen as socially
constructed, so the racialized South African economy was argued to have
chronically misclassified skill levels according to race. Through these two
lines of analysis, it was argued that skills shortage must be seen as an
element of an employer attempt to justify changes which would shift the
balance of accumulation in capital's favour (Chisholm 1984; Nkomo
1990). The deskilling of workers would tend to both depress wages and
weaken organizational ability. In this view, training reform was more
about containing labour militancy than developing absent skills
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(Chisholm 1984). This was reflected in the alleged emphasis of employers
on social rather than technical skills.
The clamour regarding educational failure was also seen as part of an
ideological and economic struggle between the state and big business on
the one hand and the working class on the other. At its heart was an
educational parallel to the arguments about training of Chisholm. This
centred on a perception of an attempt to better socialize workers to serve
the capitalist system (Azanian Peoples Organization [AZAPO]44 1984).
This was viewed also as part of the broader strategy, reflected clearly in
the Riekert proposals and the UF projects, to co-opt an African middle-
class (de Clerq 1979). The attempt by the de Lange Commission, and those
who followed, to shift to market and technocratic solutions was seen by
critics using Habermas (1976) as part of an attempt to depoliticize the
educational arena in order to preserve the current balance of power
(Nasson 1990). Education thus became perceived as a central element of
the Total Strategy of the Botha regime during the 1980s (Moyo 1995).45
As Wolpe and Unterhalter (1991) argue, this view of education and
training was closely related to notions that education reflects the needs
and structures of capitalism, and so to the correspondence theory of
Bowles and Gintis (1976), mentioned in Chapter One. In such a view,
education in a capitalist society does not lead to social mobility but to
reinforcement of class divisions and "reproduction of the capitalist
relations of production" (Wolpe and Unterhalter 1991: 6). That such a
view had spread beyond the university was evident from the following
44 The principal inheritors of the Black Consciousness Movement's legacy.
45 The Total Strategy was a concerted plan of the South African state to crush local,
regional and global opposition through such means as military force, diplomacy,
propaganda, and economic, educational and political reform.
120
quotation taken from the deliberations of the AZAPO-aligned National
Forum:
Education cannot be seen as separate from the wider
society. In South Africa education is part and parcel of a
racist and capitalist system. Schools reproduce class, colour
and gender inequalities. The main aim of the educational
system for the oppressed is to create a cheap black labour
force, with the skills and attitudes that will benefit
capitalism. (National Forum 1986: 272)
This focus on education as an element of the broader system of political
economy, whilst justified, led to a tendency to see solutions to
educational problems purely as a part of the transformation of the
political economy. Overthrowing capitalism, not transforming
education, appeared to be the most obvious solution.
Challenge: People's Education
The second strand of opposition thinking regarding education in the
1980s emerged out of the school boycotts of 1985 (Muller 1987), although it
built in many ways on the longer tradition of Charterist opposition ot
Bantu Education.46 Concerned with the continued disruption of
schooling, the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee convened a National
Consultation Conference to discuss black education. Meeting at the
University of Witwatersrand in December 1985, the conference sought to
counter the call from radical student elements for "Liberation Now,
Education Later" with the alternative slogan of "People's Education for
People's Power" (National Education Crisis Committee 1985).
46 The ANC-aligned education tradition may also be described as Charterist, building as
it did on the educational statements of the Freedom Charter.
The conference, which marked the establishment of the National
Education Crisis Committee (NECC), began developing this new model of
People's Education. The ideas agreed upon at the first NECC conference
can be divided into four principal areas. First, there was a reiteration of
the long-standing call for universal access to schooling. In the context of
the widespread boycotting of classrooms in the previous decade, this
should be seen partly as a reaffirmation of the importance of education.
This call was allied to the reiteration of calls for equity in education
opportunity and provision. Again this has a specific context, that of the
de Lange Report with promotion of non-formal education as a means of
disassociating access and equity.
Second, there was a concern with transforming school governance. Here
the two most important calls were for democratic parent-teacher-student
associations (PTSAs) and for student representative councils (SRCs)
recognized and free from intimidation by state or school authorities
(NECC 1985).
Third, there was a strong concern with curriculum reform, so as to
remove the biases in syllabi introduced by Bantu Education. As noted in
Chapter Two, the subjects which received the most attention were
English (Johnson 1991) and History (Muller 1987), two of the most
culturally sensitive.
Fourth, this intention to reform the curriculum was linked to wider
notions of a transformed philosophy of education. This is reflected in a
number of calls for a shift of emphasis in the underpinnings of
education.
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Critical thinking, rather than recitation of the "facts" hitherto presented
by a pro-capitalist, pro-Apartheid education, was held to be necessary for
the creation of the active citizens needed for a post-Apartheid settlement.
In the meantime, critical thinking would also be valuable in the
development of student resistance to those "facts" and to the broader
structures of oppression (NECC 1985).
Collaborative learning was identified as a way of moving beyond the
competitive, atomistic and individualistic logic of capitalist education.
Diagnostic testing, focusing on the identification of student weaknesses
for remedial purposes, rather than the pass-fail logic of the competitive
examinations of the existing system, was seen as a further necessary
move away from capitalist educational philosophy and practice (NECC
1985).
The People's Education movement drew on the established tradition of
alternative education in South Africa47, as the keynote speech to the
conference by the Secretary of the [Catholic] Bishops' Conference made
clear (Mkhatshwa48 1985). It at times showed an almost Freirean belief49
in the integral role of education in the liberation process (Mkhatshwa
1985; Sisulu 1986). The shift was one from protest to challenge (Muller
1987). However, grounded as it was in a broad alliance of black grassroots
protest rather the Marxist-influenced academic critique, People's
Education focused on the links between education and politics rather
than between education and the economy, as in the academic critique
47 One notable period of alternative education provision was in the aftermath of the
introduction of Bantu Education when the ANC called for popular schools to be
established. See Lodge (1984) for further details.
48 As of June 30th 1996 he has taken up the post of Deputy-Minister of Education.
49 Paolo Freire is a Brazilian radical adult educator, whose Pedagogy of the Oppressed
(1972) in particular has been of great influence on radical educational thinking
internationally.
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above (McKay and Romm 1992; Wolpe 1992). If the economy featured at
all it was as a provider of resources for education (Greenstein 1995a). As a
result, People's Education was even weaker than the academic account on
the subject of training policy (Wolpe OI 1995).50
To construct a view of People's Education as a coherent ideological force,
or meta-narrative, is difficult, however (Levin 1991).51 In part this is due
to unresolved tensions between and within the parent, student and
teacher constituencies (Naidoo 1990). It owes something also to the belief
of some proponents that People's Education represented an invitation to
discourse and therefore should avoid being too dogmatic (McKay and
Romm 1992). Equally, the twin forces of repression and cooption are
crucial. The state acted harshly against the NECC, imprisoning leaders of
both it and affiliated local organizations before the process of consultation
with those grassroots organizations and communities could flesh out the
initial conference ideas (Muller 1987; Mashamba 1990; Wolpe 1991;
Wolpe and Unterhalter 1991).
At the same time, liberal and professional support for some of the
notions of People's Education began to grow (Wolpe and Unterhalter
1991). Given the weakening of the NECC by repression in the period
before 199052, there was a space created for the sanitization of People's
Education. In so far as curricular and pedagogical reform became
prominent, there was a delinking of the practices of progressive
educational reform from the broader liberation struggle (Wolpe 1991).
50 There was some interest in Education with Production as a result of local Southern
African trends. This, however, does not amount to a policy on mainstream training.
This is particularly true when a reading, as here, is based on the rather limited
published material.
52 The NECC was able to rebuild itself quite successfully after the unbanning of opposition
organisations in early 1990, as we shall see in the next chapter.
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This was seen particularly in the operation of the "Open Schools"
movement. At this time a number of white private schools, particularly
in the Catholic sector53, began to admit black students in ever larger
numbers (Christie 1990a and b). The state eventually decided to acquiesce
in this and the subsequent attempt to produce a new multi-racial
curriculum. This process of curriculum reform resulted in the
establishment of the Independent Examinations Board (IEB), which we
shall encounter again in Chapter Five.
More seriously, Wolpe argues that the space provided by the state's attack
on the NECC structures led to a more general tendency "to equate access
to 'good' education, to the universities, to skills (such as reading and
writing) with 'People's Education'" (Wolpe 1991: 81). As we shall see in
the next chapter, this reformulation of People's Education was to be
accelerated after the ANC's unbanning.
MAKING SENSE OF THE RESPONSES
Summarizing the Principal Trends
There is both continuity and progression running through the official
education and training responses to the challenges facing South Africa in
the period between the Soweto Uprising and the unbanning of the ANC.
The concern, which surfaces with the Wiehahn and Riekert
Commissions, regarding the need to expand the production base of the
53 Catholic schooling for all races had chosen to maintain its independence (and hence be
self-funding) when the reforms of the 1950s led to other denominations abandoning their
educational provision for Africans.
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economy through greater African incorporation is one such theme which
developed through the subsequent investigations.54
The Wiehahn Commission's concerns with skill shortages is another
theme which was repeated by later reports. Equally, a stress on the
market rather than race as an allocative principle received its first major
introduction into National Party discussions through the Wiehahn
Report. The contested nature of this move was strongest in this its first
rehearsal, although it did become evident again when the government
responded to de Lange Report.
Whereas this tension between race and market surfaced on the pages of
the Report itself in the case of Wiehahn through the medium of
minority recommendations, the structure and operation of the de Lange
Commission proved far more suitable for keeping dissent out of the final
report (Hartshorne OI 1995). Indeed, the de Lange Report has far more of
a technical rather than a political feel. However, the official response to
the Report's recommendations again showed the huge problems faced in
moving away from Apartheid rationales.
The de Lange Report also stressed one theme absent from the Wiehahn
Report but destined to become central to all discourses of the 1980s:
educational failure.55 In the de Lange Commission's formulation this
was to be highly instrumentalist with a very heavy vocational emphasis.
The de Lange Report also developed the pro-market vision further,
expanding its scope from the largely privately-organized training system
to the state-controlled education system.
54 This concern mirrors that of the spate of United Party-established commissions in the
1940s, such as the Fagan Commission referred to in Chapter Two.
55 Evidence for the argument was not particularly apparent in the report, however.
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Although the three HSRC/NTB reports were concerned with training,
they frequently strayed into the arena of education. In so doing they
tended to reinforce strongly the notions of the de Lange Report about the
nature of educational failure and of the most suitable remedies for it.
The feel was also more like that of the de Lange Report, as statistics and
technical committees multiplied. By the time of these reports, discussion
of Apartheid rationales and reasons for their replacement no longer
appeared to be necessary. The exact relationship of market and state,
however, was still a subject of debate. The high unemployment levels of
the mid-1980s led to a relatively pro-active view of state training
involvement in the second report. However, this concern had given way
to the most explicitly pro-market vision yet by the time the third report
reached publication.56
It is necessary to make the distinction between these official reports and
the views of the state. Here it is evident that the state found it far easier
to accept recommendations from the later HSRC/NTB reports than from
the Wiehahn and de Lange Commissions.
In this chapter I have also looked at two other areas of account
generation. In the case of the views of business, as represented by the
proposals of SYNCOM and the programmes of organizations such as
Anglo-American and the Urban Foundation, there appears to be a fairly
consistent stress on many of the same themes as contained in official
reports.57 In particular, concern with educational failure and a belief in
greater vocationalization as a response to it, permeate both accounts.
56 The extent to which the findings of this report were changed by the political climate
after the unbanning of the ANC cannot be discounted.
57 Which of course were influenced in part by long established positions emanating from
big business.
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Belief in the role of the market and the problem of skills shortage are also
evident across official and business accounts.
More oppositional discourses were divided into two broad schools earlier
in the chapter. What the division points to is largely a difference between
stances of critique and challenge. It must be remembered, however, that
many of those who have been identified earlier as providing critique
were also supportive of, and often active in, the process of challenge. For
example, Peter Kallaway, the editor of the Apartheid and Education
volume, was to play an important role in the development of an
alternative curriculum and textbooks for People's History.58
What both schools also had in common was a strong belief in the need to
link educational transformation with broader transformation of the
South African political economy, although they differed in emphasis
between the political and the economic. This led them to stress the
democratization of learning, in terms of curriculum, governance and
pedagogy.
Explaining the Trends
It is important to produce a description of the development of the
various meta-narratives of South African education and training policy
in this crucial period. However, this should be but a step on the road to
an explanation of why these meta-narratives developed, or declined, in
58 This is notwithstanding the implicit contrasting of Apartheid and Education, seen by
McKay and Romm (1992) as based on an inappropriate Marxist structuralism, with a true,
non-structuralist, People's Education approach.
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the ways outlined already. That will be the task of this part of the current
chapter.
Three types of influence on the policy debate can be identified. First, the
role of international, sometimes global, discourses in shaping South
African thought and expression. Second, the local reality of the triple
crisis of accumulation, education and legitimation faced by the South
African state which contextualizes all the discussions of policy and
practice that this chapter has outlined. Third, the ways in which
subsequent policy formulations were affected by social actors reshaping
earlier policy formulations during the implementation phase.
The Influence of Global Discourse
The period under consideration in this chapter saw a fundamental
ideological shift on the part of many of the powerful in South Africa.
The convention of Afrikaner state using Apartheid rationales, in indirect
collaboration with English capital reliant on liberal capitalist ideology,
underwent a transformation in the post-Soweto environment. In its
place came a far closer ideological, and frequently practical alliance, built
upon elements of the market-oriented meta-narative, so pervasive in
such circles internationally during the 1980s.
The call for greater reliance on market forces described in detail in this
chapter cannot plausibly be read as occurring in isolation from the rest of
the world. Rather, the Thatcher/Reagan influence appears to loom large
in legislation such as that on privatization (Kallaway 1989). In the
education sphere this influence was particularly evident in many of the
recommendations of the de Lange and the HSRC/NTB Reports which
reflected similar themes in the more developed Anglophone countries.
The increasing stress on parental choice and state-private sector
collaboration are two examples of such themes.
A second strand of the New Right agenda as it affects education is what
has been called New Vocationalism by British commentators. This policy
was based in a powerfully instrumentalist notion of the role of education
and stressed a greater emphasis on orientation, preparation and
socialization of students to be better workers, coupled with a greater
prioritization of vocational courses. Such elements were clearly present
in the reforms outlined above. Moreover, Kallaway (1989) has reported
that de Lange travelled to England in 1980 to visit the principal agent of
this policy, the Manpower Services Commission. Furthermore, the NTS
openly acknowledged British influence on its ideas for new youth
training programmes which would:
take cognisance of schemes in other parts of the world
such as the Youth Training Programme of the United
Kingdom, .... the English National Vocational
Qualification. (NTS 263)
A third element of the New Right's ideological influence on South Africa
was the growth of technocratic rationality. Habermas (1972) argued that
advanced capitalist states find that their power comes to be questioned as
a result of their manipulation of market forces. Part of the solution, as
we saw above, is to re-emphasize the market. However, it is impossible
for the state to divest itself of many of its functions. Therefore, it seeks to
portray its deliberations in those areas as scientific and non-ideological.
Such a trend does seem to have been occurring in the countries
Habermas considered (in Western Europe and North America). It was
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also evident in South Africa in the 1980s. Earlier I argued that the de
Lange Commission was better able than the Wiehahn Commission to
produce a report that portrayed itself as neutral and technical.
Furthermore, I noted the use of statistics and technical sub-committees.
Together with jargon and acronyms such as MLM (medium level
manpower) and EAP (economically active population), such modes of
discourse helped this technicist portrayal.
International influences on radical academics also are easy to discern, not
least through the sojourn of many of them in places such as London and
Brighton during post-graduate studies. From citations lists in books and
articles it is possible to get a sense of the influence in South Africa of
critiques such as the New Vocationalism, already noted.59 From
America, I have already noted both Braverman's (1974) arguments
concerning the fragmentation of skilled work and Bowles and Gintis's
work on education as reproduction. These were more explicitly Marxist,
influences. As with the adoption of New Right thinking above, such
borrowings put elite discourses very much in a Northern rather than an
African context.
Through its focus on education as part of a process of liberation, the
People's Education meta-narrative moved away from these Northern
influences. Instead, inspiration was more readily available from
Southern struggles. This is exemplified by Mkhatshwa's keynote address
to the first National Consultative Conference where the two writer-
activists quoted with approval were Freire and Cabral (Mkhatshwa
1985).60
59 See Kallaway 1984b and 1989 for a flavour of this.
60 Amilcar Cabral was the leading figure in the movement for independence in Guinea-
Bissau. Latin American influences, represented here by Freire, were also important in
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The Influence of the Triple Crisis
The global crisis and the role of international discourses was only one
element of the context of education and training reform. The importance
of the local must also be affirmed. In Chapter Two I introduced the
notion of the triple crisis (in accumulation, legitimation and education)
which the Apartheid state experienced in the mid-1970s. It is necessary to
return to that crisis here and to show how its continuation into the 1980s
also impacted upon attempts to reformulate education and training
policy.
Accumulation Crisis
A major influence on the changing emphases of education and training
policy from the Wiehahn Report to the NTS was the accumulation crisis
facing the South African economy. The profitability of South African
industry was seriously affected by a downturn in most major economic
indicators in the mid-1970s in the wake of the First Oil Crisis.61 Gross
domestic product and the balance of payments declined, whilst
unemployment and inflation increased (Price 1991). Production, and
hence profitability, were also adversely affected by the wave of strike
activity in 1973-4.
Such phenomena were repeated in the first half of the 1980s. Between
1981 and 1985 profits and productivity again fell, whilst in 1985 inflation
South Africa at this time. Lodge (1992) argues that Dependency Theory from Latin
America, a Third World strand of Marxism, was a major influence on student activist
thinking at this time. The popular education tradition of Freire et al. can also be seen as
highly influential in the vision of People's Education.
61 The crisis of Fordism referred to in the previous chapter.
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reached its highest level since 1919 (Moss and Obery 1987: xvii). On
several occasions the economy looked to be recovering only for recession
to set in again. This led Kaplan to conclude in 1987 that "recessionary
conditions have become the South African norm and periods of
expansion only limited and temporary aberrations" (Kaplan 1987: 525).
This persistent recession seemed to political economists to be a
fundamental crisis. Awareness of regulation theory notions led some
commentators to link the South African crisis of accumulation with a
broader crisis being experienced in the advanced capitalist states. In such
a view the crisis facing South Africa arose out of its structuring around a
system of Racial Fordism, in which both the production and
consumption base was only massified for whites. Increasingly, it was
argued, this was contrary to continued capital accumulation (Cassim
1987).62
The responses to this crisis were seen as characterizing an attempt to
transform the South African economy onto a broader Fordist basis.63 The
Wiehahn-Riekert proposals of greater access to training for urban blacks
along with greater security of urban residence can be read as a strategy to
this end. Programmes by the Urban Foundation to develop and coopt an
African middle class also fall within such an analysis.
The calls for greater marketization, which reached a crescendo around the
1987 Privatization and Deregulation White Paper, have also been seen as
part of this strategy. Kallaway (1989) argues that one of the principal
62 Significantly, Hobsbawm (1995) notes that the similar levels of income inequality in
Brazil are generally considered to have been at the root of that country's failure to
develop a sustainable Fordist economy.
63 As noted in Chapter Two, this was conceived of as operating in the economic not the
political sphere. Of course the challenge in the advanced economies was in moving beyond
Fordism.
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elements of the privatization strategy was to reduce taxation so as to
increase profitability. Equally, in so far as privatization represented the
transfer of profitable elements of state enterprise to the private sector at
sub-market rates, potential for private sector capital accumulation was
enhanced further.
The core reform proposals regarding education and training have also
been seen in the light of this crisis. The increased instrumentalism of
education policy debates was logical given the perceived accumulation
crisis of capital, manifested particularly through the stress on skills
shortages. The increased emphasis on academic bias and the need for
better technical, attitudinal and basic educational preparation for work
can be read as being indicative of such accumulation fears. Equally, the
stress on socialization may have been related to the need to encourage
worker docility in the light of attempts to reweight allocation of profit
shares further in the favour of capital.
This broadly regulationist account seems persuasive as regards the
accumulation crisis faced by South Africa. Most importantly, it highlights
the need to view the political and economic domains as having complex
inter-relationships in a way that narrower Marxist models such as
correspondence theory fail to capture. Attention will now turn to the
political, or legitimation, crisis of the state.
Legitimation Crisis
In a manner somewhat analogous to the regulationist approach,
Habermas (1976) argued that the legitimacy of the advanced capitalist state
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is supported by a complex system of structures and institutions.
However, the contradictions of such states as both mediators of capital
accumulation and producers have a tendency to induce crises of
legitimacy.
Here the intention is not to try to read Habermas into South African
experiences. As will be clear from the discussion of the accumulation
crisis above, South Africa is somewhat different from Habermas's
advanced capitalist states as a result of its different point of insertion into
the world economy. Rather, the concern is with using a broad notion of
legitimation crisis as indicative of the manifestations in the political
sphere of a systemic crisis. The South African state's belief in the inter-
connectedness of the triple crisis is to be seen in Botha's development
during the 1980s of the Total Strategy aimed at addressing all elements of
the perceived threat, internally and externally.
A central element of this response was the drive to depoliticize as many
areas of social and economic activity as possible. Privatization was one of
the two strategies through which this was attempted, as noted above
when I considered borrowings from international discourse. Innes
argues that for South Africa:
the privatisation strategy aims to "depoliticise" society by
transferring social regulation from the state to market
forces which regulate both the economy and social life.
(Innes 1987: 561)
He also considers this strategy in the arena of education. He suggests that
the school crisis after 1976 was a major element of the broader
legitimation crisis of the state and that educational reforms, such as
greater parental choice, should be seen as an attempt to depoliticize the
school:
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The privatisation lobby .... argues that if the state hands
over certain state-run services to the private sector, such
as education, these will be depoliticised. They will no
longer be run according to the dictates of apartheid
ideology and nor will the content of school courses be
ideologically determined According to this argument,
the whole system will thus be shifted from a racially
determined base to a "non-ideological" one.
Consequently, the battle in the schools will cease. (Innes
1987: 558)
Innes makes a crucial point here. It would be erroneous to view the
drive to privatization as purely a state attempt to protect its legitimacy.
Such a concern with the state's ability to appear apolitical was of course
also a pressing concern of many leading corporations. Much of their
drive towards social responsibility expenditure after Soweto appears to
have arisen out of a belief that such spending by the private sector was
essential given the illegitimacy of the state in the eyes of many in black
communities.
The second strategy was the use of technicism (again referred to above).
In a well-known article, Buckland (1982) analysed the de Lange Report as
a technicist text. I have shown above that this reading can be extended to
the three HSRC/NTB Reports as well. Held argues that technicism
operates in the following way:
Practical issues, underpinned by particular historical class
interests, are defined as technical problems; politics
becomes the sphere for the technical elimination of
dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks that threaten "the
system". (Held 1982:181)
Both state and capital also sought to limit what was predominantly
African opposition through a broader strategy of cooption and control.
The recommendations of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions
regarding permanent settlement rights and training, together with the
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corporate social responsibility and African advancement programmes,
sought to give a larger number of Africans an economic, if not a political,
stake in the system. Moreover, the state often proved adept at taking on
board and sanitizing liberal and radical ideas. Legalization of non-racial
trade unions and even adoption of some of the language of People's
Education (Levin 1991) can be seen as an attempt to coopt reform in order
to better control it.64
The state's legitimation problems were not simply related to opposition
from black communities. The tensions in the Wiehahn Commission
and the state's response to the de Lange Report's recommendations have
already been mentioned. These arose out of difficulties the National
Party found itself faced with in dealing with its own traditional
constituencies.
Barker (1990) argues that one typical element of a legitimation crisis is the
inability of a state to produce ideological messages which reflect the
different expectations of diverse societal groups. This appears to have
been a major phenomenon of this period in South Africa. Increasingly,
the state got ideological messages right for big business, and even for
elements of black South Africa. However, it proved very difficult to
combine such successes with messages for large sections of traditional
National Party (NP) support.
In 1969 the Herstigte Nasionale Party split from the NP (Hyslop 1987). In
the 1981 elections they achieved their best showing to date: 14,4% of total
votes. Perhaps more significantly, they attracted 33% of all Afrikaner
64 Levin quotes a 1986 speech by Gerrit Viljeon, then Minister of Development Aid and
Education: "in terms of the basic terminology of 'People's Education', there are also
positive aspects which has [sic] been part of our approach and which should be further
emphasized and given effect." (Levin 1991: 11).
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votes (Schrire 1991: 44). The right-wing threat to the NP was even
greater, however, as many who had stayed loyal in the 1969 split were
increasingly unhappy. The focus of this unrest was Andries Treurnicht,
NP leader in the Transvaal and former head of the Broederbond.65 In
February 1982 Botha brought the disagreement to a head and seventeen
MPs, including Treurnicht, were expelled from the party. The following
month, the Conservative Party was launched with Treurnicht as its
leader (Schrire 1991: 46).
Although the new party had few parliamentarians, it could draw on large
numbers of supporters amongst small farmers, blue collar workers and
minor bureaucrats, the groupings most threatened by the Botha reforms.
The economic crisis of the early 1980s served to increase the disquiet of
these groups. Between 1981 and 1986 white unemployment grew by over
500%. At the same time bankruptcies of small business quadrupled and
white real wages fell (Hyslop 1987: 395). The reforms and the recession
were also reinforced by fears generated by the wave of resistance occurring
in the townships in the mid-1980s (ibid.).
The effect of this crisis can be seen in the response to the de Lange Report
where the state appeared to be trying to play to the right-wing audience in
its response to what was, in South African terms, a broadly liberal report.
It also was reflected in the tendency of the Botha government to veer
between reform and repression. In the educational sphere, repression
impacted most clearly on the development of People's Education, when
arrests, bannings and harassment seriously affected the development of a
coherent and generally agreed upon model. As a result, the official
65 A secret organisation aiming at the preservation of Afrikaner cultural, economic and
political dominance.
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discourse had to balance often conflicting elements of both the Apartheid
and the market-oriented meta-narratives in an attempt to deal with the
multiple threats it faced.
Education Crisis
It has already been argued that it was an event in the educational sphere
that provided the trigger for the cycles of resistance, repression and
reform of the past two decades. We have already seen the inter-
connectedness of the education crisis with the accumulation and
legitimation crises but some further points should be made.
The splits in Afrikanerdom, not least between senior reformers and
junior conservatives in the education bureaucracy, lent a sense of
confusion to much of the state's education policy during the period.
Nonetheless, the influence of big business and, indirectly, the black
population does help to give educational discourse a fairly clear shape.
If Bantu Education had ever been functional to the interests of state and
capital, this no longer appeared to be the case.66 As the shift to greater
African economic involvement continued, so concerns about the
quantity and quality of African education spread from African
communities to business and government circles. As we have seen,
educational failure became a major motif of the de Lange and
66 The question of whether Bantu Education was functional to the interests of capital may
be seen as part of a broader debate regarding the relationship between capitalism and
Apartheid which has formed a principal line of cleavage between Liberal and Marxist
historiographies in South Africa (e.g. Fransman, Graves and Simelane 1983). It is worth
quoting Hobsbawm here: "the point about really big business is that it can come to terms
with any regime that does not actually expropriate it, and any regime must come to terms
with it" (Hobsbawm 1995: 129). This points to the futility of such a debate.
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HSRC/NTB investigations and a rationale for the huge corporate social
responsibility programmes of big business after Soweto.
These concerns were translated into a highly instrumental view of
education, largely driven by the accumulation crisis and, to a lesser
extent, legitimation fears. Education increasingly came to be seen as
social investment rather than social consumption (Kallaway 1989). This
instrumentalist view explains the vocationalization tendency evident in
the 1980s.
Vocationalization messages are popular with elite groups as employers
but not as parents. Through continued segregation, increased devolution
of power from the central ministry and privatization the state sought to
reconcile this tension by allowing elite education to remain aloof from
the vocational trend. Whilst the first of these strategies was still a racial
one, reflecting the need to placate right-wing white opinion, the latter
two were indicative of the attempt officially to deracialize discrimination,
whilst still in practice allowing both race and class to strongly shape
individual educational opportunities.
The development of educational discourse in the period after Soweto
cannot be understood outside the context of black resistance. The events
of 1976, and the subsequent school boycotts of 1980 and 1985, were crucial
factors in the timing and nature of the state's response of reform and
repression, and in the corporate social investment programme. The
nature of the relationship between resistance and official response
naturally changed with the new challenge of People's Education but the
fact remained that official policy formulation was, at least in part, reactive
to grassroots opposition.
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The Influence of Social Actors
This short analysis of the factors shaping the policy debate has pointed to
the necessity of seeing the inter-connectedness of three principal trends in
the domestic macro-environment: the economic, the political and the
educational. It has also pointed to the further inter-connectedness of the
local reality and global intellectual trends as they helped generate
discourses and shift the balance of power between conflicting meta-
narratives. However, there is another important element to be
considered. As the previous paragraph indicated, the discourses, and
meta-narratives, which achieved prominence, official or otherwise, were
also influenced by the actions of social actors who sought to resist,
reshape or replace them.
This thesis is concerned primarily within the changing shape of powerful
and visible discourses and meta-narratives. As a result it has tended to
look in directions where such ideological phenomena can be found and
illuminated: policy documents and interviews with policy formulators.
Therefore, the methodology permits less to be said with certainty about
the voices of the less powerful.67 Nonetheless, their impact must at least
be the subject of some comment.
Reference has already been made to the role of black communities in
resisting education and training policy. First through students boycotting
schools and then through wider community involvement in
movements such as People's Education, these communities were
increasingly able to articulate a view of education provision which did
begin to influence official policy.
67 This very important issue was raised in Chapter One and will be addressed more
thoroughly in Chapter Six.
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As we shall see in the next chapter, this influence carried on into the
period after the unbanning of the ANC as the power of COSATU to shape
policy, particularly on adult education, increased and as the state
accelerated its policy of cooptation and sanitization of popular
educational demands. The latter response points to one of the principal
results of popular demands internationally: the tendency for their
hijacking and reworking as official programmes.
I have also referred to white opposition to reform and its influence on
National Party policy. The agenda of progressive Afrikaner forces and of
large corporations has also been evident. The role of those who were
responsible for policy implementation equally was crucial. Teachers,
head-teachers and educational bureaucrats all shaped the
implementation of policy formulations. This in turn influenced the next
round of formulation as past themes were either reiterated or dropped
according to progress in their implementation.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to explore the transformation undergone by
South Africa education and training policy discourse between 1976 and
1990. It has considered the major official documents of this period: the
Riekert, Wiehahn and de Lange Reports and the HSRC/NTB trilogy, and
the legislative responses to them. It has also studied discourses emerging
from business, academic and community sources.
Central to the changes seen in this period was the increased economic
involvement of Africans, which, though beginning earlier, came into the
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official policy arena at this time.68 This was inseparable from changes in
training and industrial relations legislation, such as legalization of non-
racial trade unions and African access to apprenticeships.
Equally, it was at the heart of reforms in the education system. The long¬
standing stress on socialization of African students was updated to take
account of their new role in training and employment, as concerns of
segregation finally lost out to concerns of industrialization and the need
to respond to African unrest. The de Lange Report appeared to mark the
extension of instrumentalist views on education to all races. However,
the new stress on privatization allowed white education an escape route.
Concerns with the continuing schools boycotts saw a third strand
introduced to education policy: technicism.
These trends in education and training, and the broader role of Africans
in the South African economy, cannot be viewed outside the framework
of the triple crisis of economics, politics and education. This in turn was
linked to the crisis of the system of Racial Fordism.
The changing debate was characterized by the pressures of local
contestations, from black and white communities, and from employer
interventions. Here the most noticeable change was the emergence of an
oppositional discourse of challenge, where protest and critique had been
previously dominant.
The debate also saw heavy borrowings from international intellectual
trends. In the case of the official discourse there was a paradigmatic shift
during the period to a position which closely resembled that of the
68 As noted in the previous chapter, this issue had been on the policy agenda of the United
Party government in the 1940s.
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international New Right ideology. In doing so the state moved away
from the Apartheid meta-narrative as the cornerstone of the official
ideology, although the market-oriented meta-narrative which replaced it
allowed divisions along race and class lines to remain largely intact.
There was also a noticeable change in the nature of the operation of
official policy formulation between the Wiehahn Report, representing
the first stirrings of the new approach, and later reports. Whilst the
Wiehahn Report was full of internal contestations which highlighted the
political nature of the formulation process, later reports far more
successfully portrayed the technical dimension of such activity. This too
can be seen in the light of a new dominant ideology which was also
shaping practices.
The changing debate of the period after 1976 also can be seen as part of an
attempt to think through the process of allowing Africans a significant
economic role in South Africa whilst denying them political space
outside the homelands. This attempt proved untenable, however, and
on February 2nd 1990, de Klerk acknowledged this by unbanning the
ANC. The struggle to define and control a future African political role
now came to the fore. In the next chapter I will consider the education
and training dimensions of that struggle.
POST-SOWETOMETA-NARRATIVES,1976-90
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THE ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS:
FEBRUARY 1990 TO APRIL 1994
INTRODUCTION
The unbanning of the ANC in February 1990 fundamentally altered the
policy process in South Africa. The period between then and the
elections of 1994 became almost an interregnum as the state seemed
largely unwilling and/or unable to make and implement policy. Instead,
it moved towards a strategy of agenda setting designed to create a
negotiating position through which it could minimize the impact at the
levels of both policy and practice of what seemed to be an inevitable ANC
victory at the polls.
The ANC and its allies too moved into a similar phase of agenda setting.
The oppositional tendencies of the People's Education movement no
longer seemed entirely relevant in the face of the need to make policy
with an ever closer eye on being in power. At the same time, the shift
towards policy and away from small innovative projects1 saw the
emergence of new participants in the policy discourse, most notably the
ANC Education Department and COSATU.
The first part of this chapter will explore this move towards research-
based agenda setting which characterized state and opposition policy
discourses between 1990 and 1992. In so doing, it will analyse the nature
1 This ranged from the more ambitious such as Khanya College, a bridging year before
university run by the South Africa Committee for Higher Education (SACHED), to the
many literacy projects and fewer literacy-supporting magazines, often funded by churches.
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of this new phase of opposition discourse in which the stress at the level
of meta-narrative moved increasingly from socialist transformation,
linked to the violent overthrow of the state, to Post-Fordist economic
reorganization, based on the ever-increasing likelihood of a peaceful
assumption of power-
There was a change of gear between this phase, 1990-2, and that of the
following two years. In the latter phase, 1992-4, the focus was more
sharply on the development of policy formulations. This was to take
place both internally within organizations and in national policy fora.
This latter period also saw the emergence of a new meta-narrative
amongst segments of the business community. This, in part, was a
reaction to the changing policy environment and to business and
intellectual trends domestically and internationally. Its effect was to
produce a rival, pro-capital version of Post-Fordism.2
The National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) of 1994 was to see the
attempt to bring together the two new Post-Fordist meta-narratives with
the market-oriented meta-narrative and People's Education of the
previous chapter. It is to the emergence of the first of the two new
discourses in opposition circles that attention will first be directed.
THE NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICY INVESTIGATION (NEPI)
In December 1990 the NECC launched the NEPI process (NEPI 1993: 1).
This two year programme of research arose as a result of three principal
2 As noted in Chapter Two, in regulationist terms this would be characterised as Neo-
Fordist. However, given the widespread use of the term Post-Fordist to refer to both pro-
capital and pro-labour versions, I have chosen to use Post-Fordist as a generic term for
narratives about a regime of accumulation which arises after the demise of Fordism.
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dynamics: the arrival of the era of negotiations earlier that year3; the
development of new state policies for education (the Education Renewal
Strategy- see below); and the need to coordinate the NECC-affiliated
Education Policy Units at a number of South African universities (Kraak
1993a: 1). The programme brought together over three hundred
researchers into 12 work groups. These in turn were supported and
monitored by a series of structures which included representation by the
NECC as well as other organizations such as the ANC, COSATU and
student and teacher bodies (NEPI 1993).
For many of those involved, NEPI represented a first entrance into the
world of policy (Wolpe 1994). However, strictly this was not into policy
formulation but into the agenda setting phase. This distinction arose out
of a strong awareness that policy formulation should be the task of mass
democratic structures.4
The 12 sectoral or thematic reports and the overall framework report
were to be informed by five underlying principles, which strongly
reflected the People's Education tradition of the NECC: non-sexism, non-
racism, redress, democracy and a unitary system (NEPI 1993: 6-7). The
concerns of People's Education with regard to the democratization of
school control were also strongly evident in the focus of one report on
Governance and Administration (NEPI 1992a).
3 Although negotiations in the political arena, principally around unbanning of
organisations and release of political prisoners, predated February 1990, it was de Klerk's
announcement of that month which gave greatest impetus to negotiations across a wide
range of subjects.
4 See Chapter One for a brief discussion of notions of a policy cycle. It was in this concern
(not always put into practice, however- Appel 1993) to place their findings before the
people for them to then decide policy that marked the distinction between the NEPI
researchers' methodology and that of the more technocratic research carried out by the
official commissions of the 1980s and early 1990s.
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However, as the NEPI process continued, it became evident that the new
era of negotiations was bringing with it a perceived need to move beyond
established NECC concerns. The imperative to think about policies for
when the ANC assumed power led to an increasing stress on efficiency,
feasibility and affordability (Greenstein 1995a).
The emergence of a new meta-narrative was most evident in the debate
that appeared around the question of whether there was a tension
between equity and development (Wolpe 1992). The 1960s globally had
seen a great faith in the inevitability of economic development of the
South and in the trickle-down of the fruits of development to the poorest
sections of society. However, in the 1970s there had been a widespread
realization that both these assumptions were rarely justified by the
evidence. As a result a counter-emphasis on basic needs and equity-based
strategies emerged.5 Whilst structural adjustment appeared ascendant in
the 1980s, there was still a powerful left critique which saw any economic
benefits that were likely to accrue as being offset by negative implications
for equity.
In the NEPI process this debate centred around the report on Human
Resource Development (NEPI 1992b), although it also permeated both the
Framework Report (NEPI 1993) and the Adult Basic Education (ABE)
report (NEPI 1992c).
Two strongly divergent positions emerged on the equity-development
question during the NEPI process. The overall view of the HRD report,
although even it contained tensions, was that equity and economic
5 The chief propagators of this view in educational circles were the International Council
for Educational Development (Coombs and Ahmed 1974; Ahmed and Coombs 1975; Coombs
1980).
149
development could be achieved simultaneously. The way to bring this
about was through a model which borrowed heavily from international
(largely British) notions of New Times6 and of thinking about a High
Skill Equilibrium (NEPI 1992b). Through reductions in learning and
workplace disparities; through improving both of these environments;
and through greater international competitiveness, South Africa would
be both more prosperous and less inegalitarian.
The HRD report called for a high participation-high skill education and
training system which would encourage larger numbers to partake of
good quality learning and which would be linked to an industrial focus
on high skilled, and therefore high waged, labour (NEPI 1992b). Such a
model would be built upon a national qualifications system which would
do away with the previous divisions between academic and vocational
domains. In any case vocational education was roundly condemned,
with much of the criticism reading like a rather simplified version of
World Bank arguments regarding the desirability of general (academic)
over vocational education (World Bank 1988).7 The newly unified
education and training system would be based on the notion of broad
generic competencies (NEPI 1992b).
This position was subjected to considerable criticism from other elements
within the NEPI research community. On the subject of competencies,
the Framework Report noted the big gap between employer and trade
union conceptions and the danger that a competency-based approach
might lead to a narrowing of learning (NEPI 1993: 81). This was part of a
6 Introduced in Chapter One, this meta-narrative will be explored at greater length later
in this chapter.
7 The World Bank position is, in summary, that general education is cheaper, easier to
manage and more efficient than vocational preparation which, whenever possible, should
take place in the workplace.
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broader acknowledgement that COSATU were key movers behind the
proposed model. Indeed, there was some concern expressed that narrow
COSATU interests were being served:
The model will accentuate the differences between the
'haves' and the 'have nots' because only employed
workers will benefit, with substantial working time and
resources committed to learning. The model does not
cater directly for women or for those in rural contexts.
(NEPI 1993: 81)
The feasibility of the high skill approach was also questioned. It was
argued that the model would need to build upon a range of factors.
These included a strong economy; a strong civil society; a strong state;
and strong corporate relations (NEPI 1993: 24-5). The Report argued that
these were untenable and, in particular, the likelihood of the COSATU-
inspired link of education and training to jobs via career pathing8 was
questioned (NEPI 1993: 81)
However, the intellectual underpinnings of this model, and its central
assumption that equity and economic development were compatible,
were not so clearly questioned in the final texts. Although this issue of
compatibility was raised by one of the NEPI editorial group (Wolpe 1992),
his critique is hardly mentioned in the published results of the
investigation.
The high skill, national qualifications model was but one alternative that
arose out of the NEPI process. Nonetheless, it soon became clear that it
was effectively the new policy of the democratic movement. The reasons
for this success will now be examined.
8 Career pathing will be discussed later in this chapter. It is essentially the notion that
instead of a working life consisting of a series of discrete and uncoordinated jobs, it is better
to conceptualise such a working life in terms of a path from one level of skill and
responsibility to another and to structure work accordingly.
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The importance of the new era of negotiations in shaping new policy
thinking from the democratic movement has already been identified. To
this must be added the effect that the collapse of state socialism had on
thinking in such circles. The perception that there was no longer a
radical socialist alternative to be found, coupled to the need to think
concretely about implementable policies, largely channelled NEPI
thinking down pragmatic social democratic thought paths. This was
reinforced by the influence of international intellectual trends,
themselves in part a response to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The New
Times version of Post-Fordism offered both an alleged solution to the
equity-development dilemma and a "new left" pedigree. Although
originating from the artisanal democracy idyll of Piore and Sabel (1984)
and the more pessimistic structuralism of the Regulationists (e.g. Aglietta
1979), it was the popularization of such notions as New Times by authors
aligned to the then Communist Party of Great Britain (Hall and Jacques
1989) and Post-Fordism by elements of the Australian trade union
movement (Mathews 1989) that appeared to have the greatest influence
on South African intellectuals.
This is seen most clearly in the work of Andre Kraak (e.g. Kraak 1993b),
who as one of the three authors of the HRD report played a central role in
the introduction of the progressive version of Post-Fordist thinking into
the South African education and training policy arena.
In Kraak's work, and in its broader application to education, this
progressive Post-Fordism is built upon by reference to British notions
about a low skill equilibrium and how it could be transformed through a
unified education and training system. Here again, it is worth noting that
the borrowing in this case was largely from work which was politically
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affiliated: the British Baccalaureat published by the Labour Party think-
tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research (Finegold et al. 1990).
The dominance of the new model over People's Education thinking was
reinforced by the shift in oppositional power brought about by the
unbanning of the ANC. Partly as a result of disorganization and
continued state repression and partly out of an apparent willingness to
cede the initiative to the "authentic voice of the masses", NECC's
importance declined after NEPI (Samoff et al 1994).
As the NEPI process had not really led to the levels of feedback and
grassroots selection from policy options initially intended, there was no
popular mandate for any of the options generated.9 As a result, it was
possible for the ANC to move towards the selection of options which
reflected its need to negotiate its way to power. This process of ANC
structures accumulating power over policy formulation was furthered in
1993 by the establishment of the Centre for Education Policy
Development (CEPD). This think-tank was not to be headed by a
NECC/NEPI stalwart, but by long-term exile Trevor Coombe, then based
at the University of London.10
The nature of the democratic movement's policy discourse after the
establishment of the CEPD will be examined shortly. However, first it is
necessary to explore the equally crucial role of COSATU in ensuring the
adoption of the New Times meta-narrative of NEPI as the principal
strand of the democratic movement's policy discourse.
9 A lack of organisational capacity seems to have been at the root of this failure (Appel
1993; Samoff et al 1994).
10 He was not simply an academic, however, having been an educational planner in
Zambia during the 1970s.
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COSATU'S ROLE IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT
COSATU's role in the NEPI process has already been alluded to in the
reporting of criticisms of the New Times line. COSATU directly
influenced the NEPI process, both through papers presented to research
groups (e.g. Bird 1992a) and through membership of key NEPI overview
committees (NEPI 1993). However, it was through the parallel
programme of research in the union movement that COSATU was most
influential nationally as an agenda setter.
The first major intervention in the research process by the unions was by
one of the largest affiliates, the National Union of Metalworkers
(NUMSA). A few months prior to NEPI it had begun work on its
NUMSA Vocational Project, which reported in 1991 (NUMSA 1991).
After research visits to Australia, Britain, Italy, Sweden, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe, a model for reformed training, and its links to education, was
proposed.
This again showed considerable Post-Fordist influences, particularly from
the Australian trade unions, whilst at the same time being grounded in
the aspirations of union members and the obstacles to advancement they
faced. These two came together most clearly in an interest in multi-
skilling, seen in part as a way of increasing members' earning potential.11
The project's findings stressed the need for a system of paid education and
training leave (PETL) and recognition of prior learning (RPL) as central
11 It was here particularly that the policy was a NUMSA one rather than belonging to
COSATU as a whole. Although the distinction between NUMSA and COSATU policy
has often been blurred, this area engendered some tension between NUMSA and the other
largest affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). NUM members tended to be
less educated and less likely to benefit from the changes offered by the New Times vision.
For NUM, issues of Paid Education and Training Leave (PETL), Recognition of Prior
Learning (RPL) and Adult Basic Education (ABE) were more pressing than multi-skilling
and career-pathing.
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underpinnings of a shift towards lifelong education and training. The
document also developed the notion of a nexus between training, skills,
grading and wages which would provide the framework through which
both career paths and closer linkages between formal education, adult
basic education and training would be stressed.
The NUMSA project was followed up by COSATU's commitment to an
on-going Participatory Research Programme (PRP). Through this and
other formulations, a COSATU position developed further. The need to
link education and training with economic development was made in a
presentation by NUMSA Education Officer, Adrienne Bird, to one of the
earliest meetings between the unions and the state training bureaucracy
(Bird 1991). The related imperative to improve linkages between
education, training and adult education was also strengthened by the PRP
into a call for a national qualifications framework [NQF] (COSATU PRP
1993b). It was also recommended that "all education/training and
assessment must be determined on the basis of competency" (COSATU
PRP 1993a). This represents an early (in the South African context) and
very clear call for competency-based modular learning (CBML), a key
element of the current debate, as we shall see subsequently.
The COSATU position, grounded as it was in both workplace strategies
and a belief in a shift towards a Post-Fordist economy, also led the
movement in other non-learning oriented directions which, though not
central to the concerns of this thesis, are in need of brief consideration for
their impacts upon such concerns.
Part of the New Times vision for the economy was for high-skilled
production to lead to greater export earnings which, in turn, would act as
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an engine of further economic growth (NEPI 1993). The identification of
suitable niches to be developed as part of this vision became an element
of the work of the Industrial Strategy Project carried out by ANC-aligned
economists Qoffe et al. 1993). In so far as the new education and training
system would be expected to answer economic imperatives, this focus
becomes highly significant.
The New Times vision was also one of industrial harmony, with
collaboration in the work-place replacing confrontation (Mathews 1989;
Kraak 1993b). Moreover, in its South African form it was argued that the
radical restructuring of interlocking institutions in order to facilitate a
paradigm shift from low-skill to high-skill production could only be
achieved if there was a high level of cooperation between capital, labour
and state (Baskin 1993). As a consequence, elements of the COSATU
leadership began to argue for a policy of "strategic unionism" (ibid.). Just
as much as the educational policy proposals, this represented a paradigm
shift in thinking from the radical and confrontational stance of the late
1980s to a new pragmatic and collaborative stance for the early 1990s.
Other union officials saw the danger in such a policy that it might lead to
a narrow corporate compromise (Bird and Schreiner12 1992). Such a fear
seemed particularly justified given the claim by some leaders that
COSATU represented the broader masses of South Africa and not just a
unionized elite (SALB 1993 [interview with Ebrahim Patel13]; Baskin
199314).
12 Both were NUMSA officials.
13 General Secretary of the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union and chief
COSATU negotiator on the National Economic Forum.
14 Jeremy Baskin, Director of the National Labour and Economic Development Institute,
nominally independent but located in COSATU House, maintained this position in a 1995
interview with the author and argued that there was research data to back up this claim.
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Such a stance is of significance to the education and training debate. The
fear of a COSATU-driven policy was raised by some commentators
during NEPI, as I showed above. However, through the joint preference
of both the ANC and COSATU for a vision which accorded well with the
New Times meta-narrative, this danger was effectively heightened rather
than avoided as the policy process continued to evolve.
Just as NEPI, and the parallel work of NUMSA and COSATU, marked the
development of a research-based agenda for negotiations from the
democratic movement, so a similar process was occurring within the
state, as we shall see now.
THE STATE AGENDA
In the previous chapter I examined the National Training Strategy.
which, though commissioned prior to the unbanning of the ANC,
reported in the era of negotiations. With its focus on a strongly market-
led strategy, this amounted to the National Party negotiating position on
training. Two subsequent reports, commissioned in 1990, were to
constitute the official educational agenda. These were the Curriculum
Model for Education in South Africa [CMESA] (DNE 1991a) and the
Education Renewal Strategy [ERS] (DNE 1992).15
These documents contained the principal market-oriented strands
already evident since the de Lange Commission: an explicit claim to be
legitimate; a heavy dose of technocratic rationality; a strong stress on
Such a position was strongly contradicted by other unionists and external commentators
interviewed.
A draft ERS appeared in 1991 (DNE 1991b) and will also be referred to.
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privatization; and a powerful reworking of the relationship between
education and the economy.
Nonetheless, the new context of the 1990s meant that the state was more
squarely behind such notions, as elements of a strategy to maximize the
continuation of white power and privilege. This new stance was perhaps
most evident in the treatment of race. The draft ERS was representing
the voice of the state in a way that the de Lange Report never did when it
argued that "race should not feature in the structuring of the provision of
education" (DNE 1991b: 21).
Legitimacy
The claim to be legitimate was based in both reports on the assertion that
all viewpoints were sought out in the consultation phase. The fact that
ANC-aligned organizations and individuals refused to respond to calls
for their participation was treated as unimportant. A more implicit claim
to legitimacy also was present in the continued attempt to coopt
oppositional discourse.
The weakness caused by the lack of legitimacy present in state organs had
not been successfully tackled by the twin tracks of reform and repression
in the 1976-89 period and the decision to unban the ANC had continued
to foreground this problem. This lay at the heart of the explicit claims to
have consulted before producing documents and in the largely gestural
attempts to cooperate on education policy through organs such as the
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Joint Working Group.16 It was also evident in the intensified usage of
highly technicist language and a technocratic rationality.
Technocratic Rationality
This permeated both these two important reports as well as the NTS. The
education reports, like their training counterparts in the 1980s, were
compiled by bureaucratic commissions and based on the more detailed
work of expert committees (Bennell et al. 1992). In the ERS process, for
example, the focus was very much on the production of management
solutions. This was in sharp contrast with the NEPI approach's focus on
providing options to a popular constituency for it to make final decisions.
Curriculum reform was also seen as a technical process in the CMESA
Report: "curriculum reform is an extremely complex process which must
take place in a scientifically responsible manner and on an evolutionary
basis" (DNE 1991a: vi).
Such a view served a triple purpose. First, it mystified the process of
reform so as to limit critique. Second, it portrayed it as value-free in an
attempt to deflect accusations of political bias. Third, by stressing the
evolutionary nature of change, it sought to derail calls for radical,
transformatory change.
16 For a period of just over a year in 1991-2 a forum between the state and the ANC
alliance met occasionally to discuss immediate educational problems such as textbook
shortages and to consider the possibility of negotiations on educational transformation.




The attempt to reduce the state's presence in the education sector, begun
in the 1980s and analysed in the previous chapter, continued in the ERS.
Decentralization from the national department and greater managerial
autonomy for schools were frequent themes of that Report. Moreover,
the principle of freedom of association was used to justify the right of
communities to establish their own schools.
This was reflected in the one real attempt during this period to act rather
than to agenda set. Through the Model C system, most white state
schools by 1992 had come under the control of their existing parent
communities, who could set admissions policy and, in the light of
increased cost-sharing, fee levels (Christie 1994). This effectively
controlled the desegregation process and limited black access to white
schools, albeit on a class, rather than strictly racial, basis.
Other elements of the international debate regarding the marketization of
education were also evident in the ERS formulation. Cost-sharing has
been noted above, and this was particularly to be encouraged at post-
compulsory level, a strong echo of World Bank policy (World Bank
1988).17 Parental choice was stressed, echoing government rhetoric in
Britain and elsewhere. Finally, provider capture (the notion that the
education system often comes to serve the interests of educationalists
rather than parents and pupils) entered the discourse, in a reflection of
debates emanating from England, the United States and New Zealand
(e.g. Chubb and Moe 1990; DNE 1992; Gordon 1992).
17 The degree to which there was direct World Bank influence appears unresolved.
However, it is possible that the strong resonances with Bank views might arise from the
large numbers of World Bank sabbaticals granted to South Africans during this period. I
owe this point to Kenneth King.
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Vocationalism
CMESA in particular represented a very strong attempt to further
vocationalize South African education. This of course can be seen, at
least in part, as a result of the limited degree of implementation of the de
Lange Report's proposals of a decade earlier. Along with the ERS, the
CMESA proposals shared the 1980s view that education was failing in the
orientation, preparation and socialization processes involved in
transforming learners into workers. Lack of relevance and academic bias
were central elements of such an analysis (DNE 1991a: 3-4).
In response to these failings, CMESA called for a "paradigm shift from
predominantly university-oriented education towards vocationally-
oriented education" (DNE 1991a: vi-vii), an almost direct copy of the de
Lange Report's conclusions on this issue. This shift was to be effected by
curriculum reform at all levels of schooling. At junior primary level
economic education and vocational guidance would be introduced (ibid:
26). There would be a heavy emphasis on socialization, with students
being expected to learn how "to be acceptable to others" (ibid: 15). From
this stage until the end of schooling, vocational orientation would be a
cross-curricular theme permeating all subjects (ibid: vii; 33). At senior
primary level would be added a specific focus on the inculcation of
"positive attitudes to work and the development of a work ethic" (ibid.
15-6).
The junior secondary school would see the emphasis on the
"development of economic literacy and entrepreneurial skills" (ibid: 16-
7), the former in spite of the previously stated focus on economic
education since the beginning of schooling. This level of schooling
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would also include the introduction of a focus on six vocationally-
oriented themes, although it was simply stated that they would feature in
the curriculum, not what form this focus would take (ibid: 23).
These themes were engineering; business; arts; agriculture; utility
industries; and social services (ibid: 20). At senior secondary level they
were to be the structure for a vocationally-oriented strand, to be provided
in schools, which would be offered along with an academic education
strand. A vocational education strand would be offered in technical
colleges. The first two strands showed a New Vocationalist emphasis on
orientation rather than technical preparation. The third strand was in
keeping with this in so far as it moved technical preparation back out of
the school system. This tripartite approach had clear parallels with the
system of General National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs) emerging
in England at the same time.18
The balance was to be shifted further towards the vocational even at this
upper secondary level. Whilst those in academic education would be
encouraged to take courses from the six vocationally-oriented fields,
which would also be used to shape their academic subjects, students in
the vocational strand at technical college would do no academic subjects
(ibid: 42).
The effect of these proposals was to reiterate the state's commitment to a
position in which education would be held in a close, instrumental bond
with industry. Both education and training had been slated for a
reorganization which would facilitate better interaction between them in
their joint striving to serve the economy. However, this was by no
18 Indeed, it is worth noting that this triple-track approach returned to centre stage in
England in early 1996 (Guardian 02/03/96: 1).
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means integration of the two, and notions such as competency had yet to
pass over to education from training.
The education provided for the masses, however, would be focused
closely on attitudinal, and to a lesser extent, technical preparation, which
carried connotations of training. Notions of the three strands of
education commanding equal status were hard to sustain in the face of
frequent clarifications that academic education was for the most able and
that sifting out to non-formal education or into more vocational streams
would primarily be on the criteria of aptitude and ability for academic
study (ibid: 22-4).
This "meritocratic" system must of course be read in the light of the
parallel privatization strategy. That strategy's operation "as a means of
protecting patterns of privilege" in white education (Christie 1994: 50),
meant that the ERS/CMESA proposals amounted to little more than a
rerunning of the 1984 Education Act's division between broad liberal
education for the white elite and narrow instrumentalism for the African
masses. Where it differed, however, was in its stronger commitment to
induction of a limited number of wealthy Africans into the elite system.
After this initial post-1990 phase of research-based agenda setting, the
stage was set for policy formulation. Attempts to develop meaningful
negotiations between the state and the state-in-waiting had begun with
the 1991 establishment of the Joint Working Group, but remained largely
unsuccessful. In the mean time the ANC and COSATU began to develop
a coordinated policy for education and training, which was to form part of
the ANC's election manifesto package, and the position from which the
alliance did finally enter onto the national negotiating stage.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANC POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
In January 1994 the ANC published its education blueprint for the post¬
election period. This document, A Policy Framework for Education and
Training. (ANC 1994a) arose out of post-NEPI policy deliberations which
saw a further elaboration of both the COSATU and ANC notions about a
progressive Post-Fordist education and training system. Something of
the nature of this evolution of policy thinking can be seen through an
exploration of the draft documents which fed into the core section of the
framework, regarding integration of education and training.
Stage One: An Integrated Approach to Post Compulsory Education
In March 1993 a paper on "An Integrated Approach to Post Compulsory
Education" was produced (ANC-COSATU 1993a).19 As the title indicates,
this document had a narrow focus on the further education level.
Following on from the debate about equity and development which the
New Times model allegedly overcame, the paper was structured around
the equity, economic efficiency and democracy dimensions of various
policy themes. The intention behind this was clear: National Party policy
would be shown to be neither efficient, equitable nor democratic, in direct
contrast to proposed ANC-COSATU policies.
Central to these proposed policies was the integrated qualification
structure first considered in the earlier COSATU/NUMSA papers (ANC-
COSATU 1993a: 4). This would have three major levels. First, there
19 This and subsequent drafts were authored by Adrienne Bird (NUMSA) and Gail Elliott
(ANC).
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would be a basic education level, comprising primary, secondary and
adult basic education, and leading to a General Education Certificate.
Second, there would be a further education level, leading to a National
Higher Certificate. Third, there would be a higher education level,
leading to (unspecified) degrees and diplomas (ibid: 5).
In this particular document the focus was squarely on the second level.
This would have five certification levels within it, with the existing
matriculation level being equivalent to level 3 (ibid: 6). At each level
learners would be expected to take a prescribed core group of courses plus
a further set of options. This would be based on a competency-based
modular approach. However, this form of competency would not be the
traditional concept of the ability to perform narrowly
defined tasks. Rather, it must be construed as consisting of
three basic elements- the traditionally vocational element
of the application of skill; the traditionally academic
element of knowledge of theory underpinning various
applications and the traditionally missing element which
deals with the interface of the two. (ibid: 6-7)
All modules would carry the same number of credit points and this
would facilitate credit transfer (ibid: 10). The oversight of standards
setting would be done by a National Education and Training Board. This
would have two sub-committees, one for training and one for education.
Significantly, the latter would be the only place that teachers would be
included as standard setters, whilst universities would have no apparent
involvement.
This model appeared to draw very heavily on that of the British
Baccalaureat (Finegold et al. 1990), itself primarily a vision of further
education reform. However, whereas the British research arose out of
the education sector and retained the feel of an educational view of
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integration, here the feel was very much that of a unification which was
training-driven. All learning was to be competency-based and all
students would have to do at least one vocational subject (ANC-COSATU
1993a: 9). The reference to vocational subjects is itself a reflection of the
unfinished nature of the new thinking, as in a fully unified system there
would be neither academic nor vocational subjects.
In spite of this training focus, however, the document lacked a really
coherent view of how this model would interlock with the nexus. This
resulted in a sketch of career paths for a variety of sectors that had 8 levels
which were totally un-articulated with the levels previously suggested for
education and training (ibid: 14).
Stage 2: A Framework for Lifelong Learning. Draft One
In June 1993 a second paper appeared which broadened the focus to the
whole of education and training: A Framework for Lifelong Learning.
Draft One (ANC-COSATU 1993b). It used the same tripartite strategy of
focusing on equity, efficiency and democracy, but added a longer preamble
which further emphasized the equity dimension of the proposals
through a restatement of the principles agreed upon by the 1992 National
Education Conference (Essop 1992), an attempt to reinforce popular
support for ANC education policy. Among these, it was stated that
education and training should be:
provided to all on a democratic and unitary basis,
opposing any discrimination on the grounds of race,
gender, class and age;
[and]
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extended to all disadvantaged groups including women,
adults, students, youth and rural communities, in order to
redress historical imbalances. (ANC-COSATU 1993b: 1)
This document largely replicated its predecessor in its early discussions of
the problems of the current system and the principles of the proposed
alternative. However, this discussion developed into a new exploration
of two possible approaches to integration: a crucial debate in the context of
what has happened subsequently.
The first model the paper considered was that of "Two ladders with
bridges". This was represented as a version of the German dual system
(ibid. 12). There would be an education track and a training track with
provision for transference between them at certain specified points. This
model was rejected in this draft for four reasons.
First, it was argued that South Africa was poorer than Germany and
therefore could not afford to make the training track as high prestige as
the education one. This was a striking argument in the light both of the
borrowings of the ANC-COSATU model from elsewhere in the OECD
countries and of the NEPI critique of what was now the preferred ANC-
COSATU approach as unrealistic at South Africa's level of development
(NEPI 1993). It seemed that borrowings from England and Australia were
more feasible than those from Germany.20
Second, "it does not solve the problem of those adults who have no
general education" (ANC-COSATU 1993b: 12). This is another important
20 In so far as the English system is widely held to be inferior in the quality and quantity
of skilled labour produced, it may indeed be more feasible to reach English rather than
German levels of training. Such an argument was put to me in an interview by Tony Ansara
of the Hospitality Industry Training Board (Ansara OI 1995). However, given that the
English notions being borrowed were to do with Post-Fordist transition, the argument that
a German model was less feasible is unconvincing.
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point to keep in mind when we consider subsequent formulations of the
actual breadth of learning to be offered as part of adult basic education.
Third, occupational mobility between different sectors was limited as
"there is no underpinning for portability of skills in the form of generic
knowledge" (ibid.). This issue of portability is another that will re-emerge
later in this thesis.
Fourth, it was argued that the "ladders and bridges" model disallowed
combinations of academic and vocational learning. This appeared to
accord the two tracks a level of rigidity and purity that was not reflected in
practice.
The document proposed the alternative of a "unified, multi-path model"
(ibid.). This would have a single qualification structure with a core and
options (as proposed in the previous document). This approach, it was
claimed, "ensures that there is integration in the provision of education
and training, hence no polarity of status can result" (ibid: 13). Maximum
portability, flexibility and access would be guaranteed through such a
structure.
This new document introduced some new ideas and adapted others from
the earlier paper. A single Department of Lifelong Learning was
envisaged to oversee the integrated system, assisted by a National
Certification Council (ibid: 15). Industry Training Boards would be
replaced by Sector Education and Training Boards with representation
broadened beyond corporate interests. These boards would be expected to
oversee training for both the formal and the informal sectors (ibid: 9).
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The uncertainty surrounding the meaning of competency noted in the
NEPI Framework Report (NEPI 1993) was heightened by an inconsistency
in terminology. Whereas page 25 of the document still talked of
"competency", page 19 had already seen a shift to "competency outcome":
potentially a less behaviourist notion. The shifting sands of terminology
in this area will be revisited subsequently, both in this and the following
chapter.
In other areas, little development from the previous paper was evident.
This was particularly the case for integration between the nexus and the
qualifications framework, which was still heavily under-theorized.
Two further themes of this draft are also worth reflecting upon briefly.
First, in spite of the shift to a tight integration of academic and vocational
education, the paper argued that "the rest of the world recognises basic
general education as a democratic human right" (ibid: 2). Whilst it is
possible to argue that a truly general education is one which integrates
education and training, that clearly was not the conventional usage in
"the rest of the world" at the time. Again, what seemed to be happening
here, though no explicit references were made, was a further attempt to
coopt World Bank arguments, this time in order to move beyond, rather
than overthrow, state policy.
Second, the paper was explicit regarding ANC views about where power
should reside. As we saw above, the National Party strategy in the 1990-4
period was to remove as much power as possible from the state, whether
through decentralization, deregulation or privatization. The ANC was
determined to resist this strategy. As regards learning systems, this
document made it clear that
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Education and training policies have to be decided upon
and governed from central government level (i.e.
national). Regional and local government tiers will be
responsible for implementation and delivery, (ibid: 4)
The battle between this position and that of the National Party, as we
shall see subsequently, was also a battle which affected the nature of the
unified system being proposed.
Stage 3: A Framework for Lifelong Learning. Draft Two
A further version of this paper appeared in August. This amounted in
the main to a tidying up of the previous version. Nonetheless, some
interesting shifts did emerge. For instance, there was a stronger attempt
to marry career path levels with educational levels. Instead of an eight-
level career path and a twelve-level qualification system, a combined
twelve-level structure was proposed, although this remained rather
under-developed on the side of the career path, with four levels still "to
be defined" (ANC-COSATU 1993c: 9). The National Certification Council
has been replaced by a South African Qualifications Authority (ibid: 15),
more closely reflecting New Zealand usage.
The shift in competency-based language became even more apparent in
this version:
Whereas an outcomes approach is a way of defining a
curriculum in terms of learning aims, a competency
model refers to a particular form of outcome- usually the
performance of a narrowly defined task in a workplace (or
by simulation). What is being suggested here is a notion
of educational outcomes that is broad enough to include
any learning experience that might traditionally have been
included in an academic course, a college based vocational
course or a work based programme, (ibid: 27-8)
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This change in language was very significant. Such a version of
competencies-outcomes was potentially far more acceptable to
mainstream educators than the previous versions. However, it was also
quite a move away from what was the accepted industry view, which in
practice included large sections of adult basic education provision.
Moreover, there was still little likelihood that many educators would see
the shift as anything more than a smoke-screen.
Stage 4: A Policy Framework for Education and Training
The ANC policy document published in January 1994 as part of its
manifesto development process was far broader in scope than the
documents discussed in this section so far.21 In its first chapter on "Goals,
Commitments and Tasks" it developed a powerful critique of Apartheid
education and stressed the need to overcome the legacy of segregation,
poor and inequitable access and undemocratic governance (ANC 1994a:
2). These, of course, were major strands of the equity theme of the
People's Education meta-narrative which continued to be placed at the
front, if not the centre, of ANC policy.
At the core of the new system was the proposal for an integrated system
(ibid: 15). As previously, this would not only provide equity but would
make South Africa more competitive in the face of globalization
pressures (ibid.). However, the detail on this was very thin. Whereas the
previous documents had covered thirty closely packed pages each, here
21 This was officially designated as an ANC document in contrast to those previously
examined. However, as COSATU (along with the South African Communist Party) was
committed to supporting the ANC platform for the forthcoming elections, this document
should be taken as having COSATU backing.
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the consideration of this major new innovation covered only five well-
spaced sides.
There was reference only to three "major certificated levels or exit
points", with a further three ABE levels beneath these (ibid: 18). RPL and
career paths were mentioned but not elaborated upon. Outcomes were
now clearly preferred to competencies. However, given the confusion
present in the previous formulations regarding their relative meanings,
the failure to define outcomes, in this their first public airing, can be read
as a major omission.
Two major new points for discussion emerge from a close reading of this
document. First, there was a lack of clarity regarding the nature of
national qualifications at the higher education level. In the key chapter
on "Evolving a National Learning System" there was stress on better
coordination between university courses. However, the only reference to
a "national core curriculum based on the integration of academic and
vocational skills", applied this model simply to pre-Higher Education
levels (ibid: 19). Equally, the chapter on "Higher Education", later in the
document, made no mention of outcomes in the tertiary level context.
The proposals could be read, therefore, as allowing some degree of
movement for the universities in avoiding what, for some of them at
least, was an unpalatable new approach, shifting, as it did, the balance of
power in education away from the universities (Lugg 1994).
Second, the constitutional negotiations prior to the publication of the
education and training policy framework had undermined previous
comments regarding the centrality of the state in education policy and
provision:
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Under the Interim Constitution, which defines the
powers and responsibilities of the national and provincial
levels of government, and in terms of the national
policies for education and training, as much decision¬
making and executive responsibility as possible will be
devolved to local and institutional governance bodies as
they can sustain, (ibid: 22)
Such a position was far more in keeping with National Party policy of the
past decade.
Provincial Education and Training Authorities (PETAs) would be set up
to co-ordinate policy at the provincial level (ibid: 24). However, what this
meant in practice amounted to very little if the following passage is to be
believed:
they [the PETAs] will observe national policy in respect of:
the national qualifications system, the national
curriculum framework, policy frameworks and
guidelines, norms and standards, planning and financing
processes, including fiscal equalisation, conditions of
service of education personnel, industrial relations in
education and training (public employees only),
management information systems, and a national quality
assurance system, including the monitoring of redress.
(ibid: 24-5)
This second passage suggested little in the way of autonomy for
provinces, and none with regards to the national qualifications system.22
However, the previous passage, and its close relationship to
constitutional negotiations, left open the possibility for greater regional
powers. The delineation of those powers, and their implications for
specific policy areas such as national qualifications, would have to wait
until a later stage of the policy process after the elections. However, an
22 It also seemed to mark a clear move away from the local curricular autonomy suggested
by National Party documents since the de Lange Report.
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Implementation Plan for Education and Training was drawn up by the
CEPD (1994).
The Reconstruction and Development Programme
Education and training policy was but one facet of an overall ANC policy
strategy, and also should be considered within that broader framework.
Therefore, I will now turn to a brief consideration of what the central
ANC document, The Reconstruction and Development Programme
[RDP] (ANC 1994b), had to say about education and training.
The RDP, as its name suggests, was built upon assumptions of the
feasibility of providing development and equity simultaneously,
"reconstruction" frequently being used as a synonym for redistribution.
However, whilst "building the economy" was one of its five central
principles (ibid: para.1.4.1.1), and globalization was referred to several
times (e.g. para.1.4.1.7), the principle of "developing our human
resources" displayed a bias towards equity.
There was a major focus in the RDP document on the need to develop
ABE and compulsory formal education as a response to education as a
basic human right, and for empowerment. Although both SAQA and an
NQF were mentioned, there was no reference to either competencies or
outcomes. Indeed, the stress of the chapter on human resources was on a
concern with human development rather than the linkages between
learning and work.
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Summarizing ANC Education Policy
Through this internal policy process the ANC seemed, therefore, to have
developed a position on education and training which saw integration as
central to the post-election system. A National Qualifications Framework
and a South African Qualifications Authority were also on the agenda,
although their likely nature remained unstated in published documents
and inconsistent in internal ones. Other positions also remained unclear
and contested, notably over the crucial issues of centre-province
responsibilities and equity-development tensions. In the case of the
latter, the RDP position seemed to reflect a stress on equity which was
fundamentally different from the more development-oriented concerns
of the education and training policy framework.
A further shaping of all these issues would be provided by the National
Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) which was also to report in early 1994.
Before turning to an examination of that crucial document, however, it is
necessary to briefly examine how the corporate sector was responding
both to the new era and to the negotiating positions being developed by
the National Party and the ANC-COSATU alliance.
THE CORPORATE RESPONSE
In many respects the corporate view regarding education remained
unchanged from that sketched out in the previous chapter. There was a
continued attempt to both supplement and shape state provision through
heavy educational expenditure. Investment in technical education
continued, but increasingly there was a huge emphasis on making the
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school system more effective. Teacher upgrading schemes, improved
mathematics and science education and new infrastructure were all
elements of the 1990s investment programme (Moyo 1995).
What was more significant, however, was the ever-increasing
importance of the business community in the policy process. With the
rise of privatization, this new funding from the private sector was
increasingly central as a source of leverage for innovation in education as
well as training. Moreover, the demise in the state's ability and
willingness to dominate the policy agenda gave big business the space in
which to attempt to develop a view of education and training that could
be placed against the ANC-COSATU vision.
Much of the new wave of corporate expenditure came from the sources
identified in the previous chapter. However, two huge new players
emerged. The Independent Development Trust, a state-capital alliance,
was responsible for disbursements of R470 million to education in the
period covered by this chapter (Samoff et al. 1994: 30). The Joint
Education Trust, corporate-funded but with trustees from a wide range of
major political and economic organizations, was established in 1992 with
a R500 million budget for five years (ibid: 29).
In addition to investment in formal schooling came ever-increasing
bursary programmes for African university students, as companies
sought to accelerate African corporate advancement. A much larger
impact, however, came from a stress on adult literacy and basic education.
A large drive towards employee literacy had started in the mines during
the 1980s (NEPI 1992c). In the 1990s that began to broaden out into
manufacturing and shift focus towards wider notions of adult basic
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education. Major companies, such as Mercedes-Benz and the Electricity
Supply Commission (ESKOM), pledged themselves to adult basic
education for all employees (Dovey 1995; ESKOM 1993).
Development of provision also was apparent in the field of training. The
establishment of industry training boards in some industries led to a
growth of competency-based modular training (Building Industry
Training Board [BITB] 1991; Plastics Industry Training Board 1993; Riches
[Director of the Clothing Industry Training Board] OI 1995).
Notions of career paths began to emerge in certain industries such as
building and electricity generation and distribution (Burroughs 1993;
ESKOM 1993). Multi-skilling also began to enter corporate strategies
(ESKOM 1993). Recognition of Prior Learning came into sharper focus.
This had been legislated for as part of the 1981 Manpower Training Act,
but it was the 1990s before industries such as building again led the way in
developing mechanisms to formalize it (BITB 1991; Burroughs 1993).
These practical developments in education and training were
accompanied by interventions at the policy level. Here the 1989
establishment of the Private Sector Education Council (PRISEC),
representing the major business federations, was an important step.
PRISEC's agenda was largely in tune with that of the government with
marketization and relevance the two central themes of policy documents
(e.g. PRISEC 1992). The entrenchment of technocratic rationality was
furthered by the establishment by the Urban Foundation of its own
education policy unit (EDUPOL). The EDUPOL vision was very strongly
one of market forces and value-free statistical research (Hofmeyr and
Buckland 1992).
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There was the emergence, however, in the early 1990s of a new strand of
thinking amongst employer representatives which was an elaboration on
some of the practices outlined above. A 1992 paper by Bobby Godsell,
chief corporate negotiator in talks with COSATU and senior Anglo-
American training manager, was particularly significant in this context.
Godsell showed a strong familiarity with the kind of language being
employed by the ANC and COSATU. His vision was one of collaboration
with trade unions in organizations which bore a strong resemblance to
the type of firm predicted by the New Times model.23 In this vision,
employers would have the responsibility for providing workers with
literacy and numeracy training, a major COSATU demand. On
education, the call was for a move beyond the academic-vocational
division, again reminiscent of the New Times meta-narrative (Godsell
1992).
Such a stance from the corporate world became even more apparent as
negotiations between both sides of the political and industrial struggle
began. It was largely a response to the successful development of a
coherent and persuasive agenda by COSATU. However, two other
influences also helped the more visionary corporate leaders to see
opportunities as well as threats in the ANC-COSATU propositions.
First, the one existing model of integrative practice in education and
training was that of New Zealand, where it was an element of the most
thorough-going marketization of education in an OECD country. Taken
together with semi-integrative trends in Australia, England and Scotland,
23 Such a firm would be based on high skill labour; flexible production technologies;
reduced hierarchies and harmonious industrial relations.
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the New Zealand evidence suggested that integration could be organized
in the interests of elements of capital.
The significance of integrative practice emerging in the countries with
which white South Africa's had its strongest cultural ties should not be
under-estimated. However, this seems less important than a second
influence, which I shall explore at greater length.
The possibilities of Post-Fordism were also increasingly coming to the
attention of South African corporate leaders as a result both of the
growing international response to perceived globalization pressures, seen
through the actions of many of the transnational represented in South
Africa and in the emerging international literature on the need for
organizational transformation (e.g. Peters 1987).
Although this literature was little different from New Times in its
concerns and claims,24 its manifestations as corporate practice made it
rather less Utopian. Therefore, it is important to distinguish it from its
more pro-labour rival. To this end I have called it "Lean Production"
after the epithet used in one of the key texts of this meta-narrative
internationally (Womack et al. 1990).
There is a growing and wide-ranging literature about Lean Production but
here the focus will be on five of the meta-narrative's principal facets
before a brief consideration of its implications for education and training
policy. Internationally, there is a large critical literature regarding this
discourse, as well as a rather less rigorous advocacy literature, and both of
these will be used here. In the case of South Africa, the newness of the
24 Hence my use of Post-Fordist as a generic term in this chapter.
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discourse means both these literatures are rather sparse.25 As a result
there will be a greater than ideal reliance here on external sources and
extrapolation therefrom.
Knowledge Workers and the Learning Organization
One of the central themes of New Times thinking, as we saw earlier, is its
claim that the new economic and technological climate leads human
resources to become the most important element of a firm's competitive
advantage. This stress was reflected in South African employer
formulations (e.g. South African Business Network 1994b). These were
in turn rooted in international texts such as Made in America which
spoke of a "continuously learning workforce" (Dertouzos et al. 1989: 149)
and "firms as learning institutions" (ibid: 82).
Employee Participation
This meta-narrative stresses employee participation in the decision¬
making process of the firm. Again, this is analogous to the New Times
meta-narrative. However, some authors have stripped away a little of
the gloss from this vision. Beale, for example, noted the need to
distinguish between employee participation and employee involvement
schemes (Beale 1994). Whereas the former sees workers as equal
collaborators with management; the latter sees greater involvement in
problem-solving for the company by workers. This amounts, in their
25 Indeed, probably the best South African source was written by an Australian trade
unionist imported by NUMSA, Chris Lloyd.
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view, to little more than "the discovery of ways of allowing the company
or organization to benefit from 'shopfloor expertise' traditionally
neglected by management" (ibid: 91).
Such an analysis was concurred with by the NUMSA shop stewards at
Toyota SA in Durban in a piece (NUMSA Shop Stewards (Toyota SA)
1992) which was written in further elaboration of a Nattrass article about
the factory. In that article she had pointed to the limited nature of
participation in the factory, despite Toyota's rhetoric (Nattrass 1991). For
instance, the company ran a scheme called Siyacabanga (we think) in
which three innovatory suggestions from a worker would earn that
individual the reward of a mug and a key ring. The disparity between the
benefits to the firm from worker-led innovation and those accruing to
the workers themselves are laid bare by this example.
Flexibility
One of the central terms used by Lean Production advocates is
"flexibility". This notion has been used to break down job classifications
and demarcations; and to increase the number of non-permanent or part-
time staff (Atkinson and Meager 1986). For Wickens, a former director of
Nissan UK, flexibility denotes the maximum expansion of all jobs
(Wickens 1987). Flexibility inevitably has become a contested practice and
its principal British researcher has concluded that it "has been virtually
synonymous with the idea of labour being flexible in the interests of
capital" (Atkinson 1987: 98).
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Such a view can also be sustained for South Africa where many
companies seem more concerned with the flexibility elements of Post-
Fordism rather than the high skill ones. This has been particularly
evident in the case of the contestation between multi-skilling and multi¬
tasking, as we shall now see.
Multi-Tasking
Lean Production shares New Times's use of the term "multi-skilling".
However, as with flexibility and participation this has been strongly
contested. In its rubbishing of the German craft tradition (Womack et al.
1990) and in the Japanese-style stress on limited technical training (Lloyd
1994) the approach is seen by its critics as being far removed from true
multi-skilling. Rather, it is argued to be about task accretion (Garrahan
and Stewart 1992, and as Wickens implies above) or rotation through a
range of unskilled tasks (Lloyd 1994). Lloyd argued that both of these
forms of multi-tasking were far more common in pre-election South
Africa than multi-skilling (ibid.).
Work Intensification
Linked to multi-tasking in the critique of Lean Production is the notion
of work intensification. The accretion of tasks noted above, and
applauded by some Lean Productionists (e.g. Peters 1987), is one element
of such an intensification. To this is linked the tradition of enforced
overtime in Japanese companies such as Toyota (Dohse et al. 1985). The
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increased international usage of Just-in-Time approaches26 means that
workers are less able to control the speed of work and hence create their
own unofficial rest breaks (Lloyd 1994). Through the use of work teams
with bonuses decided collectively, it is further possible to intensify work
as group surveillance of individual workers is more effective than
overseer or electronic means.
Some authors go as far as to suggest that what emerges from this
discourse in practice is not just Neo-Fordist but is also Neo-Taylorist
(Beale 1994; Berggren 1989). Although a stress on learning does emerge, it
is far from a radical empowering vision. The inculcation of attitudes and
values appears more important than the development of technical skills.
As such, integration means little more than a retreat from costly
vocationalism into a narrow competency-based attempt at socialization in
both school and workplace, where relevance becomes the guiding
principle. Such a shift appears very pertinent in South Africa as
subsequent discussions will make evident.
THE FOUR META-NARRATIVES
I have now outlined four meta-narratives, two of which were
continuations of pre-1990 positions. First, from progressive civil society
and education, there was an on-going stress on equity and access to
education which, however, lacked a well-defined view of the learning-
work relationship. Second, from the ANC, COSATU and many of their
26 Just-in-Time refers to a system of maintaining zero buffer stocks at both ends of the
production process with small levels of supplies being delivered as necessary. This means
work is expected to go on at a constant pace as any stoppage has effects throughout the
system. See Lloyd (1994) for more details.
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intellectual supporters, there was a position which claimed to reflect both
equity and development considerations through a largely Post-Fordist
strategy of transforming both learning and work, but which often
privileged both development and the workplace. Third, from the
National Party and its allies at the head of the education bureaucracy,
there was a continued stress on privatization and a need to tighten the
links between learning and work. Fourth, from within the business
community, but still in its infancy, there was a reading of the same forces
as in the ANC-COSATU version of Post-Fordism but which stressed
reorganization of both work and learning for capital's benefit.
THE NATIONAL TRAINING STRATEGY INITIATIVE
Whilst the education sector saw few signs of meaningful communication
between state and opposition, there was more progress in the arena of
training. COSATU was first represented on the National Training Board
in August 1991 (Bird 1992b: 47). The movement's representation on the
Board was instrumental in the subsequent rejection of the NTS Report
and in 1993 it was agreed that a new National Training Strategy Initiative
(NTSI) should be launched, with a new task team including COSATU
members. This was to be the first official commission in which the
democratic movement actively participated.
Central to the deliberations of the NTSI task team was the ANC-COSATU
proposal to integrate education and training. Although the team was to
look at training, this focus led it into the educational arena. In this light
it was significant that membership of the task team was extended to
Gustav Niebuhr of the Department of National Education and F. A.
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Booyse of the (white) Department of Education and Culture: House of
Assembly, but to no progressive educator.
As with several of the other reports that have been considered in this and
the previous chapter, the deliberations of working committees were also
important. The limited number of progressive educationalists in the
eight working committees was also striking. Whilst one EPU director
(Enver Motala) was a working committee member, none of the NEPI
Editorial Committee and neither the ANC Director of Education nor the
CEPD Director were included in any of the committees (NTB 1994:
Appendix A).
Before turning to a consideration of the main Report, I will examine two
papers that emerged from the most important of the working
committees, that on "Integration of education and training; competencies
and career paths and certification" (NTB 1994: 12): committee 2.
Document 1: Towards a Concept for a South African National
Qualifications Framework
Given the central importance of this committee it is significant that it was
chaired by someone from one of the most conservative industries, Bryan
Phillips of the Gencor mining house.27 The early document, "Towards a
Concept for a South African National Qualifications Framework"
(Phillips 1993- September), was a clear indicator that an employer-friendly
version of integration could be developed.
27 Through the "Education for Adults" programme, Phillips had come to prominence in the
adult literacy field in the 1980s.
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This discussion document was littered with approving comments about,
and examples from, the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA),
the Scottish Vocational Education Council (SCOTVEC) and the English
National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ). The document
appears to have been primarily concerned with building up a corporate
lobby in favour of integration and the largest element of its focus was on
the desirability and feasibility of such an approach for companies.
The narrowness of the approach was striking when contrasted with the
earlier ANC-COSATU formulations. Organs of civil society were to be
excluded from membership of the proposed Sector Education and
Training Organizations (SETOs) and the informal sector, rural
populations, women, youth and the unemployed all disappeared from
view.
The approach was also narrow in that it seemed only to apply definitely to
the further education and training level, although it was argued that "it
may be desirable to broaden these definitions to incorporate general and
higher education" (Phillips 1993: 1).
Indeed, this model's focus was even more limited than that of the post-
compulsory-focused first ANC-COSATU draft document analysed earlier
in this chapter. In that vision, the matriculation examination would
have been replaced by an integrated National High Certificate award at
level 3 (ANC-COSATU 1993a). Here, however, it was suggested that
matriculation should continue as a separate award equivalent to a
National Certificate (Phillips 1993: 13).
186
Document 2: A Proposal for an Integrated National Approach to
Education and Training
The committee's eventual submission to the NTSI task team (NTB
working committee 2 1993- December) reflected much of the Phillips'
view on the future shape of the NQF. This was not surprising given that
during the deliberations of the committee, Phillips, representing the
PRISEC alliance, and Bird, representing COSATU, dominated
proceedings, according to other committee members (Bellis OI 1995;
French OI 1995).
Reflecting the COSATU influence, the focus of this final paper was still
narrowly on the further education and training levels of a model that
finally seemed to have settled on eight full levels plus three sub-levels
for ABE (NTB WC2 1993: 6). The exclusion of the broader community
from the SETOs was confirmed (ibid: 35). Narrowness of vision was clear
in a further comment in passing about universities not necessarily being
part of the system (ibid: app. 3. 54). Indeed, the limits to integration were
illustrated clearly when it was argued that there should be a separate
Education Authority (ibid: app. 3. 47).
This notion of a separate authority for education was tied to a potentially
significant linguistic shift. Whereas ANC-COSATU formulations since
mid-1993 had talked of an integrated system, and continued to do so in
the ANC policy framework of January 1994, committee 2's document was
entitled "A Proposal for an Integrated National Approach to Education
and Training". Whilst, the distinction between "system" and "approach"
remained as opaque as many of the other linguistic turns of the period, it
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appeared that this represented a looser corporate view, in contrast to the
more strongly statist view of the trade union movement.
This sense of looseness was reinforced by an explicit description of the
NQF as voluntarist, in the case of private education and training
providers (NTB WC2 1993: app 3. 51). Whilst it still appeared to be
assumed that the NQF would be largely uncontested, this represented the
first attempt to address the issue of voluntarism. The strong market
influence on this document was also reflected in the assumption that
SAQA would be a private company rather than an organ of state (ibid:
app 3.47).
The proposal did show signs of a continued equity stress, however,
although it was further muted. It was perhaps most noticeable (as too
often was also the case in ANC documents) in the initial outlining of
principles on which the new education and training system should be









• recognition of prior learning
• articulation
• portability
• non-racism and non-sexism (ibid: 4-6).
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Of these, three stand out as strong symbols of the People's Education
meta-narrative. First, transparency, in order to "ensure that access routes,
prerequisites and opportunities are clear, simple and understandable to
all" (ibid: 5). Second, the commitment "to provide access to appropriate
levels of education and training for all prospective learners in a manner
that facilitates progression" (ibid.). Third, the requirement to "actively
promote non-racist and non-sexist practices" (ibid. 6). The underlying
principles of the NQF will be a theme returned to as attention now shifts
to the final NTSI Report.
The National Training Strategy Initiative: Discussion Document
The NTSI also based itself in a list of twelve principles (NTB 1994: 8-11).
In this list, transparency and non-racism/non-sexism were replaced by
legitimacy and guidance of learners. It appears from this that policy and
practice no longer had to answer to calls to be transparent but simply had
to appear legitimate. This seems to reflect a shift from NECC-style usage
in the draft towards greater sympathy with National Party concerns in the
final Report. Hence, it is also indicative of a weakening of adherence to
the People's Education meta-narrative and the strengthening of the
market-oriented alternative. The abandonment of non-racism/non-
sexism, a core NECC principle, can also be seen in this light.
It is worth focusing briefly on some of the other principles as they
introduced certain key notions of the Report as a whole. The first
principle was that of integration. In keeping with the work committee's
document, the preferred terminology was that of an integrated approach
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(ibid: 8). The significance of this usage had already been indicated earlier
in the Report:
The term "integrated approach" indicates a super-ordinate
strategy dealing with education and training as a whole
which does not, however, impinge on the potential of
dealing with each sub-system in a unique tactical manner.
(ibid: 6)
This room for manoeuvre given to the sub-systems (however they were
to be defined) reinforced the potential for asymmetry between different
parts of education and training in what appeared to be a strong contrast to
the tighter vision of an NQF, which had been implicit from the earliest
NEPI-ANC-COSATU formulations.
The potential for conflict and contradiction inherent in this account of
integration was also present in the fourth principle: coherence and
flexibility. This stated that
Education and training should adhere to a coherent
framework of principles and certification which may be
established at national level, but should permit the
flexibility of interpretation required to meet the needs of
industry and service sectors, providers and learners, (ibid:
9)
In this formulation it was not entirely evident that coherence and
flexibility could be successfully balanced nor which would take
precedence if balance was impossible. The phrase: "may be established at
national level", could be taken as suggesting that national coherence was
certainly not an over-riding principle.
The next principle, standards, led the document into the continuing
morass of competency-outcomes distinctions. In this formulation it was
stated that
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In the training system it has been the practice (and the
legal requirement) for some time to express the results of
training in terms of competency. That term has however
become subject to different interpretations by different
organisations and needs clarification, hence the use of the
term outcomes in this context, (ibid.)
However, nowhere in the Report was such clarification of the meanings
of either competency or outcomes made explicit.
Articulation, progression and portability were important and related
elements of the proposed approach. The need to facilitate movement
within parts of the system (portability); among those parts (articulation);
and between different levels (progression) all had formed a core of the
proposal from its earliest development.28 However, for these to operate
to their full extent, coherence rather than flexibility would have to be
emphasized.
In reality there was little discussion or elaboration of many of the
principles subsequent to their presentation in the introduction. Instead,
the Report moved into a lengthy but highly tendentious examination of
international experience and its relevance for South Africa, based on
research commissioned specially by the NTB and coordinated from Berlin
(Frey et al. 199429'30). This research largely seems to have been conducted
28 In common usage portability tends to be used to cover all horizontal movement and so
corresponds to the meanings of portability and articulation in this report.
29 This three volume study looked at "Vocational and Technical Education in Australia,
Brazil, Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania and Zimbabwe" and was supplemented
by NTS research on the NCVQ in England. At least in the case of Zimbabwe, for which I
have the most personal knowledge, based on three years of service in the education
system, the evidence presented was riddled with inaccuracies about education, training
and the economic and political system. Many of these appeared rooted in a rather
conservative ideological position.
30 The selection of these countries might seem rather bizarre. However, they can be seen
as representative of the NICs (Malaysia, Singapore); the rest of Africa (Tanzania,
Zimbabwe); the Old Commonwealth (Australia, England); and the continental European
tradition (Germany). As a relatively industrialised and hugely inegalitarian society,
Brazil is often identified as sharing many characteristics with South Africa.
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to legitimate rather than inform the NTSI, as can be seen from the claim
that international experience (and not from New Zealand!) pointed to the
need for an NQF (NTB 1994: 30).
This discussion was followed by an exploration of such issues as defining
units of learning and what constituted a module. This represented a
retreat to the micro-level of technical detail before the broader
philosophical and political questions had been addressed in any
meaningful way. Again, this is indicative of the market-oriented meta-
narrative.
The Four Meta-Narratives and the NTSI
How did the four meta-narratives shape the NTSI discourse? It was still
the case that pro-equity dimensions were claimed for the NQF process,
although this was far less explicit than in ANC-COSATU documents.
Access was a principle underlying the Report and a concern in this area
was a recurrent theme. This was seen as first manifesting itself in the
formal schooling system:
Although theoretically all children of a school-going age
are able to attend school, the standards and facilities at DET
schools are significantly inferior to those found within
DEC schools. Furthermore, the number of schools in rural
communities is such that children are required to travel
substantial distances every day to get to school. These
factors restrict the numbers of scholars able to attend
school and contribute to the very high drop-out rate
experienced in the first few years of schooling, (ibid: 64)
This had implications in turn for access to training and further and
higher education, and on ABE provision through higher levels of
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demand. The commitment to access and equity also can be seen as
operating through the stress on RPL (ibid: 11).
However, the Report can also be read as a further defeat for a radical view
of education and training as a result of a series of exclusions. This first
became obvious in the principles, which, as was already noted, no longer
included "transparency" or "non-racism and non-sexism". It was also
apparent in the Report's one comment regarding the issue of paid
education and training leave, which acknowledged that, "labour believes
that workers should have the right to paid education and training leave
(PETL)" (ibid: 149).
This sentence is the epitome of the paradigm of negotiated compromise
that characterizes the Report. This issue was clearly too important to the
unions to be left unrecorded but its contentious nature meant that no
discussion or conclusion was attempted.
Exclusion from the discourse and from the NQF was also very strikingly
demonstrated by the admission that the data collected on South Africa
largely rendered invisible: women, rural communities and the informal
sector (ibid: 35).31 The effect of this was to give the Report a serious male,
urban, formal sector bias. As a result there was a danger that those who
were already relatively or absolutely privileged would continue to benefit
disproportionately from the new system. COSATU members could
largely be characterized as relatively privileged in such a context.
Elements of the state's reliance on the market-oriented meta-narrative
could also be discerned from the text. This was most evident when the
31 Whilst some of this data would not have been easy to acquire, the ommission of the
informal sector is striking in the light of the NTB's previous interest in this sector (see
Chapter Three).
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Report did concern itself with education. Mismatch was one such theme
which emerged:
A mismatch currently exists between the outputs of the
education system and the economic requirements of the
country. This is demonstrated by the number of
matriculants and degreed people who are incapable of
finding jobs while at the same time a shortage of technical
skills exists, (ibid: 58-9)
It was argued that "in terms of integrating the school-leaver into work,
the education system plays no meaningful role" (ibid: 72). Academic bias
was also seen as a major problem (ibid: 71). All of these strands of
discourse were indicative of a continued instrumentalist view regarding
education.
That many employers were still locked into conservative training
practices was also an element of the Report's narrative, which indicated
limitations to Post-Fordist, or even Neo-Fordist, thinking amongst key
stakeholder groups. The limited coverage and impact of industry
training boards (ibid: 103-4) and the continued presence of "free-rider"
problems (ibid: 171-2) forced the Report to dwell on rather Fordist
problems.
Nonetheless, the Report was underpinned by notions of a paradigm shift
in education and training being required in order to respond to a similar
shift in the economy and the pattern of world trade. Such concerns were
evident from the first page of the document:
Economic growth, predicated on meeting the needs of
South Africa's own citizens as well as on finding
international market niches at the more value-added end
of the world trade spectrum, is a prerequisite for and is
based on the availability of more skilled people, (ibid: 1)
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Only through an NQF, it was argued, could such markets be accessed. A
reading of a new learning-work paradigm was also evident in a use of
themes such as flexibility, multi-skilling and career paths.
However, the Report was born out of the coming together of certain
strands of union and employer thinking, as represented by the Bird-
Phillips axis. Produced by a committee and shaped by the need to
negotiate and reach compromise, the NTSI was a master-piece of
impressionism in which the overall notion of a NQF responding to
globalization was easily recognisable, but in which the actual detail was
very hazy.
The implication of this for education was that a large body of stakeholder
support now existed for a greater integration of education and training.
The mixture of competing meta-narratives and the negotiated and vague
character of the NTSI made it unclear as to the nature this integration
would assume. The battle for the future path of integration would be left
till after the elections.
SUMMARY
In the period between the unbanning of the ANC and the 1994 elections,
the two principal meta-narratives of the 1980s, the Market-Oriented and
People's Education accounts, were joined by two further important
visions. The Market-Oriented meta-narrative of the state was continued
through the ERS and CMESA reports. New Vocationalism was at the
centre of proposals for a triple-track at senior high school level and the
introduction of vocationally-oriented subjects from the primary level.
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Equally, the policy of privatization was reinforced by the new Model C
schools with their greater autonomy from the state.
People's Education continued to be reflected in the work of the NECC.
most notably in the NEPI reports. However, increasingly the ANC
position became more closely associated with that of COSATU and an
alternative meta-narrative of New Times emerged. This promised the
simultaneous achievement of both equity and economic development
goals and postulated a unified education and training system built
around national qualifications.
As the elections neared, a segment of the business community began to
respond to this position through a meta-narrative of Lean Production.
Whilst this used much of the same language of and made similar
proposals to the New Times meta-narrative, it tended to downplay the
equity and access elements in favour of efficiency.
The NTSI apparently managed to reconcile the four strands. In the next
chapter, the problems of maintaining this compromise in the post¬




































The previous chapter charted the emergence of an apparent consensus on
the future outline of education and training policy in the deliberations of
the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI). Nonetheless, it must be
understood that the policy parameters agreed upon were both relatively
broad and open to a variety of interpretations. As the policy
environment shifted from the interregnum before the elections of April
1994, with its pressures to develop consensus policies, to the contested
reality of the post-election period, with both a coalition government and
civil society engaged in a war of position, so the process of building a
dominant discourse of education and training underwent a fundamental
transformation.
In the run-up to the elections, the principal challenge had been to
develop a single discourse within which the majority of stakeholders
could operate. After the election, however, whilst this remained a very
visible, and not insignificant, element of the discourse building strategy,
another challenge achieved dominance. The new overriding imperative
for the active stakeholders became that of shaping the new system by
imposing their particular reading onto the broad consensus positions of
the immediate pre-election period. It is the development of this struggle
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to define and hence control the new system that is the focus of the final
section of the thesis.
The Research Questions
In this chapter I am concerned with the two most crucial research
questions that emerge from this struggle. First, what model of South
African education and training (if any) was emerging between the 1994
elections and the National Party withdrawal from the Government of
National Unity two years later? Second, what factors help to explain the
shape of South African education and training policy in mid-1996 and the
debates that surround it?
The Types of Data
With a shift in the nature of the policy debate comes a shift in the type of
data that can best be used for its exploration. In the post-election period
there has yet to be an official document of the seminal nature of
Wiehahn or the NTSI. Nevertheless there are official, and public,
documents which are crucial to an understanding of the current policy
phase. Here, of most importance are the draft and final versions of the
Education and Training White Paper (DNE 1994; DE 1995a), and the
South African Qualification Authority Act (RSA 1995), the latter being
enabling legislation for the establishment of this Authority which will be
responsible for the operationalization of the National Qualifications
Framework. None of these documents, however, contains anything like
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the level of data necessary to provide a clear picture of an emergent
system.
Inevitably, there are also documents which have an official origin but
which have not been published. I will make significant use of two such
sources, both from the first three months of the Government of National
Unity. Each reflect the operation of working groups which were set up
within different structures to move forward thinking about the new
education and training system. The first comes from the Inter-
Ministerial Working Group, (hereafter referred to as IMWG) established
between the departments of National Education1 and Labour Affairs,
primarily to develop the SAQA Bill. The second is a discussion
document of the NTB's working group 9, a post-NTSI group aimed at the
operationalization of that report.
With the absence of dominant official texts and, as yet, no output from
the recently appointed SAQA Board, it is necessary to place far greater
emphasis here than in other chapters on literature emerging from
stakeholder sources. Here are included a range of documents: intended
either for internal use, for dissemination to members or clients, or for
public dissemination. One such document receives far greater attention
than others: a report published by the Human Sciences Research Council
(HSRC) late in 1995. Unlike the HSRC reports encountered in previous
chapters, this is not a government-commissioned document. Nor, as was
the case with those previous reports, is it representative largely of views
of the Afrikaner intellectual elite. Rather, it represents "an informal
1 The Department of National Education became the Department of Education on 1st
January 1995.
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initiative of a group of concerned specialists and practitioners in
education and training" (Coombe 1995b).
These "specialists and practitioners" were mostly elements of four
principal stakeholder communities: trainers in manufacturing, trainers
in the parastatals, COSATU officials and adult educators (HSRC 1995: iv-
v). Whilst this does not make them legitimate or official, it does make
their findings highly significant, as witnessed by a "notice" at the start of
the Report from Trevor Coombe, IMWG Chairperson.2
Use will also be made of the relevant academic literature. This is rather
sparse but nonetheless significant given the involvement of many of the
key writers in policy advice at national and provincial levels.
Even combined, these literatures cannot provide a rich enough picture of
the policy process. This chapter will, of necessity, break from the
methods of earlier ones through its far greater reliance on the discourses
of stakeholders as expressed through interviews and conversations with
the author.
As stated in Chapter One, I met with 40 stakeholders, drawn from
national and provincial education departments, the RDP Office and the
Department of Labour Affairs; the NTB and the industrial training
boards; large employers and employers' associations; and trade unions
from the white craft tradition to independent African unions. Topics
discussed included their vision for future policy and practice; their
2The degree of legitimacy given to this report by such a foreword (calling as it does for
comments on the report to be sent to the EMWG) is a tangential, though interesting,
question. Subsequently, further official sanction was given to this report by its citation in
the national submission to the mid-term review of Education for All (DE 1996c).
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understanding of the dynamics operating on education and training
policy in South Africa; and their perceptions of the likely actions of other
stakeholders. Meetings with another 20 commentators (academics,
journalists, former stakeholders, donor officials) also helped to shape my
reading of the current period.3'4 Further useful insights into the current
policy process were gained through a brief direct involvement in the
process as a member of a Gauteng provincial task team on technical
education and training.
The Structure of the Chapter
The structure of this chapter will follow the delineation of the two
principal research questions. First it will address the question of what
model of South African education and training appears to be emerging
post-election. In doing so it will seek to interrogate the NTSI model in
the light of stakeholder comments. This will provide some view of the
conflict that lurks behind the consensus. Arising out of the exploration
of consensus and conflict, this section will then proceed to outline the
possible forms that a South African National Qualifications Framework
could take and some key criteria by which different outcomes for the
NQF can be theorized.
3The distinction between commentator on and active participant in the development of
emergent policy and practice in South Africa inevitably is an artificial one. I have
already noted the work of some commentators as consultants. Moreover, some of those
categorised as commentators were members of the group which produced the HSRC report.
In so far as such individuals are not staff of major stakeholder organisations and
conversations were focused on their readings of national trends, such categorisation
appears valid.
4A full list of all informants is included as an appendix.
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In the second substantive section of this chapter the focus will shift to the
second research question and seek to outline the factors that explain the
development of South African education and training policy in the two
years since the 1994 elections. Here an analysis will be built upon the
rationales of stakeholders and a reading of global discourses and meta-
narratives pertaining to education and training which appear to have
relevance to the policy process in South Africa.
THE POST-ELECTION MODEL OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING
The Election-Time Consensus
As was noted in the preceding chapter, an apparent consensus on the
future shape of the South African education and training system had
emerged by the time of the 1994 elections. The agreed upon model was
grounded in an integration of education and training. This integration
was to be operationalized through a National Qualifications Framework,
under the supervision of a South African Qualifications Authority. This,
at least in the view of the ANC, would report to an integrated
department of education and labour (IDEAL).5 The new, integrated
model would make use of competency-based modularized learning
(CBML). Outside the ambit of IDEAL, but nonetheless vital to the
functioning of the new integrated education and training model, would
be a nexus of policies and structures to develop the links between skills,
training, grade and wages.
5 In some formulations this would be called the Department of Lifelong Learning
(DEPOLL).
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Such was the broad outline of the consensus of early 1994. However, as
was argued in the introduction to this chapter, the elements of this
consensus have necessarily taken on new forms and expressions as
attempts towards operationalization proceed. It becomes necessary,
therefore, to explore each of the four key elements of the consensus:
integration, an NQF, CBML, and the skills-training-grade-wage nexus; in
greater and more critical detail.
Integration of Education and Training
There continues to be very strong support for the integration of
education and training. This is seen by many stakeholders as vital to the
future success of the South African economy. Rationales for integration
have both a local and a global flavour. In the case of the former, ANC
and COSATU sources tend to stress the utility of integration as a means
for eradicating past divisions; the mental-manual division being
reinforced by the black-white division of Apartheid. For the IMWG,
however, the presence of a global trend towards integration (itself a
reflection of broader forces of globalization) was a strong argument:
There is a worldwide shift towards an integrated approach
to education and training which has been compelled by
the need for labour market mobility, the learning
requirements of advanced technology and new forms of
work organisation. A unique opportunity exists in this
country to leapfrog stages of development and to
implement integration which other countries may be less
able to implement comprehensively because of the weight
of tradition and the lack of an appropriate political climate.
(IMWG 1994: 3)
Although there clearly is broad acceptance of the notion of integration, it
is equally evident that there are widely varying understandings of what it
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means. Most obvious here is the tension between the use of the terms
"integrated system" and "integrated approach". As noted in the previous
chapter, this is not mere semantics as the two have very different
organizational implications. In South African parlance an integrated
system would require an integration of responsibility at ministerial level.
An integrated approach, however, could be pursued without such a
merger, with an over-arching but decentralized NQF ensuring
commonalty of purpose.
There are stakeholder differences in terminology. This is reflected, for
instance, in Democratic Party support for an integrated approach
(Democratic Party 1994) versus COSATU-affiliates' support for an
integrated system (SADTU 1994; Settler 1995). It seems most likely,
however, that such differences are born from confusion rather than
contention.
This is not surprising given the very real contradictions that were present
in ANC/GNU formulations during these two years. In June 1994 the
IMWG argued that the RDP had called for an integrated system:
The RDP requires "the development of an integrated
system of education and training The education and
training bureaucracy must be reorganised at national,
sectoral and provincial levels through the establishment
of a single national ministry". (RDP base document cited
in IMWG 1994: 1)
On the basis of this they proposed an action plan to transfer the NTB to a
renamed Ministry of National Education and Training. This, however,
did not take place. Indeed, by the time of the White Paper on Education
and Training in March 1995, it was argued that whilst the Minister of
Education has primary responsibility for the development of an
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integrated approach, training "falls within the competence of other
Ministries" (DE 1995a: 15). This was reflected further in the SAQA Act
which talked of the Minister of Education working in consultation with
the Minister of Labour Affairs.
It seems that the original ANC plan to set up an integrated department,
although abandoned at the time of developing the GNU, remained a
strand of negotiation for some time longer at the IMWG and inter-
ministerial levels. However, as the training lobby continued to drive the
NQF debate and as the new ministries continued to take shape, support
for an integrated system began to slip from the agenda. Certainly, at the
time of interview a year after the elections, Trevor Coombe, now a senior
education bureaucrat, placed great emphasis on the fact that a radically
decentralized NQF, as by then envisaged, meant that there was no need
for an integrated system; an integrated approach instead being required
(Coombe OI 1995a).
Whilst an integrated system was not a certain guarantor of actual
integration on the ground, it is the case that the shift towards an
integrated approach raises many questions regarding the envisioned new
model. Although Coombe argued that a lack of symmetry between
different structures of learning provision (e.g. schools, technical colleges,
ABET6, company training) is desirable (Coombe OI 1995a), there are many
others who are worried and confused about the absence of an integrated
strategy between these different structures. The NTSI, and subsequent
theorizing by working group 9 and the HSRC group, had very little to say
6 In keeping with the integrationist debate, Adult Basic Education now became Adult
Basic Education and Training in South African usage.
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about formal education, particularly at compulsory education levels. On
the other hand, the Department of Education's White Paper (DE 1995a)
was almost entirely focused on compulsory schooling.
Whilst the IMWG was officially designed as a means of keeping channels
of communication open at the highest levels, it was apparent even from
within the senior levels of the education bureaucracy that the process of
integration was not seen as emanating from educational concerns.
Senior non-ANC education bureaucrats, whilst affirming their support
for integration, expressed the feeling that the extent of an educational
vision and, in particular, the role of the curriculum remains unclear in
the emergent model (Botha OI 1995; Niebuhr OI 1995- both Department
of Education [and formerly DNE] bureaucrats). Among educators
generally, there remains a suspicion of integration as industry-led
(although this rarely results in rejection of integration as a notion). The
most vocal complaints have come from the universities. Whilst not
publicly opposing the NQF and integration, they have argued strongly for
the right to interpret the NQF in their own way (Fehnel OI 1995 - Ford
Foundation; Niebuhr OI 1995). The work of the National Commission
on Higher Education (DE 1996d) has done little to suggest a coming
together of the universities and the state around the NQF.
The universities and sceptical educators seem unwilling and /or unable
to reject the integrative notion. Indeed, the decision to shift from an
integrated system to an integrated approach was intended to secure their
compliance (Coombe OI 1995a; Niebuhr OI 1995). It is ironic, therefore,
that the shift towards an integrated approach gives them greater scope to
claim the right to develop their own, sub-system specific, models of
integration.
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The degree to which this is tantamount to reinstating the model of
ladders (separate sub-systems) with bridges (limited opportunities for
transference) between them, a model rejected by the ANC before the
election, is open to debate (DE 1996a). Certainly, this was the fear of
several commentators who saw no common vision across the different
learning sub-systems (Bellis OI 1995; Fehnel OI 1995).
This question will be a central one for SAQA in its deliberations. It is also
one which will be returned to when my attention shifts to the range of
possible systems that could develop. However, for the moment attention
must be directed towards the development of thinking about the key
element of those systems: the National Qualifications Framework.
A National Qualifications Framework
Since the 1994 elections there have been many complaints that both
stakeholders and the public have been given insufficient detail about the
likely form of the NQF (e.g. Democratic Party 1994). Even the SAQA Act
did little to answer such criticisms. Whilst only intended as enabling
legislation, its lack of even a preamble to enunciate its spirit made it of
little use as a guide towards the future NQF (French OI 1995). Equally, the
two versions of the education White Paper are very short on detail. As
noted above, this seems to have been largely the matter of deliberate
strategy to limit dissent.
Whilst two years after the new government was instituted there is still
no detailed official version of what the NQF will look like, there are very
strong pointers from a number of other sources. The deliberations of
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working group 9, the HSRC group and the Ministerial Committee for
Development Work on the NQF (DE 1996a) are important here. I will
make use too of the annual Education. Training and Development in
Business survey for 1995 by the management consultancy group, BMI. A
final important source of insights into the likely shape of the NQF is the
articles and presentations of Adrienne Bird, for many the guiding spirit
behind the NQF.
It is clear that the notion of an NQF has developed greatly in
sophistication and detail in the two years since the ANC "Yellow Book".
It now boasts a long list of aims:
introduce a fair assessment system measuring
achievement against clearly stated standards;
establish a dynamic and flexible system which can adapt
quickly to changes in the labour market, workplace and
education and training;
encourage more participation in further education and
training;
develop learning relevant and responsive to the needs of
the individual, economy and society;
promote access to learning;
provide a variety of routes to qualifications;
simplify the structures of qualifications;
provide national quality assurance. (BMI 1995: 4)
As the vision of the NQF has developed, so has the role of SAQA in
ensuring its implementation. In its guise as operationalizing agency for
the NQF, SAQA is envisaged as setting national standards via National
Standards Bodies (NSBs- see below). It will advise the Minister of
Education on relevant issues (BMI 1995: 38; RSA 1995 [SAQA Act] Section
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5). It will establish the "form, procedures and criteria for regulation of
standards and qualifications, certification and moderation" (BMI 1995:
38).
It will be responsible for the development of accreditation policies and
procedures for Education and Training Qualifications Authorities
(ETQAs- see below) and, through the ETQAs, will develop policy and
procedures for secondary accreditation. This in turn will require it to
establish quality assurance systems; to develop national principles and
guidelines for assessment and certification; and to ensure accredited
bodies have fair, valid and reliable assessment procedures (BMI 1995: 38-
9).
The NSBs will cover a single "learning pathway or learning progression
route" (Bird 1995b: 37) and will bring together education and training
providers, employers, unions and professions. Their primary tasks will
be to
set standards which ensure portability and progression
within the National Qualification Framework
submit standards to SAQA for registration and publication
present standards in a format to be agreed by SAQA which
fit within the NQF 'grid' of levels and fields. (Bird 1995b:
37)
ETQA status will be determined by criteria of representativeness and
capacity. Two types of ETQA seem to have been agreed upon:
1. Provincial authorities (e.g. provincial departments of
education) for schools and, perhaps, the fundamental
category for adult basic education and training;
2. Sectoral bodies (e.g. industry training boards). To ensure
progression, these sectoral bodies may work with the
relevant professional bodies. (HSRC 1995: 144)
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They will be primarily responsible for the monitoring and review of the
standards set by the NSBs; accreditation and disaccreditation of providers;
administration of testing; and issuing of certificates (Bird 1995b: 38; HSRC
1995:145).
In the February 1996 formulation of the Ministerial Committee, a further
level was suggested. Below the NSBs would come a group of Standards
Generating Bodies (SGBs) responsible for setting standards for sub-fields.7
The broad parameters of this model appear to have widespread support.
Many employers welcome it, stressing its economic benefits. These
benefits were reinforced by the HSRC group in their promotional exercise
for the NQF. In their view, the NQF will promote competitiveness,
efficiency, development and growth (HSRC 1995).
The response of adult educators to the proposals is less straight-forwardly
positive. Leading adult educators, from the Independent Examinations
Board (IEB), the DEAL Trust, Using Spoken and Written English (USWE)
and the HSRC, were members of the HSRC group. They and others have
also been involved in NTB structures. Adult educators voices can be
seen in the emphasis on the NQF's pro-equity and redress credentials
(HSRC 1995).
However, whilst the NQF is seen as a useful mechanism, it is also seen as
presenting potential problems. Indeed, some have identified it as posing
a threat to the popular adult education tradition. Insensitivity to issues
7 In the Social Sciences, for example, in the HSRC model there would be a field entitled
"Individuals and Societies". Within this it would be possible in theory for
anthropologists, sociologists, etc. to develop sub-fields relating to their disciplinary
concerns, according to the Ministerial Committee.
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of race and gender is one major criticism here (Chisholm and Motala
1994). Many adult educators are also unhappy about the labelling of
ABET levels as "sub-levels", which they see as indicative of the lack of
seriousness with which they are treated (Burroughs 1995 OI- HSRC).
Overall, whilst adult educators do not wish for educational content
which is meaningless, there is also some concern that the high standards
envisaged will create a "qualifications fortress" (Burroughs OI 1995). The
claim that the metals industry scheme to upgrade workers to artisan
status will take 50 years for the average worker at current training levels
(O'Connor OI 1995) is indicative of such concerns. There is also a concern
among adult educators about the unresolved issue of an NQF language
policy. Overall, whilst a balance between access and credibility is seen as
necessary, it is far from clear as to where this should lie.
The potential lack of common purpose across the sub-systems is another
worry. The training version developed by the NTB ignores the informal
sector, being too geared to the needs and concerns of formal industry.
The education version found in the draft and published versions of the
first White Paper, however, seems to be too school-focused (Chisholm
and Motala 1994; Christie 1995b).
As was noted above, the universities, on the whole, are far from
enthusiastic about the NQF. In many quarters this is reflected, not in
opposition, but in avoidance. At a colloquium I attended at the
University of Witwatersrand on the future of the university, which was
held during the consultation period for the SAQA Bill (June 1995), not
one Wits academic made any reference to the NQF and its implications
for higher education.
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The proposed structure for the NQF does little to dispel the view that its
proponents are equally ignorant of the position and realities of the
universities. The levels proposed for the NQF reflect neither current
practice in the universities, nor potential future best practice as
envisaged, for example, in Kraak (1994a). This has not been adequately
addressed by the National Commission on Higher Education in its draft
report (DE 1996d).
The HSRC Report further indicated the gulf in understanding. That
degrees should be validated, and their equivalence decided on, by SAQA
(HSRC 1995: 17) may be logical but it was not likely to be popular with the
universities. Furthermore, the proposed list of fields and NSBs in
appendix B (but arising from earlier working group 9 deliberations)
showed apparent contempt for academic conceptions of subject
boundaries and the right of subject specialists to determine, or even have
a say in determining, such boundaries. It also betrayed a heavy bias
towards an instrumentalist view of knowledge, which seriously
undermines the validity of academic pursuits. To illustrate these points
one need only compare the one proposed NSB for "Individuals and
Societies" (i.e. the bulk of the social sciences) with the six for "Utility
Services", including "Archiving and Information Storage" (HSRC 1995:
182-5).
Teachers and other school-oriented educators too have largely not
rejected the NQF but remain far from enthusiastic. One of the major
teaching associations argued that the proposal was unworkable due to
capacity problems (NAPTOSA 1994). Senior educationalists, including
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the Gauteng Education MEC8 and the director of the RDP Culture of
Learning Project, pointed to the other problems facing education
(Metcalfe OI 1995; McGurk OI 1995). Certainly, the prospect of having to
reorient teachers to a radical new methodology in the light of the
massive challenges facing education in other areas is a daunting one
(Chisholm and Motala 1994). An acceptance of a lack of symmetry
between sub-systems means the training will not have to wait for
schooling. However, it may also mean that pressures on schooling to
address the NQF will be seriously reduced. Indeed, one leading
educationalist argued that a working NQF in education may take as long
as two generations (Badcock-Walters OI 1995-Education Foundation)!
It seems clear that the NQF has been broadly accepted, or at least not
rejected, by the majority of stakeholders. However, this acceptance often
seems to be rather superficial. It is apparent that the real terrain of
contestation is the operationalization of the NQF. Lack of symmetry has
already been identified as providing a key space for dissent. A second
such space would be provided by a decision to make the system
voluntaristic.
There appear to be real tensions in the formulation of the NQF regarding
voluntarism. Neither the SAQA Act, working group 9, nor the HSRC
group has successfully settled the question of the degree of voluntarism
to be allowed in the NQF. Working group 9 argued that
Such a framework envisages that all qualifications would
be made up of modular-based credit-bearing learning
programmes (with the possible exception of the first 10
8 Member of Executive Council, i.e. provincial minister.
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years of compulsory education for the young at school).
(WG9 1994: 3)
This appears to imply a universal system, except (possibly) for
compulsory schooling.9 A rather different reading can be made of the
more recent HSRC document:
The National Qualifications Framework is envisaged as
being developed and implemented on an
interdepartmental basis, with fully consultative processes
of decision-making, including all concerned government
departments, education and training providers, and major
stakeholders in education and training. An attempt is
being made to fully involve all these national
stakeholders around clearly articulated nationally-agreed
objectives, while at the same time recognising the right of
individuals to learn and the right of institutions to
provide learning opportunities, as each think most
appropriate. (HSRC 1995: 9)
This quotation appears also to demonstrate a continued belief in the
efficacy of a universal adoption of the NQF. However, the final sentence
hints at an awareness that some providers would not wish to adopt the
national model.
There is a very real problem of interpretation still present. Whilst
voluntarism and lack of symmetry appear to have been accepted as
inevitable on the one hand, there is still a very strong belief in the
efficacy of a strong and universal NQF model. Given continued
suspicions about the ANC's statist proclivities, there remains a fear that
making the NQF work may run rough-shod over voluntaristic
principles. The National Party withdrawal from the GNU may serve to
heighten such fears in certain quarters.
9 As the lower secondary level would end at the first NQF testing point, it would seem
more likely that seven years of schooling at most would be non-modularised.
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If voluntarism is to win the day then questions immediately arise as to
who will then opt-out. The universities are prime candidates, of course,
in spite of FehneTs (Ford Foundation) argument that indirect pressure
from the pro-integrationist technikons may temper the universities'
enthusiasm to go it alone (Fehnel OI 1995). If schools are to be included
as an integral part of the NQF, this too could signal large-scale opting out,
with independent and Afrikaans-medium schools resisting on a variety
of grounds: standards, anti-vocationalism and culture (McGurk OI 1995).
Even among ITBs, enthusiasm for a strong NQF is not universal. Whilst
some boards have explicitly aligned themselves with the forthcoming
NQF system (HITB 1994; BITB 1995; PITB 1995a), the 1995 BMI survey
found that only one board was actually in favour of taking on the role of
an ETQA (BMI 1995: 154). This split between the ITBs also relates to the
issue of voluntarism. Whilst the least active supporters of the NQF stress
voluntarism very strongly, a tension was evident in the opinions of the
more active boards between the needs for voluntarism and a successful
NQF, as well as frustration at the slow progress of their colleagues: "of
course we want them to come on board voluntarily but the system has to
work and hard decisions will have to be taken" (Tyers OI 1995- Transnet
Training Board).
Competency-Based Modular Learning
Central to the debate about integration and the NQF has been the notion
of Competency-Based Modular Learning (CBML): the use of a competency
approach across the whole learning system. For many employers
competencies are very familiar, Competency-Based Modular Training
r
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(CBMT) being well established in several industries (e.g. building and
clothing). Employers largely seem to welcome the further use of
competencies. Indeed, for the Private Sector Education Council, the use
of the language of competency was one of the more positive elements of
the draft White Paper (PRISEC 1994). COSATU also has been very much
in favour of the use of competency (Machin 1995; NUM 1995; Settler
1995).
There is also a large degree of support for CBML from the adult education
constituency, although, as we shall see, here too adult educators are at the
more critical end of supporters of the new system. For many of them,
outcomes (I shall address terminology presently) are a good way of
dealing with the many problems caused by Apartheid education
(Burroughs OI 1995). It is also argued that they can serve to mobilize a
large number of stakeholders. However, as I shall outline, they are also a
source of contention for others.
Competency is a highly contested term as the last chapter indicated.
Given the controversy surrounding it, there has been an attempt to use a
variety of other terms to describe the approach. Certainly such an
attempt is not merely cosmetic. Rather, it represents a very significant
increase in the sophistication of the approach, which in some ways far
surpasses efforts elsewhere. Nonetheless, this is still very much the
debate of a very small group of experts (largely those involved in the
HSRC group and the Ministerial Committee) and bears as yet little
resemblance to the understandings either of the critics or of many of the
most staunch supporters of competency.
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Whilst educationalists immediately prior to the elections seemed more
comfortable with the notion of outcomes rather than competencies (e.g.
Gauteng 1994), trainers during 1995 developed a model which shifted the
language once more. Bird argued that learning abilities are preferable to
generic competencies (Bird 1995b); whilst the Plastics Industry Training
Board argued that capabilities should be used in preference to outcomes
(PITB 1995b).
The state of the art in terms of definition appears to lie with the HSRC
group who defined the four terms: competency, outcome, ability and
capability as follows:
Ability: is a generic term for the mental and physical
processes that people use, such as communication,
decision-making, problem-solving and using tools. These
abilities are at the core of all training and education and
provide the means of performing tasks in a learning, work
or everyday situation. Abilities are developed through
engaging with knowledge and activities in a context.
Abilities cannot be directly assessed: rather, assessment is
carried out indirectly via the performance of tasks which
rely on abilities for their completion.
Capability: the expression of generic abilities as they relate
to specific content areas, context and value frameworks. A
capability is the basic enabling component of performance
which involves generic abilities acting in relation to
defined content areas, contexts and value frameworks.
Competence: the capacity for continuous performance
within specified ranges and contexts resulting from the
integration of a number of capabilities.
Outcome: is that segment of a unit standard which is a
statement of the required learner capabilities that must be
demonstrated. Outcomes are specified by stated
performance and assessment and range criteria. (HSRC
1995:1-2)
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These are expert definitions rather than commonsense understandings.
Whilst they further the clarity of the expert debate, there is a danger that
they also serve to limit non-expert critique as they shift language away
from the commonly understood. This notion of competence can be
defended as different from that which people think they are attacking:
that of narrow Taylorism and behaviourism.
It must be stressed that the HSRC group's view is not that of all training
stakeholders. Here the stress is on a balance between knowledge and
skills: an emphasis which many trainers are coming to adopt, as Erwin
Sonnendecker of the Building Industry Training Board acknowledged:
For instance, just by way of physics you do run into
problems when you feed water from a copper pipe into a
galvanised pipe. However if you do it the other way
around you don't have a problem. Now the trainees just
would be taught, "This is the sequence", but on the road
ahead they will also be taught exactly why. (Sonnendecker
OI1995)
However, there are others, particularly in the mining industry, who
seem to retain a behaviourist view of CBMT, as illustrated by the sample
modules prepared for the proposed Mining Industry Qualifications
Framework (Phillips 1995). Such an approach is strongly criticized by
those who were involved in the HSRC research process.10 This is
exemplified by the comments of John Tyers :
if you are training in that [Neo-Taylorist] paradigm you
subvert the very positive things that have come out of
competencies and outcome based learning. You subvert
them into this narrow training of a bloke to be competent
to do a job. (Tyers OI 1995)
10 Phillips was initially a member of the HSRC group but later withdrew from
participation.
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Whilst adult educators see the positive potential of the new approach,
they argue for the need to retain a critical stance. This is seen most clearly
and coherently through the work of the Independent Examinations
Board (IEB) as they seek to establish national examinations across all the
ABET sub-levels.
The IEB cautions for the need to keep competencies broad and to stress
content and meta-learning. They point to the danger of measurable
behaviours being privileged over non-measurable learning; of adequacy
rather than excellence being tested; of modularization not fitting with the
developmental and non-sequential nature of some types of learning; and
of competencies ignoring individual and cultural realities. Above all,
they stress that competency is only an assessment tool and should not be
fetishized (French OI 1995; IEB 1995; IEB 1996).
Those from the world of formal education find it harder to see the merits
in competency. Even Pam Christie, who is broadly in favour of a
competency approach, has noted that it is unclear as to whether
competency is relevant to the development of children (Christie 1995a).
Within the Afrikaner element of the education bureaucracy, similar
sentiments have been used to argue that competencies should not be
used in the compulsory phase of schooling. A more subtle position is
that of Gustav Niebuhr, the most senior of the retained bureaucrats, who
argued for the need to run a series of pilots of a competency-based
approach in the formal school system prior to an broader
operationalization (Niebuhr OI 1995). Whether such a strategy would
effectively prevent wider competencization of formal schooling cannot
be discounted.
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Many educators fear that competencies would make knowledge
peripheral, as Ahmed Essop, the Director of the ANC think tank, the
Centre for Education Policy Development, noted:
I would certainly be concerned if we ended up in the
school system with a notion of competencies and
outcomes that threw away with it any notion of what a
student should be learning. (Essop OI 1995)
No-one in South Africa has yet advanced a critique of the competency
approach of the strength of that of Alan Smithers (1993) in England or
Simon Marginson (1994) in Australia. However, Andre Kraak has begun
to develop such a line, although it has as yet been more focused on Neo-
Taylorism in training rather than the implications for formal education
(Kraak 1994b).
Perhaps inevitably, it is the university sector which seems the least
prepared to accept competencies. Along with SAQA validation of degrees
and trainers' proposing subject divisions for NSBs, the use of competency
appears to be seen in some university quarters as part of an industry
attempt to capture the definition of really useful knowledge from the
universities, as was claimed in academic critiques of the New
Vocationalism in England and Wales a decade earlier.
Competency perhaps remains the most controversial element of the
proposed new system. This may be due to its representation of not just
an arena for contestations of power over learning but also the central
theoretical divide. Other elements of the approach are simply not so
controversial. For many educators, especially those of Deweyian or
Marxian backgrounds, the idea of breaking down the mental-manual
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barrier is attractive. The regional interest in Education with
Production11, and the central role of South African exiles such as Patrick
van Rensburg in developing that approach, helped to attract many
educators to such notions (Setai 1990). Given the legacy of Apartheid in
both unequal education and unequal development, there are strong
pragmatic attractions in integration.
For an even broader group of educators, issues around the NQF,
symmetry and voluntarism are not crucial. Rather, it is this issue of
competency, with its connotation of narrow training and behaviourism,
which unites large sections of radical and liberal educators in concerns
regarding the new system. The support of leading ANC educational
bureaucrats for the CBML approach allows members of the old
bureaucracy to assume the mantle of liberal education as defenders of
broad educational values against the alleged threat from narrow training.
In the context of the spaces provided by asymmetry and voluntarism,
there is the real possibility that an NQF based on CBML will lead to
widespread opting out of the new system, to the extent that its
pretensions to be a national framework could be rendered ridiculous.
A Skills-Training-Grade-Wage Nexus
Thus far this chapter has been focusing on the contention behind the
consensus around the National Qualifications Framework and its
implications for education and training. However, the struggle to
11 The Education with Production movement began in Botswana as an attempt to make
education more economically and ideologically relevant to the needs of Southern Africa.
Its theoretical base is in the Marxist tradition of polytechnic education.
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construct a new education and training system is but one part of a broader
attempt to shape the political economy of post-election South Africa. In
particular, given the crucial role that both trade unions and employers
have played in the education and training debate, it is not possible to
separate education and training policy from debates on policy and practice
in the workplace.
The nexus model argues that the four areas of skills, training, grading
and wages must be understood as interlinked. International
competitiveness depends on upskilling of workers and this must be the
central focus of the training system. Grading and wages should be based
on the training record and, thus, skills acquisition of workers, and not on
other criteria such as seniority. Equally, grading hierarchies should be
based unequivocally on real differences between the level and type of
skills used for different jobs and not on traditional notions of the "rate
for the job" which reflect past not present realities.
Whilst the NTSI did not confirm the nexus as national policy, it did
mark the first official recognition of COSATU thinking about the nexus,
which had developed from the work of the NUMSA Vocational Project.
Nonetheless, the notion remains as one of the more controversial
element of attempts to develop a human resource development strategy
as part of a broader economic strategy.
Explicitly, COSATU tend to focus on the first three elements of the nexus
(e.g. Settler 1995). However, it is clear from even the most cursory
reading of many internal documents that the fourth element, wage, is an
important part of COSATU thinking (Machin 1995). Whilst COSATU
focuses on the nexus as a means of increasing productivity, Business
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South Africa (the post-election alliance of business organizations) sees it
primarily as a collective bargaining strategy (Dippenaar OI 1995). This
view is also shared by other trade unionists (Allen OI 1995- Amalgamated
Engineering Union; van der Walt OI 1995- Federation of South African
Labour Unions).
This is not to say that support for a greater coordination of the four
elements of the nexus does not extend beyond COSATU. What is the
ground for contention is the exact nature of such coordination,
particularly as it relates to the issue of wage levels and structures. In this
section I will seek to explore this contention in greater detail.
Skills
The definition of skill and the subsequent control of access to skilled
status is a globally experienced arena of contestation.12 In South Africa,
as elsewhere, race and gender have been two powerful weapons used to
define and control skill. What makes South Africa unusual in the ranks
of industrialized and semi-industrialized countries is the way in which a
racial defence of skilled status was given the sanction of law until very
recent times.
The legacy of that past is that current debates about skill cannot be
separated from the historical impact of huge misclassifications of skilled
status on racial grounds, and the massive distortions to incentives to
12 See the earlier discussion on page 54 (footnote) in particular for a more detailed
consideration of this point.
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acquire skills that the system of the colour bar brought about for all racial
groupings.
However, the South African debate around skills also has many elements
that would be immediately recognisable to students of OECD skill debates.
One aspect of this is an employer emphasis on social skills (e.g. Godsell OI
1995- Anglo-American's Group Director for Human Resources) as
opposed to a trade union stress on technical skills (e.g. Lloyd 1994-
NUMSA official). This is linked to broader debates over the range of
skills workers need. Whilst trainers in manufacturing see the need for a
broad conception of relevant skills of workers, representatives of the
mining industry tend to take a narrower view.
This links to the internationally contentious issue of multi-skilling, one
of the key areas in which distinctions between the New Times and Lean
Production meta-narratives are most apparent, as Chapter Four made
clear. Whilst trade unionists largely support the notion of multi-skilling,
they maintain a degree of scepticism regarding the proposals or
programmes of many employers (Lloyd 1994). Even within employer
circles, it seems that understandings and models of multi-skilling are
varied.
This is not purely the result of sectoral differences. Automobile
manufacturers are certainly more vocally in favour of multi-skilling
than mine management (and are explicitly committed to multi-skilling
through a national agreement with NUMSA). However, even within
the automobile industry differences have been noted between what is
seen as the multi-tasking of Toyota, focusing on workers being expected
to carry out a wider range of low level tasks- such as sweeping around
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their work stations, and what is viewed as the multi-skilling of
Volkswagen- focusing on the developing the ability of workers to move
between (semi) skilled tasks (von Holdt OI 1995). Here, a crucial factor
appears to be the different countries of origin of these two companies,
with their radically different cultures of skilled labour and employer-
employee relations.
Multi-skilling is seen as a major force impacting upon the education and
training system and the NQF by both Adrienne Bird and Chief Director
for Adult Education (DE), Khetsi Lehoko (Mail and Guardian 11-
17/8/1995). However, this points to another probable area of contention
and contestation. Voluntarism and asymmetry would imply that
different visions of both education and training and multi-skilling may
emerge in different parts of the system. This will have major
implications, however, for other elements of the official view. The
avoidance of behaviourism and Neo-Taylorism might well be
compromised and with them the notion of the NQF as a high skill path.
Equally, the stress of the NTSI on portability might also be undermined.
Where, as in the automobile industry, radically divergent views appear
to be held by the key organizations, the potential problems are immense.
Training
Around the issue of the encouragement of training there are also a range
of diverse opinions. Some employers, particularly the parastatals, are
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working towards a vision of the "learning organization"13 as envisaged
in the Post-Fordist literature (Verster OI 1995- ESKOM). However, in
other sectors of industry the picture is still one of reliance on poaching
for skill needs, particularly in the case of smaller firms, as acknowledged
by both Business SA and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Dippenaar OI
1995; Dames OI 1995). Many of the more active training board staff spoke
in interviews of their frustration with conservative employers: "it's hard
to imagine them taking these paradigm shifts with anything other than
an 'over my dead body' kind of thing. It might well come to that, we
might have to wait for a whole generation of industrialists to die out"
(Tyers OI 1995).
The central area of contention is around who pays for additional training.
This feeds into the question of whether continued employer
responsibility for the bulk of training finance means that employers
should have the right to set the training agenda without consideration of
other stakeholders or of long term interests of themselves and their
industry.
Tensions are perhaps most evident in the mining industry which, as we
have already seen, is towards the more conservative end of the sectoral
spectrum on the employer side. Here there is a major disagreement
between the NUM and the Chamber of Mines over the broadness of
training that should be provided. Whilst the NUM are pushing strongly
for greater emphasis on health and safety education and improved
literacy and numeracy (Plasket OI 1995); the Chamber seems to have a far
13 As continuous process innovation and intellectual skills become central to company's
competitive advantage, so, it is argued, these companies come to stress and reward the
learning inherent in production.
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narrower view of what constitutes "relevant training" (Burrows OI 1995;
Dippenaar OI 1995).
It is over the issue of paid education and training leave (PETL) that this
divergence of views has been most evident, with the NUM formally
declaring a dispute with the Chamber over this issue in early 1995. The
NUM position was that ILO Resolution 140, recognizing workers' rights
to PETL, should be binding on all industries, and that the notion of
learning during leisure time was not realistic for the mining industry in
particular:
mine workers work some of the longest hours of all
workers in South Africa, probably aside from farm
workers, and they are then expected voluntarily (and often
being quite old and unused to learning situations) to
undertake learning in their own time. We've seen that
where those opportunities have been made available to
workers, very few workers have come forward and even
fewer have made a success of it. It's simply not good
enough to say that we're offering it part-time, after-hours,
come-along-if-you-like, without any back-up support,
encouragement or incentives. (Plasket 1995)
Employers, however, have focused on the cost of such provision for a
struggling industry and appear to perceive this call for PETL as a union
attempt to dictate to them in an area which has always been one of
managerial prerogative. Nonetheless, after a year long dispute the
Chamber of Mines largely accepted the NUM position in a February 1996
agreement.14 How this is implemented in practice remains to be seen.
14 My thanks to Martin Nicol of the NUM for information on the agreement.
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Grading
The reorganization of grading, with its implications for wages, appears to
generate major controversy. In several industries, e.g. automobiles,
metals and plastics, there has been an attempt to reorganize grading
structures to better reflect the types and complexity of skills actually being
used by the workforce. Career pathing, recognition of prior learning and
payment for skills acquired versus skills required have been three key
areas of contention in this regard, and these will now be explored.
Career Pathing
This arises out of the notion of careers rather than jobs and the need to
develop a system of career paths for workers. Again, some firms and
training boards have responded favourably to COSATU arguments in
this regard (e.g. PITB 1994). However, there still seems to be considerable
opposition to career pathing. The 1995 BMI survey reported that only
10% of ITBs thought that career pathing would increase in the future
(BMI 1995: 154). Even more strikingly, it found that less than 2% of
training managers, and only one training board, named the development
of career paths for employees as a priority (BMI 1995: 164).
Non-industry participation in the debate about the nexus has been very
limited. However, the issue of career paths has engendered some
comment from adult educators, particularly in an ABET-focused issue of
the HSRC's In Focus magazine. In a short article by Johan Wydeman,
Manager of the HSRC's Adult Basic Education and Lifelong Learning
section, there was a reiteration of his former colleague Elizabeth
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Burroughs' fears of a "qualifications fortress". In this case, it is the
empowering notion of career pathing that is seen in reality as acting as a
further obstacle for those with the least initial education and training:
The very serious danger exists that, if career-pathing is
applied as it has been in the past, it may become yet
another rigid "gatekeeping" mechanism through which
employees' mobility on career path ladders may be
controlled from the top. (Wydeman 1995: 9)
For those at the bottom of the system, Wydeman warned, the experience
may not be of moving up the ladder but of the ladder itself moving up
and out of their reach.
Recognition of Prior Learning
Concerns that career pathing may not be as empowering as proposed are
echoed in the case of recognition of prior learning (RPL). This concept
has received widespread support in South Africa since the NTSI.
However, as with many other of the NTSI principles, it is in reality a
highly contested term. Indeed, it is possible to discern three principal
meanings from South African and international usage.
In international usage RPL is largely about increasing access to further
and higher education of non-traditional clienteles. This appears to be the
meaning which is understood by the drafters of the education and
training White Paper, and was the meaning that I found employed whilst
acting as a member of a provincial task team looking at post-compulsory
education.15
15 The Gauteng Technical Education and Training Task Team (during June to August 1995).
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In Britain this debate appears to have been responded to more positively
by the further education sector than by higher education. In South
Africa, however, both sectors face very major challenges ahead over this
issue. The further education sector has tended to be very conservative
and very closely tied to its industrial roots. The universities, particularly
the English-speaking ones, have long had bridging programmes and
other schemes to increase access for other than traditional clienteles.
However, the post-election challenge is different and greater: how to
make such populations and their prior learning integral to the system.
This, however, seems to be distinct from two views in the world of
industry. From the COSATU side, it appears that RPL is about
recognizing the skills already possessed by workers and potential workers.
In the former case, this would allow them to receive the benefits of
correct grading and better promotional prospects. As such, it is a strategy
aimed at increasing wages across the "unskilled" and "semi-skilled"
segments of the workforce.16 In the latter case, it is about overcoming
biases in the hiring process towards certain racial groups, particularly as
this has operated through proxy criteria such as minimum educational
qualifications.
However, it was alleged by some trade unionists and adult educators that
employers were using RPL as part of their affirmative action strategies
(Plasket OI 1995; Burroughs OI 1995). For reasons of legitimacy,
companies want to have visible black faces further up the occupational
ladder. RPL is seen as an appropriate way of identifying and fast tracking
suitable candidates. As such, it is very far from the broad empowerment
16The use of RPL implies that such categories are meaningless.
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strategy of COSATU. There is also evidence that minimum educational
qualifications are being used in some industries as a means of avoiding
the high costs employers perceive to be part and parcel of RPL. In the
clothing industry, for instance, a minimum entry requirement of
matriculation can be seen in this light (Riches OI 1995- Clothing Industry
Training Board).
It seems that education and training have developed very different
debates around the notion of RPL. These arise from readings of different
aspects of the legacy of Apartheid. In the education system it is argued
that Apartheid structures and syllabi disadvantaged black students and
limited their access to further and higher education. In the case of
training it is the legacy of the colour bar and the related misclassification
of skills that drives reform.
Although different, these two debates do point to similar problems and
solutions and, here at least, there appears to be nothing that is inherently
incompatible between the progressive views in education and in
training. Nonetheless, in both arenas there remains considerable
opposition to such views. As elsewhere, this does not manifest itself so
much in outright rejection, but in an attempt to take control of the debate
and then shape it in less progressive ways. In both sectors this is reflected
in an attempt to reshape RPL into an updated form of post-1976
affirmative action.17
17 As noted in Chapter Two, the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising saw a concern amongst
leading companies to bring black, and especially African, workers into managerial
positions.
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As yet there seems to be little in the way of a South African debate about
the possibility of a radical model of competency plus RPL, as is emerging
in some cases in England and Wales. This radical model argues that the
conventional approach of providing a unitary course to a potentially
diverse group of learners is no longer appropriate as RPL and
competencies bring about a sharper focus on individual needs. Given
adult educators' experience of working with learners with more diverse
learning histories than tends to prevail in formal education, and their
professional grounding in group-based methodologies, such arguments
have immense potential implications for their work in particular.
Moreover, there is a question to be answered regarding the cultural
appropriateness of more individualistic conceptions of learning and
development in a South African context (McGrath 1995a).
Payment for Skills Acquired v Payment for Skills Required
A further area of major contention surrounds whether workers should
be rewarded for the skills they use, and are expected to use, in the
workplace or the skills they have acquired. Rooted in the movement's
vision of economic transformation, COSATU's call for the development
of the nexus and increased emphasis on training sees a simple path
between further training, more and better skills, higher grading and
improved wages. Most employers, however, argue that such a path
cannot be paved with concrete and that payment should only be for skills
that are relevant to the job. It is this question of relevance, encountered
above, that is at the heart of the dispute. Here the COSATU official
interviewed felt that different standards were being applied to artisans
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and professionals than to un- and semi-skilled workers (Morotoba OI
1995).
There are those among the training fraternity who argued that a shift
towards thinking about broadly relevant skills within the framework of
the NQF might not only satisfy COSATU, but could actually be in the
long-term interests of employers:
paying for skills is not the horror story that most
employers believe simply because employers generally are
bloody lazy when it comes to using their people. Now if
you force them to pay for skills then in a way you force
them to optimise their use of those people. That depends
once again on how broadly you define skills, but
ultimately and idealistically, naively, if you force
employers to pay for this broad notion of skills then that
would be an engine, I would argue, to start shifting this
Taylorist mentality, to start saying: if am paying this
person for problem solving skills at level one why am I
not structuring his job in such a way that he can use those
skills? (Tyers OI 1995)
Nonetheless, this cry of reason has yet to influence the majority in the
two camps.
This, as we have seen, is but one element of the continuing disagreement
around the notion of the nexus. The nexus is a COSATU collective
bargaining strategy. However, it is also far more than that, being based
moreover in a reading of low skill equilibrium analysis. It is built upon
an understanding of the inherited system of education and training,
which sees its links to work organization, economic policy and social
structures as reinforcing an emphasis on low skill, low wage labour
(Kraak 1993b). For the good of the economy, as well as that of the
workforce, it is believed that it is necessary that South Africa stops trying
to compete on the terrain of lower wage, more productive competitors
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(Joffe 1993). Instead, it should seek to upskill its workforce so as to
compete in higher value-added sectors.
To move to a new high skill path, a wide range of structural and
institutional changes are required. However, it is in education, training
and work organization that the most direct challenges lie. In such an
analysis, the key task becomes that of developing an NQF which can then
reshape what goes on in the workplace. In the previous section I explored
the problems faced in developing such a model of the NQF. In this
section I have pointed to the many contentious issues still to be resolved
around the changes in the workplace. Contestations around the nature
of team work and of employee co-determination have not been addressed
here, but are also elements of the battle between different visions of the
future of the workplace (McGrath 1995c). As there is conflict over the two
elements of this struggle, education and training on the one hand and
work organization on the other, there is also disagreement over the
relationship between them (von Holdt OI 1995). Whilst many employers
see it as inevitable that the NQF will reshape work organization; others
still see this as interference in the job of management.
What lurks behind such a split appears to be a gap between those who
take this hard line conservative stance, and those who see the
opportunity to shape the NQF in ways that suit them. So far in this
chapter the primary focus has been on those who have sought to use the
dominant discourse surrounding reform. However, voices of opposition
have been noted in passing. Without reference to such voices an analysis
of the likely shape of the emergent South African education and training
system would be highly skewed. Therefore, it is time to foreground those
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other voices briefly before attempting to reach some conclusions about
the nature of post-election education and training.
Other Voices
Those who participated in the NTSI and HSRC Reports and on the
IMWG and working group 9 essentially were the stakeholders that
"mattered" as the SAQA was being shaped. After the recent appointment
of the SAQA board, other voices may be given new prominence but it is
clear that certain groupings did predominate in the fora of policy
formulation during this time, although even COSATU did not always
come to negotiations and planning as a monolithic force.18 The adult
education lobby involved has already been outlined above. COSATU, the
training boards, the Chamber of Mines and the two national departments
are perhaps the other key groupings represented.
However, there are a number of other groups of stakeholders whose
opinions do shape education and training that must also be considered.
Here too, the use of group labels is more a form of short hand than a
suggestion that there were and are monolithic positions being adopted.
Divisions between employers have already been noted. There have been
references to differences between mining and manufacturing but fissures
run through both constituencies, focused around a complex range of
18For example, there remains a significant difference in membership profile and union
priorities between the two largest affiliates: NUM and NUMSA. This is part of the
broader historical difference between the manufacturing and mining sectors which
frequently has been at the heart of debates about the South African political economy
(Beinart and Dubow 1995b).
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issues, including company size and ethnic and national origins of both
the company and its management. Many employers want to carry on
with business as usual, albeit with a little affirmative action window
dressing as necessary. They are content to persist on low skill paths,
poach skilled labour and promote adversarial industrial relations as in
the past. For them there is no paradigm shift, either in terms of global
technological and economic climate or in local political realities, that
would justify rethinking policy and practice in any more than tactical
ways. As regards education, this tends to lead to a repetition of well-
rehearsed arguments about the need for greater vocationalization.19
COSATU, in spite of its high profile and central role in driving the
current debate, represents a minority of South African workers. Whilst
two other federations, FEDSAL and NACTU20, are now caucusing with
COSATU, they do not seem to have developed an equally sophisticated
view of the need for a high skill path.
There are a large number of other unions unaffiliated to any of the three
federations. It is the white unions to the right of FEDSAL that have the
largest profile of these.21 Here, there is considerable concern about the
implications of the new dispensation on members. Such concern takes
two principal forms. In the case of the Mineworkers Union (now a broad
industrial union in spite of its name and origins), the response is one of
ideological opposition, allied to close ties with the neo-Nazi Afrikaner
19 This, of course, is also the case in Britain.
29The Federation of South African Labour Unions (predominantly white-collar and with
large numbers of white and coloured members) and the National Council of Trade Unions
(Africanist) respectively.
21 To exclude potential members on the grounds of race would be illegal. However, given
their racist background and their marginalized position in the contemporary industrial
relations scene, these unions remain de facto white-only.
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Weerstandbeweging (AWB). On the side of the craft unions, such as the
Amalgamated Engineering Union, the stress is on showing the benefits
to the country that could accrue from a continuation of the craft tradition
and the apprenticeship system, albeit with an acceptance that
demarcation disputes are a thing of the past:
let's start looking at utilising aspects of artisan training so
that an operator doesn't just operate a machine and when
it breaks down he sits down and goes to sleep and waits for
the artisan to come and fix it. He must be able to analyse
the problem, he must be able to say "I can rectify that, put a
new belt on" pending the artisan coming to do a final
repair later on. (Allen 1995)
However, concern for "standards" and members' jobs remain central to
the craft union position, which thus is unable to break out of a defensive
mode.
The role of the universities in the struggle to shape the NQF has already
been noted on several occasions. However, as the universities have been
largely excluded from positive policy shaping it is relevant to return to
them here. Given the Apartheid divided structure of higher education,
the degree of commonalty between the institutions linked under the
Committee of University Principals should not be expected necessarily to
allow them to work in harmony. However, in spite of their differing
circumstances, and practices, there is little sense that the universities are
very different from one another in their philosophical defence of
academic standards and the traditional role of the university. Such a
defence treads a very fine line between a more positive commitment to
quality and academic freedom and a more negative maintenance of
elitism and non-engagement with the broad development needs of a new
nation. In practice, both strands lead to understandable suspicions
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regarding an NQF which could be seen to be both devaluing knowledge
and transferring influence over the definition of the parameters of
learning from the universities to industry.
In terms of positive proposals or practice, there is some sign of rethinking
of course structures leading to modularization, whilst the presence of a
representative of the Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) in the
HSRC group and ECSA's development of a pilot project (HSRC 1995: 114-
6) suggests that there are likely to be major changes in Engineering
faculties at least.
Elsewhere in the Old Commonwealth the forces of conservatism have
been split between the training lobby, neo-liberals and neo-conservatives
(Moore 1990). We are already familiar with the training lobby in South
Africa: those from industry who believe in a Post-Fordist paradigm shift
and who see the need for the state to promote responses to it. Whilst
many of the stakeholders often show a strong belief in voluntarism this
is far from a full-blown neo-liberal position, largely because such a
position is not tenable in the current climate. Industry is involved in the
quasi-corporatist structure of the National Economic Development and
Labour Council (NEDLAC) and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
In any case, the agenda of the progressive training lobby, stressing as it
does the importance of productivity and global competitiveness, is far
from anathema to the pro-marketeers.
The importance of neo-conservative standpoints is more relevant in any
discussion of education policy. There is a lot of support in certain
communities for the kind of multi-culturalism preached under reformed
Apartheid through the de Lange Report and the ERS (Kallaway 1995).
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That "separate but equal" formulation also has the support of the major
Afrikaner parties and cultural organizations (e.g. Federasie van
Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge 1996), as well as the sympathy of Inkatha.
The decision to make compulsory schooling a provincial responsibility,
opens up the potential for constitutional problems if a strong NQF is
developed which includes formal schooling. However, it is more
probable that provincial responsibility for schooling will lead to
significant differences between provincial school systems. Whether in
the case of the two non-ANC provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and the
Western Cape, the forces of cultural conservatism will take those
education systems on non-competency or even non-NQF routes remains
to be seen. Much will depend on national policy and the contestation of
policy by the insiders, as well as local factors and the reactions of
outsiders22.
Even in ANC-controlled provinces, contestation by conservatives will
continue, as witnessed by the attempts to derail the Gauteng Education
Bill in mid-1995 and by the disputes over access to traditionally
Afrikaans-medium schools in Mpumalanga and Northern Province in
early 1996. As was seen previously, a voluntarist NQF would give the
opportunity for conservative dominated schools to opt out, even if they
lose other battles on admissions, religious instruction, etc.
22 Cooperation between the national level and KwaZulu-Natal has been affected by
Inkatha's separatist tendencies which meant that the provincial MEC for Education (Dr.
Zulu) did not attend meetings of the Council of Education Ministers for a large part of 1995
(Bengu 1995). It is as yet unclear how the National Party's withdrawal from
participation in national government and the running of the other eight provinces will
affect the Western Cape.
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There are of course also radical educators who are unhappy with the
perceived technicist, pro-capital shift of the ANC. For this constituency
too, there is little sense of positive alternatives. Whilst non-formal
education provides a rich source of alternative practice, the People's
Education drive to transform schooling was trampled underfoot in the
headlong rush to policy of the early 1990s. Equally, van Rensburg's
attempt to introduce Education with Production into South Africa during
the same period was short-lived.23
The typical route, therefore, for radical critics is to support the NQF
approach, which after all has the potential to be so much better than the
Apartheid system of education, whilst maintaining a critical stance
towards it. Such a strategy was encountered frequently in interviews,
even with members of national and provincial bureaucracies. After an
initial praise singing for the NQF, informants would settle into a long
critique of probable and potential dangers in that approach, before
concluding with a reaffirmation of the need for the new model to
succeed. Such a stance seems indicative of the continued preference of
these critics for the pro-equity elements of the approach over the more
explicitly Post-Fordist elements.
Throughout this long discussion of education and training policy there
has been no mention of the three most important categories of
stakeholders at the grassroots level: teachers, parents and pupils. In
contrast to the years of People's Education, these voices seem to be very
distant from the heart of debates. Again, this appears to be, in large part,
23 However, North West Province has shown an interest in EWP since the elections. My
thanks are to James Drummond, University of the North West, for this information.
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an unintended result of the highly complex and technical debate around
the NQF. Moreover, these constituencies understandably are more
concerned with a range of issues such as the culture of learning, school
security, access to good schools, infrastructure and salaries.
There has been no apparent attempt to bring such constituencies into the
NQF debate. The Department of Education can boast none of the high
profile attempts to explain and listen of other departments, such as
Health, with its ministerial tour of South Africa to talk to health
professionals, or Population and Welfare, with its highly structured and
user-friendly green paper (Ministry of Population and Welfare
Development 1995). Rather, the consultation and formulation processes
have largely been conducted within a constituency representing a
combination of technical experts and narrow corporate interests.
The voices above are those of South Africans with direct involvement in
education and training. However, there are also other influential voices
which are either not South African or are external to the education and
training communities. Attention will now turn to two discourses of this
kind: first, that of international donors to education; and second, that of
South African macro-economic policy.
The International Donors
In the early 1990s external donors were contributing some $140-160
million per annum to South African education (Duvieusart and Samoff
1994: 11). Whilst this was only 1,5% of total educational expenditure, the
leverage it provided was, of course, far greater. This is especially true as
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the vast majority of state expenditure was tied up in recurrent
expenditure on salaries, etc. Therefore, of the money available for
curriculum changes and other innovations, donor support would be a far
more significant percentage. Traditionally, of course, this donor support
was not directed to co-financing with the government as a result of donor
opposition to Apartheid. This is changing as support to NGOs is
reduced.24 Indeed, the March 1996 announcement of the abolition of the
RDP office may well accelerate the shift of funds to the state.25
Donors, thus, have a potentially large degree of leverage over South
African education policy. Whilst South Africa currently is able to
effectively preside over its own donor coordination committee and has
shown a willingness to turn down offers of tied aid, the conventional
wisdom is that in the long run, South African education policy will be
strongly influenced by the donors.
The extent to which this is inevitable perhaps should not be overstressed.
South Africa's unique status in sub-Saharan Africa as a semi-peripheral
economy should lead to caution about a simplistic reading off from other,
neighbouring, experiences. South Africa is a price taker26 and has a
heavy dependence upon primary, extractive industries. However, it is
also a regional metropole, exporting manufactured goods to its
24 The slowness of the state's response to donor offers, however, has led some donors to
keep their existing handing routes open (King 1996).
25 Control of RDP finance has gone to the Department of Finance; project control to the
office of Deputy-President Mbeki. The latter seems indicative of internal ANC politics
around the succession to Mandela, with Mbeki seeking to reinforce his position as heir-
apparent.
26 That is to say, most of what it produces is not of sufficient importance in the global
economy that South Africa is able to set prices. Rather, it is largely forced to respond to
exogenously determined world prices. This may be contrasted, for example, with the much
more powerful oil producing countries.
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hinterland within the SADC region. Moreover, it also has pockets of
global core production27, which will be the central focus of trade and
industry policy if the findings of Industrial Strategy Project are endorsed
(Joffe et al. 1993).
This economic reality makes South Africa very different from its
neighbours. More crucially, as far as this study is concerned, South
Africa's distinct economic and industrial structure (for sub-Saharan
Africa) has contributed to plans for an education and training strategy
that are radically different from those which the donors are used to
funding. Indeed, with its stress on competencies, integration and a
national qualifications framework, the South African model is far more
in tune with the Old Commonwealth countries than its African
neighbours.
Donors of course will have a huge influence on the overall funding, and
hence functioning, of the system and are likely to be strongly
interventionist in their now customary areas of quality, efficiency, access,
etc. However, it seems likely that for the moment there will not be
major interference in the policies of integration with which this thesis is
primarily concerned. Crucially, such policies are not those with which
the donor community has any great experience in dealing.28
27 That is, high skill, high price, high quality.
28 The Old Commonwealth countries are involved in developing such policies
domestically but have little experience of marketing them to African countries. One
exception here would be the role played by the Scottish Vocational Education Council
(SCOTVEC) in the development of the Namibian education system.
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The Macro-Economic Debate
Education and training cannot be seen in isolation from broader
economic policy. As Peter Kallaway reminds us,
it is extremely important to place educational policy in the
context of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP) and the concrete economic and
budgetary context of South Africa. (Kallaway 1995: 4)
Kallaway detects a major shift in emphasis towards a more market-
oriented stance between the RDP document at the start of 1994 and the
second RDP White Paper (RSA 1994) in December of the same year. This
was perhaps inevitable given the international climate, with pressure
from the IMF/World Bank, broader New Right ideology and
globalization forces (ibid.). The result was a first budget in 1995 which
stressed financial and monetary discipline. Indeed, it has been described
as effectively a self-imposed structural adjustment programme (Lloyd OI
1995) rather than an attempt to implement the RDP (Adedeji 1996).
Such a policy has two major implications for the proposed education and
training policy. First, the climate of overall budgetary restraint led to
reductions in the Department of Education's budget in real terms in 1994-
5 and a less then satisfactory increase in the 1996 budget (DE 1996b).
Given the vast percentage of the budget already committed and the huge
legacy of Apartheid,29 this appears to leave very little money available for
educational expenditure on the NQF. Thus, the dominance of industrial
views in the operationalization of the NQF is likely to persist. The
29 The salary increases that would be involved in a programme to bring all teachers upto
the qualifications and salary levels found in white education would more than consume
the additional educational budget.
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broader effect of such an imbalance will, as elsewhere, be largely
determined by decisions about the degrees of asymmetry and
voluntarism that the NQF will permit.
Second, the NQF vision as formulated is itself closely connected to a
broader Post-Fordist standpoint. For its implementation to be successful,
economic growth is probably essential. The budgets of 1995 and 1996
combined, however, do not appear to have been radical enough either to
stimulate the economy through external investment, as a result of their
conservative credentials, or through internal growth, as a result of their
populist pretensions (Kallaway 1995; Lloyd OI 1995). Instead of the 8%
growth needed to stabilize unemployment, or the 5% required to stabilize
employment, growth in 1995 was thought to be nearer to 2% (Lloyd OI
1995).
In such a climate it is hard to believe that enough employers and trade
unionists will be able to negotiate the paradigm shift to a social
democratic Post-Fordism, as envisaged in the COSATU-driven vision of
the NQF. Rather, it is likely that many employers will see new
technologies as a means of intensifying production, improving
surveillance and increasing automation, all elements of a Lean
Production paradigm. Equally, it is probable that trade unions will be
forced into defensive strategies, not least because of the loss of important
theorists such as Adrienne Bird. The possible areas of contestation
explored in the previous section can be expected to be more serious in
such a climate. Yet again, how such contestations are resolved will
depend largely on whether the NQF is to be a unified model or will allow
different tracks and/or opting out.
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This chapter so far has focused upon the apparent consensus around the
notion of the NQF and its extent and limitations. The People's Education
and market-oriented meta-narratives have been present in the
background of such discussions. Nonetheless, a brief focusing on the
shifting balance between these two meta-narratives is necessary before
turning to an exploration of the current and future nature of the
emergent education and training system. This focusing will be on the
two versions of the education and training White Paper (DNE 1994; DE
1995a).
Reading the White Papers
These two versions of the White Paper, emanating as they did from the
education bureaucracy, give a far more educational slant to the discussion
than either the interviews or the NTSI. As a result of their origins they
were concerned more with issues such as equity and the role of the
market in education than were the more training-oriented texts explored
earlier.
The draft White Paper of September 1994 began with a detailed and
damning analysis of the legacy of the Apartheid education system and
had an emphasis on the major People's Education themes of access,
governance and curriculum transformation:
access to education and training was severely rationed on
a racial and ethnic basis. Compulsory education for White
children has been enforced for decades, with the result
that the White adult population has been completely
literate for generations. By contrast, millions of Black
adults and out-of-school youth still have little or no access
to education and training. Most Black adults, especially
rural women, are illiterate.
f
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.... the historic pattern of governance has been top-down
authoritarian or bureaucratic in all departments, but
especially in the systems of the majority of the people.
.... the curriculum, textbooks and teacher education were
manipulated for ideological purposes and used as
instruments of propaganda and indoctrination. (DNE
1994: 9)
This, however, could be contrasted with concerns later in the White
Paper which reflected reformist National Party positions harking back to
the ERS/CMESA proposals. The right of freedom of association based
upon culture, language and religion was one such theme reaffirmed
here. This was couched in terms of a need to reflect prior constitutional
agreements:
Every person (including a 'legal person'30) has the right to
establish, where practicable, an educational institution
based on common culture, language or religion, provided
that racial discrimination is prohibited, (ibid: 24)
More conservative sentiments also appeared in the financial
considerations of the Report. Wide-ranging limitations to free and
compulsory education in practice were laid out. This was coupled with a
statement of the need for increased cost recovery and cost sharing, even
at the primary level (ibid: 53-7).31 The overall budgetary constraints
within which educational change would take place were also highly
conservative (ibid: 37). Echoes of the National Party's technocratic
discourse from the 1980s and early 1990s were present also in a stress on
the need for managed change.
30 An organisation or institution having the same legal rights and responsibilities as an
individual.
31 The extension of cost-recovery to the primary level goes beyond the position of even the
World Bank which lobbied Zimbabwe against such a policy as the start of the decade.
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The balance of power between these two meta-narratives, and with their
Post-Fordist rivals, was brought into question by the draft White Paper's
statement that the Department of Education would have responsibility
for NQF development (ibid: 32). This appeared to mark a significant shift
in the balance of power away from the training lobby.
However, this proved to be short-lived, as the final White Paper in
March 1995 stated the IMWG's responsibility for that developmental
process. Although this reinforced the dominance of the other two meta-
narratives, the rhetoric of equity and choice was still present in the
analysis. In this light it was significant that the initial equity focus of the
draft White Paper was replaced by an opening section which was both
more instrumental and more Post-Fordist:
Successful modern economies and societies require the
elimination of artificial hierarchies, in social organisation,
in the organisation and management of work, and the
way in which learning is organised and certified. They
require citizens with a strong foundation of general
education, the desire and ability to continue to learn, to
adapt to and develop new knowledge, skills and
technologies, to move flexibly between occupations, to
take responsibility for personal performance, to set and
achieve high standards, and to work co-operatively. (DE
1995a: 15)
The shift away from equity concerns was also seen in the placing of
"parental choice" before "access" when discussing "values and principles
of education and training policy" (ibid: 21). Moreover, the section on the
historical legacy of Apartheid, now relegated to later in the text, was
seriously watered-down from its September version. Reference to racial-
based inequality, so clear in the initial text, was blurred by the
abandonment of the use of white and black as descriptors. The
achievements of the white (or "elite", as it was now termed) system were
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highlighted and South African education was seen as comparable or even
superior to other countries at the same level of development. This
resulted in a text which at times verged on an apologetic for Apartheid
education, as the following extract indicates:
As with other basic services, the distribution of education
and training provision in our country follows a pattern of
contrasts and paradoxes. South Africa has achieved, by a
large measure, the most developed and well-resourced
system of education and training on the African
continent, with the highest participation rates at all levels
of the system, (ibid: 18)
Such a claim was highly questionable, particularly with regard to the
accuracy of the second sentence. Furthermore, conscious racially-based
inequalities had become "contrasts and paradoxes": a remarkable shift
from the earlier version. Equally, the decision to begin the section on the
historical legacy with this praise-singing of white education (which
continued past these initial two sentences) clashed with the page-and-a-
half focus of the first draft on "the denial of equal educational rights"
(DNE 1994: 9).
Whilst I have argued that the major element of the emergent discourse is
built upon broadly Post-Fordist views, the relative strength of these other
two meta-narratives is important. Opposition to the NQF approach and
tensions between New Times and Lean Production conceptions points to
the uncertainty of the balance between equity and instrumentalism in the
emergent system. The apparent shift in power in the education
bureaucracy back to its ERS/CMESA position of instrumentalism rather
than equity thus has potential implications for the overall balance of the
system. This will need to be kept in mind as attention now turns briefly
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to practice and then to the exploration of the key elements of that
emergent system.
The Policy-Practice Interface
At several points already this chapter has crossed the boundary between
policy and practice. Before proceeding to a summarization of what the
emergent model might look like, it is necessary to spend a brief moment
focusing explicitly on the issue of practice.
In the development of new approaches to South African education and
training, as elsewhere, there is a complex, bi-directional relationship
between the shaping of policy and practice. What is very readily evident
in this particular case is the involvement of large numbers of the key
policy negotiators in the development of innovative practice.
This rush to create best practice appears to be based on the assumption
that those who come to the negotiating table with worked out practical
proposals will have the best chance of winning the day: "my bet is that
they will probably come to the table and say 'who's got the training
schedules and modules for that? OK, that becomes the national
standard'" (Costa Pierides OI 1995- Automobile Manufacturers Industry
Training Board [AMITB]).
The importance of the development of workable modules which
articulate policy and practice can perhaps be symbolized by the progress of
Adrienne Bird from policy proposer (NUMSA/COSATU); to practice
developer (Metal and Engineering Industry Education and Training
Board) to policy formulator and implementor (Chief Director: Human
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Resource Development, Department of Labour Affairs). It is also
evidenced by the structure of the HSRC Report which devotes a section to
practice and, more crucially, a chapter to eight case studies showing how
developments in practice amongst the HSRC group not only has allowed
them to refine theory, but also gives them the authority to speak to
communities of both policy and practice.
These are not the only models of practice that are seeking to help shape
policy. AMITB, the employers and NUMSA have developed a
programme for training across the automobile industry (von Holdt OI
1995; Pierides OI 1995). In building, BITB are currently involved in a pilot
project with the support of the National Training Board and the Irish
Government (on behalf of the European Union) to develop RPL
mechanisms within training (Eberlein OI 1995- National Training Board;
Sonnendecker OI 1995). In the mining industry too, there are attempts to
develop new modules (Phillips 1995), although these have been
hampered by the exclusively artisanal focus of the training board.32
The examples in the above paragraph are all of initiatives in training.
Five of the eight case studies in the HSRC Report are also about training.
The other three are concerned with the professional development of
engineers and Education, Training and Development Practitioners
(ETDPs), and the development of adult education examinations (HSRC
1994: Chapter 9).
32 The 1996 Mine Health and Safety Bill proposed a single Mining Industry
Qualifications Authority to cover all occupational levels in the industry (DE 1996c: 13).
Thus, it was the industry's dreadful safety record that brought about the implementation
of a long-cherished NUM policy proposal.
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There are no comparable pilot projects aimed at the school system.
Gustav Niebuhr's call for such pilots (Niebuhr OI 1995) can be read as a
recognition of the need for the school system to start operationalizing the
NQF prior to full implementation. Equally, however, it can be
understood as a recognition that those who have the most power to
shape the NQF during its formative stages are those who can talk in
concrete as well as abstract terms. At the moment, it is clear that formal
education, here too, is in danger of losing out to the far more organized
training lobby.
Even more ironically in the view of the NEPI depiction of adult basic
education at the beginning of the 1990s as "chaotic and uncoordinated'
(NEPI 1992c: 15), it appears that those in ABET are far better equipped at
present to shape policy than their formal schooling counterparts.33
Pierides' picture of policy being decided upon by those who have the
most credible modules, with others acquiescing in them, of course is
likely to only hold in part. Flere again, asymmetry and voluntarism
must be remembered. These issues need to be foregrounded, for they are
amongst the key defining issues that will shape the future of South
African education and training. It will be necessary to examine what
form such a model appears to be taking at this point in its development,
and which factors join asymmetry and voluntarism as the key variables
that seem likely to shape both the present and future trajectory of the
reforms.
33 This is probably due to the ABET community's experience of having to think
innovatively about curriculum as compared to large sections of formal education's
preoccupation with the collapse of the culture of learning and with the political role of
the formal system.
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THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SHAPE OF SOUTH AFRICAN
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
As yet no hegemonic model has been established. This is largely because
it is still very early days in the post-election era. The administrative and
political legacy of Apartheid was such that reorganizing and capturing the
structures of government, bureaucracy and civil society took much of the
energy of the stakeholders in the first two years of the Mandela
presidency. Whilst policy formulation and the development of practice
were carried on, there was the challenge of getting influence in new fora
such as NEDLAC, the IMWG (and now SAQA) as well as older organs
such as the NTB and the two departments.
Nonetheless, as we have already seen, broader planning has been
continuing. Currently, there would seem to be four possible paths the
new education and training system, centred around the NQF, could take.
This section will briefly outline these before pointing to some of the
indicators which will be useful in the future charting of the progress or
decline of these alternatives. Of course, it is probable that none of the
four paths will be adopted in its entirety. However, they are useful in so
far as they point out the possibilities and tensions that exist within the
system in rather stark ways.
The Four Paths
Path One: National. Pro-Equity
This path would see the fulfilment of the ANC/COSATU vision for the
NQF, grounded in the New Times meta-narrative. It is based on a vision
254
of an economy peopled by workers who through their broad learning are
the chief innovative resource of their firms (Kraak 1993b). This model
embraces a paradigm shift in both education and training and the
organization of work. Workers would be truly multi-skilled, where
multi-skilling means the acquisition of a broad range of craft level skills.
Training would be in the relevant skills, defined at their broadest, and
employers would provide paid education and training leave. This
training itself would be carried out in a way that is not Taylorist but
which uses the notion of competencies in a broad sense.
The concept of the training-skill-grade-wage nexus becomes integral to
the workplace and careers rather than jobs are now the norm. Training is
both the vehicle for improving skills and, through the NQF, a rational
means of sorting staff. RPL would be used to decide on training, grading
and promotion and would be offered to all workers. The new system
means that cooperation and joint decision-making between workers and
bosses become the heart of the industrial relations system (Mathews
1989).
In education, the stress shifts to using competencies as a means of
redressing the imbalance between skills and knowledge that has allegedly
plagued the conventional education system. By focusing on doing rather
than knowing, a competency-based approach is believed to move
learning away from a sterile information gathering and towards a
concern with the application of knowledge. RPL also forms an integral
element of education progression, allowing those from educationally
disadvantaged communities to access further and higher education in far
larger numbers than previously.
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It is argued that a distinction between education and training will in fact
become irrelevant as there will now be a seamless system. Formal
education, adult education and training will be more relevant as
categorizations of sites of delivery than different systems or sub-systems,
with qualifications and access to assessment being indifferent to the site
of learning (McGrath with King 1994).
Such a system promises the end of the academic-vocational divide; the
end of industrial conflict; and even the end of class conflict (Bird OI
1995a). The argument in its favour has moral force, stressing the model's
ability to be pro-equity and to redress the legacy of Apartheid. It also
mobilizes economic force as it promises increased productivity and
competitiveness in response to the pressures of globalization and rapid
technological change.
As a result, there is almost a religious faith in the model as one in which
all stakeholders will want to participate. This is a mode of reasoning that
both the ANC and COSATU tend to operate within but it is not able to
deal adequately with power relations. The discussions above make it
clear that there are powerful interests in South Africa which are likely to
obstruct such a radical restructuring of learning and work. As a result, it
is possible to theorize an alternative vision of a truly national,
qualifications framework.
Path Two: National. Exclusivist
There is a danger that a more negative version of a strong NQF might
emerge under certain circumstances. Economic stagnation or even
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decline has already been identified in Chapter Four as problematic in this
regard. A radical Post-Fordist system can best be achieved under
conditions of economic growth. There are two major reasons for this.
First, a shift to a higher skill base would lead to more unemployment
unless economic growth was rapid enough to offset the labour saving
effect of new technologies and processes.34 Second, the initial costs of
transformation could not be borne in a recession. If the radical
supporters of the NQF were defeated in the final decision making, or
were forced to make significant compromises, perhaps as part of an
overall settlement between narrow corporate interests, then a very
different system might emerge as a lowest common denominator.
Such a model, if it had an overall guiding philosophy, might owe most to
the meta-narrative of Lean Production with its notions of work
intensification and flexibilization, as responses to the challenge of
globalization. In such a system, multi-skilling would give way to a form
of multi-tasking, which would stress both the flexibility of workers to
move from one unskilled task to another and the intensification of work
through the addition of maintenance and cleaning tasks to production
workers' responsibilities. Employers would only provide, encourage or
pay for training that was deemed relevant in a more narrow job specific
sense. Such training would tend to use a less radical, more behaviourist
and Taylorist conception of competency. RPL would primarily be a tool
for affirmative action, serving as a gatekeeping device to identify those
34 The World Employment Report. 1995 argues that in the long-term new jobs have tended
to outstrip the loss of old ones. However, it notes that this is not automatic nor is their any
certainty that the new jobs will be at the same or higher skill levels than the old jobs
(ILO 1995: 56). Furthermore, it does not seem reasonable to argue both that globalization
is taking the world into a fundamentally new economic and industrial paradigm, and that
in this new paradigm we can assume that past trends on re/deskilling are still relevant.
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who would be most suitable for further training and promotion. Many
of the elements of such an approach appear to be emerging in the mining
industry as reflected both in interviews (Burrows, Dippenaar, Godsell: all
OI 1995) and sample modules for a Mining Industry Qualifications
Framework (Phillips 1995).
Looser linkages than envisaged in the first path would exist between
training, skills, grade and wage, with final decision-making lying in the
hands of management. Instead of German-style co-determination
between employers and unions, there would more probably be
something closer to Japanese-style employer-employee "cooperation".35
In education, there would be something which can best be described as
New Improved Vocationalism. The New Vocationalist trends of the
1980s and early 1990s in South African education would continue in so
far as there would probably be a strong emphasis on the well-known
elements of that analysis (as explored in previous chapters) such as
academic bias, socialization failure and the need to develop better school-
industry links. There would be an overall tendency towards
instrumental rationales for education, as witnessed by the following
Department of Education formulation:
Human resource development (the integration of
education and training) will directly influence the policies
pursued by the Department of Education - in particular the
need to vocationalise education to meet the needs of the
economy. (DE 1995b: 9)
35 German industry has a tradition of strong trade unions which are involved in a wide
range of decisions as partners of employers. Japanese industry, after the crushing of trade
unionism in the early 1950s, has developed a system in which unions with managerially
appointed officials cooperate with the schemes of employers.
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This tendency towards vocationalization would be made more powerful
by not being directed to the traditional stress on vocational/technical
schools or streams. Given the general international view on the past
performance of conventional Vocationalism, as expressed by the World
Bank (e.g. World Bank 1988); the South African context since the de
Lange Commission; and the limited possibilities for funding, it is
unlikely that South Africa will embark on a major programme of
traditional Vocationalism (McGrath 1995b).
What is more likely to emerge as part of a non-radical model of the NQF
is a gradual "colonization" of education by training philosophies and
methodologies. In particular, there could well be a shifting of the balance
between knowledge and skills that would replace a bias in favour of the
former with one in favour of the latter. In such a model, emphasis on
skills, typically "soft" ones such as problem-solving, communication and
social skills, and the use of competencies would be elements of a narrow
behaviourist view of learning that would seek to make all subjects more
"relevant".
Such a model would appear less explicitly vocationalist than the
technical high school approach of Vocationalism. However, through its
application of instrumentalism to all areas of the curriculum in a way
which is fundamentally more radical than under the New Vocationalism
of the ERS/CMESA model, such a strategy could in fact achieve more of
the vocationalizing objective of making education better fit the needs of
industry, now reshaped to take account of globalization slogans such as
flexibility. Hence the term, New Improved Vocationalism, indicating
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this model's development beyond the narrower concerns of New
Vocationalism.36
Rather than the broad consensus and participatory spirit of the first path,
consistent as it is with the overall RDP philosophy, this version would be
more narrowly bureaucratic and technicist, with decision-making
residing in the hands of experts. Such narrowness would be made more
apparent by the limited access to education and training that this model
would offer. Training would be predominantly for those in core,
unionized employment, as feared by NEPI (1993), whilst RPL would fail
to radically transform access to either education or training. Such trends
can already be discerned in the work of the IMWG (1994) and the role of
the HSRC expert group (HSRC 1995).
There is a tendency towards narrow credentialism in this path. This
would lead to education and training not being sought for the learning
opportunities it could provide but for its job-linked certification. This
would have a particularly serious effect on adult education, which has a
predominantly voluntaristic and communitarian ideology (McGrath
1995a). For those on the outside, this would result in the system
becoming a "qualifications fortress" (Burroughs OI 1995). As
qualifications become more closely tied to jobs and promotion, so access
to these qualifications is likely to become more closely controlled.
36 The relationship between New Improved Vocationalism and globalization will be
returned to in Chapter Six.
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Factors Against a National Model
Many of the interviews conducted brought out two themes which suggest
that a strong and totalizing model of the NQF may not emerge. The first
of these is asymmetry: the permitting of education and training (or
possibly elements of the two) to pursue their own paths within a rather
broad overall framework. In choosing a "unified system" over "bridges
and ladders" (see below) in 1993 the ANC was stating a preference for a
system in which there would be symmetry at all levels (ANC-COSATU
1993b). However, by mid-1995 a senior ANC civil servant in the
Department of Education was claiming asymmetry as a major advantage
of the emerging system (Coombe OI 1995a).
Voluntarism must also be considered. Initial ANC-COSATU
formulations of the NQF also were clearly predicated on an assumption
that the system would eventually achieve universal coverage. This
assumption arose in part out of statist thinking, but also out of a faith
both in the moral and logical force of the NQF and in the openness of
other stakeholders to such forces. However, it is clear that neither
compulsion nor universal voluntary acceptance of the NQF can be
assumed. The introduction of the two concepts of voluntarism and
asymmetry suggests that there may well be far greater fragmentation
under the NQF than was initially conceived. This is explored in the next
two paths.
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Path Three: Fragmented. "Bridges and Ladders"
This path would take South African education and training back to the
debates in ANC/COSATU circles during the drafting phase of the
"Yellow Book", explored in the previous chapter. However, here the
model previously rejected would be the one now adopted. It would be a
model in which the different sub-systems (ABET, FE, HE, schooling)
would retain a large degree of autonomy within an overall integrated
approach. Each sub-system would have its own pathway or "ladder". At
specified points on these ladders portability across sub-systems would be
possible across "bridges".
This approach would enshrine asymmetry between these different sub¬
systems, which would be given considerable lee-way to interpret the
levels of the NQF according to their own needs. Thus, equivalence of
awards across sub-systems would become a potential problem. Training
would probably develop along broad NTSI-oriented lines, although the
tensions seen between Paths One and Two would probably persist. Adult
education would probably be unified around the IEB adult examinations
but might well reflect a major industry-oriented bias.37
Formal education would have to respond to these trends, although
education stakeholders would be given far greater room for manoeuvre
than in a strong version of the NQF. Their response would probably
involve an attempt to redress the imbalance between knowledge and
skills, but in a way that would still see a fundamental role for the former.
37 Although a non-governmental organisation, the IEB's experience in setting national
examinations at matriculation level and leadership in the field of adult examinations
means that it will probably come to set the norms in this field.
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Modularization would almost certainly be developed significantly,
particularly at the upper levels, but competencies might be abandoned or
radically reworked. Progression within systems would be rationalized
and RPL and credit transfer mechanisms would probably develop at the
further and higher education levels.
This path introduces asymmetry but still sees a basic cohesion within sub¬
systems. However, if we now introduce the notion of voluntarism an
even more fragmented system appears.
Path Four: Fragmented. Islands of Integration
In this path, there is effectively no sign of an integrated approach, let
alone an integrated system. Rather than the coherent sub-systems of path
three, we now have "small islands of integrative best practice in an ocean
of non-integration" (Fehnel OI 1995; McGurk OI 1995). Here the
experiences of Australia might be particularly relevant. Universities, as
in that country, would almost certainly show little interest in
competencies or in coordination with the broader system except on their
own terms. Professions would be divided about involvement in the
system with many remaining outside it (Marginson 1993; O'Connor OI
1995; Lankshear 1996).
In industry, whole sectors might continue on a narrow CBMT route that
might not prove acceptable to a SAQA which maintained elements of the
original NQF vision. The participation of some ITBs but not others in
the HSRC group might be significant as a line of cleavage in this context.
The opting out of certain sectors would reflect the more negative possible
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outcome of the rush to best practice of progressive trainers: that it repels
rather than captures conservative elements. Even within sectors which
chose to be part of the system, voluntarism would allow many employers
to opt out of all or part of the modular programme offered. In such a
system, both inter- and intra-sectoral portability would become highly
problematic.
Mass opting out would be inevitable in the adult education field. Some
organizations would probably seek and achieve IEB accreditation but
many others would either find such a model too costly and demanding
or would fail in the accreditation process.
Formal education would see a similar mass opting out. The school
system might show little sign of the integrative practice envisaged by the
progressives. Instead, a more narrowly vocationalist form of integration
would probably emerge in the public school system. For both liberal and
conservative reasons such a system would not be acceptable to the private
school system, nor to many parents who would seek to remove their
children from public education. What would result is a reworked class-
divided system with broad education for the children of the elite, and
narrow training for the children of the masses, in an echo of National
Party policy since the de Lange Report. Of course, it is possible that such a
scenario might be complicated by inter-provincial differences in policy
























































































The Key Defining Factors of the New Model
From the four paths outlined above, and arising in turn out of earlier
discussions in this chapter, it is possible to identify a set of key factors that
will be fundamental to the shape of South African education and
training in the future.
Coverage
The new model could have varying levels of coverage, defined in four
ways. Systems coverage refers to the different parts of education and
training (e.g. FE, ABET, etc.) that would adopt integrative policies and
practice. Geographic coverage refers to the areas of the country that adopt
integration. This is most relevant in the case of compulsory education
which is a provincial responsibility. Sectoral coverage reflects the
question of whether all sectors of industry, and both public and private
school sectors, will buy into the NQF model. Finally, level coverage
refers to the extent of coverage of a new model across educational and/or
occupational levels. This is reflective of the possibility of university or
professional refusal to join a broader model of education and training.
Articulation
Two central principles of the NTSI Report were portability and
progression. These become major indicators of the future shape of
education and training. How easy will it be to move up through the NQF
levels, regardless of sites or paths of learning? How easy will it be to
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move among such sites or paths, and between different occupations?
These are fundamental indicators of how far the NTSI philosophy is
being put into practice.
Broadness of Learning
The broadness of the learning opportunities provided within the system,
both in terms of the range of available fields of learning and what they
each contain, is another key factor. Tensions between knowledge and
skills, and over Taylorism, behaviourism and competencies, will
determine whether those within the system get learning opportunities
which enable them to act upon the world or simply to be better reconciled
and socialized to a world that they lack the power to change.
Equity v Efficiency
At the heart of South African education and training debates in the 1990s
has been this tension between equity and efficiency. The balance of
power between these two elements in any system that emerges will be
another key defining factor. Will the system be one in which the key
emphasis is on increasing the access of all potential learners to
meaningful learning opportunities, or will the level and type of learning
opportunities be conditioned by the narrow needs of industry and the
economy? Will it be possible to create the kind of New Times future in
which the two concerns are successfully married? One particular
touchstone here will be developments in RPL.
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Asymmetry
This has been a recurrent theme throughout this chapter. How far will
different institutions and structures within the NQF model be allowed to
develop their own approaches? How far will a synoptic vision be
compromised in the process? Will it result in a lowest common
denominator NQF? Will the promise of asymmetry successfully keep
potential opponents in the NQF system, and, if so, will this harm the
approach? Such questions strike to the heart of whether the model that
emerges will owe more to the stronger integrative impulse of the first
two paths or the weaker version of the third and fourth paths
Voluntarism
This too was a recurrent theme of the interviews explored above. How
voluntarist will the NQF be? What sanctions and incentives will be used
to encourage educational authorities and business leaderships to buy into
the system? Voluntarism, of course, brings with it the danger that there
will be mass opting-out, thus bringing the alleged benefits of the NQF to a
smaller constituency. Equally, it is possible that the fear of opting-out
may lead to a watered down NQF, as noted above. The success of
attempts to secure voluntary support for the progressive vision of the
NQF will be a major determining factor of the nature of the new model.
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The Current State of the Debate
As noted earlier, it is too early to say what form the new South African
education and training system and the NQF will take. There are far too
many unresolved contestations that make prediction very hazardous.
The withdrawal of the National Party from the government is one such
imponderable at the time of writing, as is the appointment of Mkhatshwa
(see page 117) as Deputy-Minister. Nonetheless, policy and practice have
been evolving for two years since the elections. By taking these as
broadly indicative of future trajectories, some tentative predictions can be
made. In making these I will utilise the factors outlined above as
heuristic tools.
Coverage
It seems likely that coverage will be national in geographic terms, to the
extent that examples of NQF practice will be found in all provinces.
However, there remain major problems in developing coverage across
all systems. Training and adult education are broadly involved in
integrative thinking and practice but formal education is far behind,
regardless of province. This of course reflects the fact that large numbers
of trade unionists, industrial trainers and adult educators became
involved in this debate long before significant numbers of
educationalists.
It seems unlikely from the perspective of mid-1996 that formal education
as a whole will be an integral part of the new approach. Working group
9's willingness to exclude compulsory schooling from the full force of the
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NQF and the reality that only Level One of the NQF directly impacts
upon the compulsory phase of schooling suggests that formal schooling
might well be left largely to its own devices, particularly at the primary
level, although it would undoubtedly be under considerable indirect
pressure to respond to integration.
If a more centralized integrative model, as envisaged by the recent
Ministerial Committee (DE 1996a), does emerge then this would almost
certainly lead to massive opting out of private schools (whose
relationship to the NQF is unclear- particularly in the light of national
curriculum experience in England and Wales where private schools were
exempt). Indeed, it is possible, that this could even jeopardize geographic
coverage if provincial ministries find such a system unpalatable. The
degree to which the provinces have a constitutional right in this regard
remains uncertain and hence the degree of potential opt-out.
Universities have already been vocal in their disquiet about the
implications of the NQF (Greenstein 1995b). It is likely that the HSRC
Report will also have produced a further legacy of mistrust. Indeed,
perhaps the best hope for the NQF here is that the universities might be
totally out-manoeuvred through their refusal to try to pro-actively shape
the new model However, this has not happened in Australia, for
example (Donn 1996). In this context, it is significant that the National
Commission on Higher Education appears to have been paying little
attention to a detailed analysis of the universities' role in the NQF.
An attempt to develop a radical model of the NQF would of course also
bring with it the likelihood of sectors or firms choosing to remain outside
the system. This seems inevitable given the Australian experience
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(O'Connor OI 1995). Indeed, almost any form of integration and the
development of an NQF might be radical enough to be opposed by some
employers.
Articulation
It was always likely that portability between jobs would be more limited
than the publicists of the NQF claimed. Indeed, given the specific nature
of organizational practice and technology, it is probable that portability
will not be absolute even within sectors. Certainly, inter-sectoral
portability will be very limited, particularly in the current labour surplus
climate.
Progression within occupations may be expected to develop more
successfully. However, two outstanding issues remain to be settled here.
First, how will the equivalence problems inherent in asymmetry be dealt
with? Second, how seriously will the credibility of the model be affected
by the inevitable gap between the promise, encapsulated in the slogan
"from sweeper to engineer"38, and the reality, which will see no
progression at all for many workers?
Broadness of Learning
This chapter has argued that there is a willingness in many quarters to
seek to develop an integrated form of learning which is based on a non-
38 This slogan originated in the Australian trade union movement before being introduced
to South Africa by NUMSA.
271
Taylorist conception of competencies. However, there remain major
questions about the feasibility and desirability of such a strategy for
various participants in the debate. It is not clear that such a model of
competencies can be developed, especially in the light of experiences
elsewhere (Marginson 1993; Smithers 1993). In particular, it is difficult to
get stakeholder support of sufficient breadth. It seems likely that many
employers, in particular, would shape the model towards a narrower
vision in practice.
A danger also lies in employer-union cooperation. If employers want a
narrow model, but will tie it quite systematically to pay and promotions,
then trade union acquiescence may be easily achieved. This would be at
the expense of educational principles stressing broadness of learning.
Even if there was the desire to make learning non-Taylorist, a major
problem would remain as the result of the massive shortfall in both
quality and quantity of trainers able to teach in a broad system.
There does seem to be a real danger of a more subtle and pernicious form
of vocationalism emerging, in which education comes to be seen in ever
more instrumental terms. The strength of arguments against traditional
vocational education in South African intellectual circles seems enough
to foreclose any substantial move towards a major expansion of the
technical high schools sector. However, the discourse of competencies
and skills, taken together with the Department of Education's quote in
favour of vocationalism cited earlier (page 249), suggests an increasing
threat to educational values and to the role of education professionals in
setting the educational agenda.
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Equity v Efficiency
It is almost certainly the case that the New Times vision underpinning
the model of Path One above is unrealistic. The kind of economic,
political and social transformations assumed are simply not happening
in Britain and Australia (from whence such ideas came) let alone in
South Africa. There is some evidence of the adoption of the new
thinking in practice but it does not amount to a paradigm shift, nor is it
certain to do so in the future.
Given the ideological and economic climate within which South Africa
is operating, a less empowering and inclusive response to the very real
elements of globalization and technological change is likely to emerge. In
such a scenario, equity and efficiency will not be balanced. Instead the
latter will receive primary attention. In this case, the vision of an NQF
stressing access and progression for all can be expected to give way to the
narrower model of Path Two.
Asymmetry
This appears to be official policy. As was noted above, this arises out of a
concern to keep as many stakeholders as possible talking prior to the
development of a formalized model through SAQA. However, there is a
real danger in such an approach that this will ensure, rather than
prevent, a disunited system.
The presence of asymmetry in the debate is crucial. It suggests that Path
One is untenable, assuming that broad agreement on such a vision
would not be possible. As a result, it offers two lowest common
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denominator, alternative paths: an integrated system exhibiting narrow
Taylorism or an approach which leaves different stakeholders largely to
pursue their own visions. In the latter case, it is almost certain that some
sub-systems, from the educational side, would resist a radical NQF.
Perhaps even more significantly, it is far less certain that the radical view
would prevail even in the more congenial settings of ABET and the
training sector.
Voluntarism
Voluntarism in the new system appears inevitable. In this case, the
ability to persuade becomes crucial. However, it does not seem plausible
that the majority of stakeholders will buy in to a radical vision, as
assumed in Path One. Rather, voluntarism seems likely to lead to a
large-scale opting out in all sub-systems, even where an industry or a
province as a whole has decided upon participation.
The Overall Picture
The above analysis suggests that, in the current climate of debate, there is
little prospect of the radical vision of Path One being realized.39 Indeed,
the central importance of the notions of asymmetry and voluntarism
point to the implausibility of a strong national system. This relates to
39 Here again it is important to note that such a reading is based on the trajectory of the
first 2 years of the post-election period. The effects of the abandonment of the GNU by
the National Party may well shift the trajectory in ways which it would be foolish to
attempt to predict in June 1996.
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one of the weakest elements of ANC-COSATU thinking. The notion of a
strong and integrated ministry to drive education and training reform
was a central element of early pre-election formulations. This was
abandoned in practice in 1994 but it has yet to be adequately replaced by a
new strategy. This indicates that the real question is about the nature of a
decentralized system.
Those already developing practices which promote good quality
integrated learning probably will continue to do so. However, the debates
explored in this chapter suggest that such practice will not achieve
hegemony, either as formulated or implemented policy. Rather, there is
a real likelihood of a fragmented system in which small pockets of
progressive integrative practice will exist alongside wider expanses of
narrow Taylorist training, instrumentalized public schooling and largely
unreformed and elitist private and higher education.
Whether such an outcome is desirable and, if not, whether there are
plausible alternatives are questions which have been addressed
elliptically in the discussions of this chapter. Their more direct
consideration will have to wait till the next chapter. Before then it is
necessary to have a better understanding of the factors behind the
development of the current situation. Therefore, the next section of this
chapter seeks to answer the second of the research questions posed at the
outset: what factors help to explain the current shape of South African
education and training policy and the debates that surround it?
REASONS FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION
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In order to understand why the system appears to be developing in the
ways described above, I will make use of both stakeholders' own
rationales for changes and a broader understanding of global discursive
pressures on the South African education and training system prior to
making any conclusions.
Stakeholder Rationales
Stakeholders appear to have developed rationales for changes to
education and training in two distinct areas. First, they have seen such
changes in the light of the changed socio-political realities of the post¬
election period. Second, they have identified a series of economic and
education and training realities which have also shaped the
transformation.
Socio-Political Realities
There was a strong sense from interviews with stakeholders that the new
South Africa would require very different ways of operating in a number
of fields. Ray Eberlein, then chair of the National Training Board, saw
the changed climate as the root cause of transformed attitudes towards
training amongst many employers:
the big companies have realised that their future lies with
this [changed approach to training]. Obviously, there are a
number of factors impacting on this. There's the entire
change from an autocratic approach to a more multi-party
approach, there is the influence of the RDP, and obviously
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the whole series of changes that have happened in South
Africa. (Eberlein OI 1995)
Eberlein's reference to the RDP was repeated by many employers and
trainers. The 1995 BMI survey found that 64% of companies and 79% of
ITBs had set goals in terms of the RDP (BMI 1995: 158).40 In many cases
this may amount to little more than lip service. However, in the case of
parastatals, such as ESKOM (Verster OI 1995), and some training boards,
such as those in hospitality and building (Ansara OI 1995; Sonnendecker
OI 1995), it appears that a real commitment to the RDP is central to
overall strategies. How this has been, and in future will be, affected by
the change in RDP status at the end of March 1996 remains a question for
future examination.
At the heart of the original vision of the RDP was the redress of the
legacy of Apartheid. Here too, there was public acknowledgement of the
new climate from the largely white stakeholder group. Many
respondents were strongly critical of the Apartheid system and stressed
their long-term opposition to it. Such a position, for example, was taken
by Arthur Allen, head of the craft union, the Amalgamated Engineering
Union: "even before the Wiehahn Commission, in fact in 1974, we as the
AEU made a policy announcement that we supported change" (Allen OI
1995).
Condemnation of Apartheid and its legacy was particularly apparent in
comments about the education system:
40 The five RDP themes were Meeting Basic Needs; Developing our Human Resources;
Building the Economy; Democratising the State and Society; and Implementing the RDP
(ANC 1994b).
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The racial division and distortion of educational resources
and institutions of course has cost the economy and
society immensely. The failure to develop effective
educational opportunities for black South Africans is one
that we are going to pay for for a long time: a generation or
two. (Godsell OI 1995)
In the light of political change, the rejection of the NTS, and criticisms of
the ITB system,41 legitimacy was a major concern of both the NTB and
many of the ITBs. Central to strategies here have been changes in
membership of boards to incorporate more union delegates. In the case
of building, such an argument was taken further by Sonnendecker who
stressed the need for broad community involvement in the deliberations
of the training board (Sonnendecker OI 1995).
Both directly through changes in its ability to influence education and
training policy and indirectly through the impact of its decision on the
climate in the business world, the NP's withdrawal from the GNU is
likely to have significant effects on the emergent learning system. At this
stage, however, it is difficult to predict precisely what shape these effects
will take.
Economic and Education and Training Realities
Although the new political climate since the elections has clearly
influenced stakeholder policy and practice, this was not as well
articulated in interviews as economic and education and training
rationales for change. Amongst such rationales, the following appeared
41 See BMI (1995) for a discussion of problems with the ITB system.
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the most important: international competitiveness, technological change,
skills shortage, training failure and education failure. These will be dealt
with in turn.
International Competitiveness
The newsletter Competitiveness Update of the South African Business
Network shows a major concern with this issue (SABN 1994a and b). It
argues that it is now impossible to use tariffs:
The interdependence of nations, particularly in respect of
trade flows, means that protective tariffs are as likely to
harm the country imposing such measures as the country
or countries targeted. (SABN 1994a: 2)
Such a position was reflected in the drive towards liberalization by
Trevor Manuel when he was Minister of Trade and Industry, a drive that
was at a faster pace than required by international agreements. In the
light of this new competitive environment, South Africa's placing at 41st
out of 41 countries for human resource development in the 1994 World
Competitiveness Report (cited in SABN 1994a) was seen as very serious
by those interviewed in early 1995. This situation is held to be most
crucial in the NUMSA-organized metals and automobile sectors.
Concerns in the latter industry are reflected in the comments of AMITB's
Costa Pierides:
In our industry it's a fundamental necessity, if we're going
to survive: we need people who can do the jobs, we've got
to become productive, we've got to utilise our human
resources in the best manner we can and to do that you
have to train people up so it's a dynamic process. We see
it as a fundamental requirement of survival largely
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because GATT's42 coming in and we've got the duty rates
coming in, internal and external competition now
becoming a lot more fierce and if companies are going to
survive they're going to have to do things a lot smarter in
the future. (Pierides OI 1995)
Technological Change
In many ways concerns expressed by those interviewed about increased
international competitiveness were linked to issues of technological
change. The issue of Competitiveness Update cited above also was
concerned with the need to respond to technological change which
makes cutting edge industry increasingly globally mobile:
Consider what are commonly believed to be the 7 key
industries of the next few decades- microelectronics,
biotechnology, new materials industries, civil aviation,
telecommunications, robots plus machine tools,
computers plus software. All are brain power industries.
Each could be located anywhere on the face of the globe.
Where they will be located depends upon who can
organise the brain power to capture them. (Lester Thurow
(MIT43) cited in SABN 1994a: 4)
These industries, of course, are not the same ones as those represented by
the respondents. Indeed, many stakeholders reported minimal
technological change in their industries. However, a belief in rapid
technological change and the need to respond to it does seem to be
common in many of the core industries of the HSRC expert group.44 It is
also strongly reflected in the findings of the Industrial Strategy Project.
42 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
43 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
44 The industries represented by this group were hospitality, transport, electricity,
plastics and engineering/metals.
280
Thus, in the minds of many of those shaping policy there appears to be a
belief that the future health of the South African economy is dependent
on following the imperatives of the newer high technology industries
and processes.
Such a belief in a broadly Post-Fordist vision leads on to a strong stress on
the necessity to reform education and training to respond to the new
learning needs that emerge. Here, South Africa's NQF debate appears to
follow the broad outline of global discourses as witnessed in OECD
countries, with their emphasis on making education more skills than
knowledge bound, the promotion of lifelong learning and training for
flexibility.
Skills Shortage
The notion that education and training must be reformed in the light of
technological change can be seen as part of a broader, and long-standing,
concern that industry is experiencing a skills shortage, as charted in
previous chapters. Whilst the history of skills misclassification and the
lack of a skills audit were seen by some as making any definitive
statement regarding a skills shortage impossible (e.g. Eberlein OI 1995;
Tyers OI 1995), a range of concerns about a skills shortage were raised.
From a variety of industries came a concern about the insufficient
numbers of skilled workers. The skills of supervisors were also seen as
inadequate by some. This group of workers has conventionally been
white and has had little experience of participatory management of
African workers at lower levels. Instead, there has been a tradition of
281
giving orders and following them up with racial abuse and even violence
when deemed necessary. One senior manager argued that such an
approach would no longer work and supervisory staff must learn how
"you get people to do what you want them to do without kicking them,
smacking them or threatening to fire them" (Godsell OI 1995).
Training Failure
Managerial skills are also seen as problematic by those at senior levels,
such as Andre Dippenaar of Business South Africa, who argue that
inappropriate training of managers is at the root of many of the problems
of inadequate skills further down the system:
Because managers lack the skills of how to solve
problems, because they don't really understand the
relationship between labour practice and education and
training, the methodologies are simply not good enough.
There is too much stress on content, on doing the "right
thing", on following orders. In adult basic education
there's no understanding of the distinction between
androgogy and pedagogy: pedagogy simply isn't good
enough for ABE. There's no understanding of the
methodologies required. There was some movement in
the late '70s and '80s in some industries towards
competency-based training, but the majority simply
haven't changed. To be blunt, in South African industry
we don't know how to train. We ask how many courses
has someone gone on, how many hours of training have
they had, which certificates have they picked up. We
don't ask about what they learnt or what skills and
competencies they acquired, what are the outcomes of
their training. We give them written tests and say:
"you're qualified to do this" without ever seeing if they
can do the job in practice. Our concern is too much with
inputs, how many hours of training, how many courses
rather than on the output: what has been learnt, what can
this person do now. (Dippenaar OI 1995)
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Several trainers reinforced Dippenaar's arguments and reported that
many managers and owners resist training, particularly, but not
exclusively, in small firms. Problems with the ITB system in its early
years (which are still continuing in some industries); poor worker
motivation towards training; levy schemes which cover too few firms
and have too low contributions; and the historic lack of incentives to
acquire skills, all contribute to the problems faced in the sphere of
training. As a result, structured training was only available to a few by
the time of elections (Tyers and Bird 1994). Moreover, what training
there was available was still too narrowly focused on certain occupational
levels, as witnessed by the coverage of artisans only by the training board
in the mining industry. As with the NTS (Chapter Four), there is still an
apparent dichotomy between the vision and the practice of employers
regarding the skilling of workers.
Educational Failure
As we saw in earlier chapters (and as is the case in Britain) industrialists
have generally been more concerned with criticisms of educational
failure than those of their own unwillingness to develop and promote
training. However, the similarity between Britain and South Africa is
only part of the story here. Arguments about educational failure in
South Africa cannot be understood outside the context of an Apartheid
education system which provided expensive but highly propagandized
education (Christian National Education) for whites and poorly
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resourced and less academic education (Bantu Education) for Africans.45
As a result, the need for education reform is argued with a complex
mixture of motifs drawn from both industrial and welfarist critiques of
the past system.
The failures of the past are largely summed up by figures cited by
informants: 12 million total functional illiterates (Burrows OI 1995) and
rates of 60-80% functional illiteracy in mining and autos (Denton OI 1995-
Toyota SA Manufacturing; Pierides OI 1995; Plasket OI 1995). These are
indicative of the well-known crisis of African education. However, the
problem is wider, as the Hunter Commission reported:
The racism, inequitable funding arrangements and the
lack of democratic structures in the entire education
system have all militated against the development of
quality schools. (DE 1995c: Paragraph 3.52)
Indeed, whilst conservative elements might wish to defend the standards
of white education, a strong industrial critique has developed. A
trenchant denunciation of white education came from former teacher,
John Tyers, which, though lengthy, is worth reproducing in full:
people look at school buildings and neat uniforms and
well disciplined little robots and textbooks that are neatly
covered and they think that those are educational
standards. Then they look at the black schools where
there are 40 odd per classroom and no textbooks and they
think that integration is going to cause a drop in
standards. Meanwhile all of those things that we see in
white schools are not educational standards, they are the
trappings of a system, and the outputs of the system are
terrible in that they entrench this Taylorist paradigm that
we have. It doesn't teach kids to think, it teaches them to
be rote learners. The second point is worse and it is that it
teaches them to be rote learners of content that is
45 And something in between for other "population groups".
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illegitimate. Thirdly, it assesses them in such a way that it
entrenches in them this sense of powerlessness when it
comes to learning. Not only is the content of the stuff bad
but the learning design and the philosophies
underpinning curriculum development are terrible, they
are out of touch with the world. The competence of our
teachers is abysmal. Our teacher training colleges are
horrendous. I don't have very much good to say about the
schooling system at all. (Tyers OI 1995)
The lack of thinking and other skills, the stress on inappropriate
knowledge and the failings of the teaching profession are familiar
elements of the industrial critique of education found in the Old
Commonwealth countries from which much of South African
educational policy borrowing emanates. Other elements of the same
critique were also very apparent in the account of Bobby Godsell, one of
the most prominent of South African industrialists.46
He stressed the long-standing academic bias of the (white) South African
education system:
from the end of the Anglo-Boer War, and from the time
of Lord Milner, we have suffered from an educational
philosophy which has made a forced distinction between
academic and technical, and has put the emphasis
inappropriately on academic education. (Godsell OI 1995)
The further argument of a mismatch between the output of education
and the needs of industry was also rehearsed by Godsell when he argued
that "the education system .... fails to prepare young people to take up
their place in the kinds of modern societies that exist around the world
and exist here also" (Godsell OI 1995).
46 As noted earlier, he has operated on several occasions as the chief negotiator for big
business in disputes with labour and the state.
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Such stakeholder rationales show a great deal of continuity with the
discourses of the 1980s, notwithstanding the changed political realities.
As such, they also fit well with Moyo's argument that education reforms
since Soweto have been as a result of three crises (of accumulation,
legitimation and education), which were perceived by capital and the
state (Moyo 1995). Fears about skills shortage, technological change and
international competitiveness all point to continuing concerns about the
ability of South Africa to maintain past accumulation rates in the light of
new economic realities. Fears of poor education and training
performance point to a perceived crisis of education, which was seen as
so serious as to require the development of a working compromise at the
NTSI and beyond. Similarly, the range of concerns around the socio¬
political realities of the new South Africa speak directly to the continuing
need to address the crisis of legitimation. All three crises of course are
interwoven and education and training reforms simultaneously engage
with all three, although in complex ways.
These stakeholder rationales also point to global discourses and economic
pressures which equally have had a major shaping influence on the
development of education and training policy in post-election South
Africa, as I shall now briefly explore.
Global Discourses
The influence of arguments that globalization is increasing and that
South Africa must respond are obvious in some of the responses above,
particularly in industries such as autos. It is also evident in documents
seeking to formulate economic and industrial policy, notably the RDP
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and the Industrial Strategy Project. Such readings can also be seen in
education and training documents (e.g. DE 1995b and 1996a) and debates.
However, it is necessary to look at globalization pressure as containing at
least two key elements.
First, there is the market-oriented formulation with its stress on
liberalization and privatization. Such a meta-narrative clearly
influenced South African education policy in the reform Apartheid
period, as shown in earlier chapters. However, it can also be seen in
elements of post-election education policy:
education policies for a 'new' South Africa show
remarkable congruence with international trends. South
African education policy today neither advances
fundamentally new concepts or approaches nor is it
informed by educational ideas and experiments associated
with either African socialism ('education for self-reliance')
or Marxism ('education with production'). Instead, the
language of poverty alleviation, meeting basic needs,
human resource development, education for lifelong
learning, the integration of formal and non-formal
education, cost-recovery and cost-sharing are central to
educational change. (Chisholm 1994: 1)
This influence is reinforced by the pressure which the international
version of the meta-narrative can exert upon overall economic policy
(Kallaway 1995). In particular, it leads to a serious questioning of the
feasibility of a social welfarist strategy, the historical underpinning of
ANC policy on education and elsewhere.
However, there is also a second element of globalization which impacts
on South African education and training policy. It is argued in many
circles that the increased pressures for international competitiveness
arising out of globalization necessitate a major restructuring of economy,
industry and learning (Christie 1995b). This vision sees multi-skilling as
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the central element of work organization and training. This in turn
implies the use of generic skills, which feeds directly into the education
and training system. There it combines with two other international
responses to globalization pressures: competencies and integration of
education and training.
When we look at these two central elements of the current South African
debate on education and training, international influences become very
apparent. In the case of competencies, the most obvious influence has
been that of the work of the Finn and Mayer commissions in Australia,
which have influenced the industrial constituency in particular, as
evidenced by the NTB's adaptation of the Mayer generic competencies for
South African use (NTB 1994). Such borrowing has been reinforced due
to the presence of Australians in key positions in COSATU.
The NCVQ experience from England and Wales is also well-known,
although several stakeholders were aware of criticisms of the model,
particularly those of Smithers (1993). Indeed, it may prove significant
that Khetsi Lehoko, as the person responsible for adult education
nationwide, was a graduate student of the education faculty at
Manchester University where Smithers teaches.
As far as integration is concerned, lessons are also being learned from the
Australian, English and Scottish systems. However, the New Zealand
model with its NZQA and its "seamless system" of education and
training has been the preferred model of the trainers. As was noted
previously, ANC policy, arising out of both NEPI and IPET deliberations
also appears to have been very heavily influenced by the debate around
the more social democratic British Baccalaureat model (Finegold et al.
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1990). Such an influence has come directly through the involvement of
Michael Young, co-author of the British Baccalaureat. in the NEPI and
IPET processes, as well as through the writings of Andre Kraak, whose
work owes much to both Young and Finegold.
Explaining Recent Policy Developments
As we saw in the last chapter, much of the current South African
education and training policy debate arises out of the particular
convergence of international and local trends in economics, politics and
discourse of the early 1990s. NUMSA and then COSATU used New
Times ideas from Australia and Britain as a way of benefiting members
through multi-skilling and other elements of that model which could be
used to improve pay and conditions. Although such a strategy would
have the greatest immediate benefit for COSATU members, their poor
economic status in relation to white workers and the discriminatory
nature of the Apartheid systems of learning and work allowed this
approach to be portrayed as a pro-equity one.
Would-be policy makers from ANC-aligned constituencies were
undoubtedly influenced by the practical example of the Australian trade
unions but also by the supposedly theoretical example of the new British
left with its often incoherent mix of post-modernism, post-fordism and
post-socialism.
The new model also offered potential benefits to the adult education
community as the new vision of training included a large educational
element through the new notion of ABET- adult basic education and
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training. Progressive formal educators, faced with the collapse of People's
Education, could also take heart in the fact that this model sought to
breach the mental-manual divide and was likely to result in a system far
better than that which had existed under Apartheid.
The loss of power by the NECC to the CEPD and self-censorship by
SADTU, the new progressive teachers' union (Carrim OI 1995), further
contributed to the demise of radical educational alternatives. This
"collapse of oppositionist trends" (Unterhalter and Young 1994: 12) also
benefited the new meta-narrative as it gave COSATU a greater chance of
shaping ANC policy.
Employers, on the other hand, focused on the triple crisis seen above. As
the negotiation period moved closer to elections and majority rule with
an apparently pro-Socialist alliance in power, employers, at least
superficially, abandoned their differences in favour of establishing a
compromise both among themselves and with the ANC. This process
was aided by the instrumental elements of the proposed model, with its
potential to be made to stress competitiveness, flexibility and
productivity. Its similarity in form to emergent models in avowedly pro-
market countries such as England and New Zealand was also important
here.
Unterhalter and Young (1994) argue that just prior to the elections the
DNE was isolated by the coming together of the proto-state with
important elements of capital and labour. As a result, it found itself
forced to come on board in the later stages, as witnessed by Gustav
Niebuhr being appointed to the NTSI task team. There is undoubtedly
an element of truth in this. However, the vocational elements of the
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new strategy were not that antithetical to views represented in either the
de Lange or the ERS/CMESA proposals. Moreover, through the
privatization strategy, white education would probably be left untouched
by the vocationalization.
Thus a drawing on international discourses and domestic resources in
order to react to the internal political and economic tensions of the South
African transition led to the emergence of a broad consensus around the
NTSI principles in early 1994. Those forces have continued to transmute
and develop since the elections. Moreover, the policy formulation
period of 1993-4, with its imperative towards developing broad consensus
has given way to a period in which implementation must be addressed.
Broad principles must now be operationalized and priorities, structures
and funding must all be decided. These new dynamics give a very
different imperative towards detail, thus potentially eroding the
consensus.
A major element of post-election contestation has been the shift in the
relative balance of power between stakeholder groups. COSATU have
clearly been weakened by the loss of key officials to the ANC, the GNU,
the bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, the private sector. The small core
of remaining talented officials has been increasingly forced to cover extra
portfolios and help in the mentoring and staff development of new
colleagues. This has contributed to the strong impression that COSATU
is increasingly unable to set the policy agenda, as prior to the election,
especially as others have increased both their legitimacy and their
expertise.
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Although many COSATU leaders have gone to swell the ranks of ANC
experts, there is an equal sense that the ANC, particularly in the
education field, is not able to develop a strong policy direction. The
failure to integrate the two ministries and the appointment of outsiders
Bengu and Manganyi to be Minister and Director-General respectively
did much to lose the impetus towards reform early on at the very top of
the system. Bengu's ill-health after his appointment, the sunset clause
protecting the old bureaucracy, and Public Service Commission tardiness
in approving new appointments, all conspired with the huge challenge
of restructuring the Apartheid division of departments to delay the
establishment of a new corps of progressive educational bureaucrats
below Bengu and Manganyi. Indeed, appointments to new posts were
still taking place 18 months after the elections.47 The constitutional
settlement and the need to coordinate with the Department of Labour
Affairs similarly made strong policy pronouncements difficult. As it
developed through the two versions of the White Paper, educational
policy appeared to lose the feel of a radical ANC vision and take on
elements which spoke of compromise with the old bureaucracy and with
the training lobby.
As the institutionalized forces for a progressive NQF began to look far
weaker than before the elections, the marginalization of other popular
and radical voices became a more serious constraint on progressive new
policy. The ever-greater complexity of the debate around the NQF and
integration meant it increasingly resembled a technicist exercise in which
there was no scope for involvement of parents, pupils and teachers. At
47 Some of these later appointments (particularly in higher education) are already
leaving and capacity remains a serious problem (Electronic Mail and Guardian 13/06/96).
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the same time, progressive educational research voices were further
silenced by the decline of the NECC and the uncertain future of the EPUs
in the face of post-election realities.
The progressive vision of the NQF and integration also seems to have
suffered due to shifting trends in usage of international discourses. The
New Times arguments of the early 1990s were of course arguments about
policy. However, now that the ANC is in government, such arguments
have to be backed up by money.
In such a climate, and particularly as part of a Government of National
Unity, the ANC seems to be increasingly influenced by the orthodoxy of
neo-liberal economics.48 The smaller state such ideas promote is not one
to carry out the interventionist growth and social welfarist strategies that
the models of the RDP and the NQF were built upon before the elections.
In such a climate, neither direct state expenditure nor market-driven
economic expansion is likely to fuel a broad NQF as an element of an
expansionist New Times strategy.
Money is at the heart of the shifting balance of power. In a climate of
marketization, and a phase of prioritization and implementation of
policy, the contest to shape policy gives massive influence to business as a
major potential source of funding and provision for education and
training reform. Whilst the bright ideas of COSATU could carry the day
at the negotiating table prior to the elections, it is the bright coins of
business that now can be expected to achieve pre-eminence.
48 Minister Manuel's financial proposals of June 1996 were indeed so market-oriented (no
national minimum wage, accelerated tariff reduction) that a National Party spokesman
declared he could find no fault with them (South African Press Association 14/6/96).
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There still remains a group, centred on the HSRC cluster, who have a
vision for a broadly progressive version of integrated education and
training. However, this new grouping of progressive practitioners is
largely beholden to its individual organizational affiliations, many of
which are in the ITBs and the parastatals. It seems unlikely that this will
allow them to be much more than pragmatic lobbyists for a moderately
broad NQF.
Given the shift of power away from the unions to the employers, and the
inability/unwillingness of the ANC to redress this, these practitioners
may find themselves swamped by pressures towards a narrow Taylorist
form of training. In such a situation, a defensive compromise may well
be struck by COSATU which limits the coverage and broadness of
learning of the new model in return for benefits to members. Even then,
it is possible that such a deal would still fail to bring large sections of
industry and the professions on board, leading to fragmentation.
The real debate around the NQF and integration has continued to be
located in training rather than education circles. As we have seen, radical
education voices have been silenced through the dual power of
progressive rhetoric and technical complexity that have been mobilized
around the model. More conservative forces, with less pressure to be
positive and less loss of capacity, have not been so marginalized.
The vocationalist elements of the new approach, taken together with the
apparent inevitability of voluntarism, allow considerable room for
manoeuvre for more conservative forces in education. For white
schools, the universities and the retained elements within the
Department of Education, vocationalism can be criticized in such a way as
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to transform narrow sectional interests into a principled defence of liberal
educational values. At the same time, the likely ability of these
universities and schools to opt out means that a system of vocationalism
for poor (largely African) pupils and liberal education for wealthy (largely
white) pupils is a probable outcome.
Such an outcome is in keeping with the old DNE policy, as we saw above.
Moreover, the probable presence of New Improved Vocationalism (NIV)
in the state school system can also engage the support of business leaders
who retain a strong fear of academic bias. Through its reworking of
vocationalization via competencies and generic skills rather than
vocational subjects and tracks, NIV also can draw on the support of forces
more conventionally thought of as progressive. For COSATU, it appears
in keeping with their programme for industry, centred around increased
access to skills training for the working class. For many progressive
educators, the transformation of a vocationalization strategy into a
potentially positive force, legitimated as it is by international discourse, is
also a strong attraction. Given the shift of power such groups may have
been seduced into supporting a broader vision of CBML than will in fact
emerge, yet may now be incapable of stopping the narrowing of focus.
The multiple factors shifting power away from progressive forces since
the elections and the pervasiveness of international discourses that can
be marshalled in favour of a more restrictive model of the NQF, help to
explain the apparent demise of the national progressive version of the
new system (Path One). These same forces also combine to push
COSATU towards a narrower consensus, as in Path Two. However, it is
far from certain that a centralized NQF will emerge. Instead, it appears
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likely that there will continue to be considerable disagreement both
between and within sub-systems regarding the future model.
The emergent best practice may well be narrower than envisioned by the
more progressive thinkers. However, it will still be too radical for many
employers. On the other hand, its vocationalizing tendencies, as regards
education, will be sufficient to allow conservative educational forces to
mobilize against it on positive (i.e. liberal, enlightenment) grounds. This
explains why even a picture of bridges and ladders may be too optimistic.
The above analysis has sought to explain why a rather limited and
fragmented form of integration appears likely. It has not attempted in
any great detail to critique such a model, although elements of such a
critique are clearly present. This task of commenting on the strengths
and weaknesses of the emergent model will be accorded greater weight in
the next chapter.
There has been some stress on the ability of conservative education and
training forces to oppose and, hence, reshape the agenda. Nothing,
however, has been said as to whether the post-election climate offers
scope for progressive forces to mount a counter-attack. Whether such
scope exists and the form it might take are further topics for the next




TOWARDS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters of this thesis have shown the complex nature of
the interaction between learning and work in twentieth century South
Africa, mediated as it has been by the intertwining of local and global
forces; the playing out of stratifications based on race and class; and the
operation of often conflicting political and economic imperatives. This
survey culminated in an exploration of the emergent policy discourse of
the post-election era, with its often profound dissonances between
manifesto pledges and policy trends.
The first task of this chapter will be to provide a summary of the
arguments regarding the development of such a post-election process.
Then I will move towards a consideration of the policy discourse that
appeared to be the most favoured at the point at which the National Party
left the Government of National Unity. The concern here will be to
move towards some commentary on the current policy debate. In order
to do this, it will be necessary to get a sense of the positive and negative
elements of the emergent discourse in order to explore its probable
implications.
There will also be an attempt to provide a similar analysis of the main
alternative to this rather narrow model: a strong NQF as offered in pre-
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election formulations by the ANC and COSATU. Subsequently, the
possibility of a third way from outside the mainstream of the current
policy debate will be explored.
In the light of these discussions, a series of further concerns moving
beyond the scope of the thesis will be raised as matters for further
investigation. Issues will be raised regarding research strategies for the
future charting of education and training reform in South Africa.
Questions will be formulated surrounding theoretical issues such as the
generation of models of integrated education and training. Concerns will
also be expressed with regard to the implications of this research for the
development of similar policies in other countries, most notably within
the Old Commonwealth.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION AND
TRAINING POLICY DISCOURSE
As we saw in Chapter Two, at the start of the twentieth century South
Africa had an essentially pre-Fordist economy dominated by agriculture
and mining. African involvement in the white core economy was
mainly as unskilled migrant labour. This was contrasted with the
peripheral economy of the areas reserved for Africans after the 1913
Native Land Act. In the pre-Apartheid segregationist discourse these
areas were seen as the appropriate cultural as well as economic locales for
Africans, which would help to preserve both African and European
culture. In practice, of course, some Africans would enter (white) urban
areas to "minister to the needs of the white man", as the Stallard
Commission put it (cited in Lipton 1985: 18). However, these Africans
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were to be unskilled, temporary sojourners in that environment and not
an integral part of the consumer market of the white economy. This
policy was reinforced by a reliance on the large number of migrant
workers who came from outside the borders of the then Union of South
Africa.
In a situation in the 1920s in which the proper milieu of Africans was
believed to be the tribal reserves, and in which African incursions into
white South Africa were on unskilled terms, the model of industrial
education, influenced by practices in the Southern states of the USA,
appeared to make sense as a model for African education in the Union.
This model emphasized the need to adapt African education to meet the
rural needs of the masses rather than the needs and aspirations of the
elite few who straddled the boundary between the two South Africas as
clerics, court interpreters and teachers.
The inherent tensions in this model between separate development and
ministering to white needs came to a head in the aftermath of the Second
World War. On the one hand was the position of the United Party which
was broadly sympathetic to the large English1 corporations engaged
increasingly in diversifying out of mining into manufacturing.
Encapsulated in policy documents such as the Fagan Report (Union of
South Africa 1948), this position saw the future industrialization of South
Africa as both inevitable and desirable. For it to be successful, there
would also have to be a massive transfer of African production and
consumption from the peripheral to the core economy. Such a view was
based on economic incorporation of Africans not political or cultural
1 As noted earlier in this thesis, this is largely a linguistic category related to medium of
business.
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equality, the latter being notions which remained on the radical fringes of
the white political community.
On the other hand was the view of the National Party. It was, to a large
extent, the representative of the Afrikaner blue collar workers and minor
civil servants who had been the beneficiaries of the response to the poor
white problem of the 1920s, but also of the teachers, clerics and smaller
farmers who formed the backbone of respectable Afrikaner society. For
the National Party, the economic threat posed to the former constituency
by increased black economic involvement2 dovetailed neatly with the
cultural and ideological concerns which exercized many of the latter
constituency in particular. Thus it was argued that separate development
should be continued. Indeed, through the policy of Apartheid this would
be better codified.
Nonetheless, after its gaining of power in 1948 the National Party still had
to deal with the tension between the political and ideological rhetoric of
truly separate development and the awareness in the economic domain
of how far white South Africa, at both the individual and societal levels,
was dependent, and found it congenial so to be, on African labour. This
was reflected in a new learning system which encapsulated this dualism.
Bantu Education stressed the continued relevance of a curriculum
adapted to meet African needs, in particular through an emphasis on
"Bantu culture" across a range of subjects. However, it also reflected the
changing demand of the white economy with respect to African labour.
The increased importance of manufacturing, and changes in technologies
across both primary and secondary production sectors, meant an
2 A removal or watering down of the colour bar would in the first instance have led to
competition for many jobs from Indians and coloureds.
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increasing demand for labour which was basically literate and numerate
and which could be trained to semi-skilled levels.3 However, racial
separation was reinforced even in the nature of this basic education for
the workplace. Whereas technical colleges, technikons and
apprenticeship programmes continued to expand for white youth,
African industrial preparation consisted of literacy, numeracy and, for
some, sub-artisanal training, although much of the latter was geared to
the needs of the homelands. The plan appeared to be to set South Africa
on a path of Racial Fordism (Gelb 1991) which saw the white economy
achieving the industrial maturity of mass production alongside the
preservation of a pre-Fordist African economy.
The rival meta-narrative of the United Party had not been totally
eliminated however, and began to be reworked in the 1960s through the
efforts of the Education Panel (1963 and 1966). The argument was that
now, in the face of skill shortages, the continued growth of the economy
could not be guaranteed by the increased use of either domestic or
imported white labour at skilled levels. Therefore, it was deemed
necessary to bring ever larger numbers of black, including African,
workers into the Fordist economy.
This vision informed industrial practice in the late 1960s and early 1970s
as a series of exemptions to and evasions of the colour bar emerged.
However, it remained outside the official policy regime under which
African apprenticeships, for instance, were still not permitted.
Nonetheless, as Chapter Three argues, the global crisis of Fordism, which
first emerged between 1968 and 1973; the internal shocks of the 1973
3 Of course in reality many African workers operated at skilled levels, though few of
them were recognised as skilled workers.
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Durban strikes and the 1976 Soweto Uprising; and the resultant wave of
sanctions, disinvestments and company-level industrial relations
concessions, combined to produce an existential crisis for the Apartheid
system.
Large sections of the Afrikaner elite saw the way forward in an acceptance
of the discourse of English big business which sought to move towards an
Economic Fordist position with increasing incorporation of Africans into
the core economy as both producers and consumers. However, control
over African political power was seen as essential to the continuation of
capital accumulation; the maintenance of white privilege (though now to
be exercized, at least in part, through class as a proxy for race); and the
need of the Afrikaner political elite to bring as much of their constituency
as possible with them so as to remain in office.
Reforms in legislation pertaining to the workplace were the first indicator
of the emergence into official discourse of a market-oriented meta-
narrative which privileged the market whilst maintaining cultural and
political asymmetries. Recognition of non-racial (i.e. predominantly
African) trade unions and the legalization of African access to
apprenticeships were two central elements of the new approach as
reflected in the Wiehahn Report (Wiehahn 1982).
The Riekert Report's recommendation for liberalization of influx control
regulations (Republic of South Africa 1979) was another pointer towards
new thinking, although it did illustrate also the contested and limited
nature of the shift towards the dominance of the market-oriented meta-
narrative, mediated as it was by tensions within Afrikaner ranks.
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As far as the learning system was concerned, tensions were, if anything,
more acute and the state was unprepared to accept several of the
recommendations of the de Lange Report, for example for a single
education department for all races (HSRC 1981a). Nonetheless, the
primacy of a belief in African involvement in the industrial economy
over a desire for separate development was evident in both official
thinking and the increasingly substantial educational investment
programmes of the large corporations. Mirroring trends in other
countries, the former restressed the existing emphasis on the orientation,
preparation and socialization functions of education as the central
element of a vision which saw learning primarily in terms of the needs
of the workplace. Meanwhile, the corporate investment of the large
firms was often more sharply focused on technical and commercial
learning for African urban youth.
As Chapter Three argued, this shift in the dominant meta-narrative
should be seen as part of a strategy to respond to a triple crisis which
threatened to overwhelm South Africa. The shocks outlined above had
produced an accumulation crisis. The failure of education to respond to
this and the emergence from 1976 of open revolt in sizeable sections of
the education system indicated an educational crisis. Together these two
crises both pointed to and sharpened a third crisis, of legitimation. All
three crises were to inform the second strand of official educational
discourse of the 1980s: privatization.
A greater market role and a reduced state role in education potentially
served simultaneously to reduce the tax burden; to stimulate the
economy; and to distance the state from education policy, thus addressing
the other two crises. The attempt to downplay state responsibility for
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educational policy was also seen in the related rise of technocratic
rationality as policy increasingly became portrayed as a process in which
the real decision-making lay in the hands of technical experts who
provided value-free scientific recommendations upon which the state
then acted.
That this strategy was of only limited effectiveness was illustrated by the
persistence of the triple crisis throughout the 1980s. In the educational
sphere this was marked by continued contestation in classrooms and
communities which coalesced around the People's Education movement
in the middle of the decade. Based in notions of transformed access,
governance and curriculum, this movement, explored in Chapter Three,
provided a wide-ranging, if only partially systematized, critique of the
existing education system.
By the end of the 1980s it was clear that the tensions inherent in the
reform programme of state and capital were themselves unresolvable. At
the heart of the problem was the attempt to move towards a deracialized
Fordist position in the economic sphere, through the incorporation of
ever-larger numbers of Africans, Indians and coloureds into the realms of
mass production and consumption, whilst denying the Fordist logic of a
universal franchise and an integrated nation-state in the political sphere.
The impossibility of this position was accepted in February 1990 with the
unbanning of the ANC and other organizations. The four years which
followed, before the elections of 1994, have been characterized in this
thesis (Chapter Four) and elsewhere as an interregnum. As far as this
thesis is concerned, this can be seen most clearly in the struggle for
dominance between four different views of the learning-work nexus.
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Chapter Four demonstrated that the newly dominant market-oriented
meta-narrative remained largely unchanged as the circumstances of the
early 1990s, most particularly the need to shape the post-election
settlement, reinforced the state's emphasis on privatization and
instrumentalism as a means of maximizing future white economic and
political power.
The People's Education vision also remained on the agenda as majority
rule came ever closer. However, Chapter Four also illustrates the way in
which ANC documents, often now co-produced with its alliance partner,
COSATU, began to reflect arguments which had slowly emerged out of
the crisis of Fordism in the advanced industrial economies over the past
two decades. In the South African version of such arguments, the best
hope for the future lay in a shift beyond Fordism to a Post-Fordist
situation in which South Africa could hope to compete in the global
marketplace with those advanced economies and the newly
industrializing countries. Through greater economic competitiveness, a
paradigm shift towards New Times would come into effect which would
boost economic development. At the same time, equity would be
enhanced through a number of transformations. A reorganization of
learning and work would occur which would lead to up- and multi-
skilling. There would be an end to Taylorism and an associated increase
in worker participation in corporate decision-making. Finally, the
education and training system would be transformed around the re¬
integration of knowledge and skills.
In response to this vision and to international trends, a further meta-
narrative, for which I have employed the term "Lean Production",
emerged from elements of big business and the industrial training
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community. Here, it is suggested in Chapter Four, the emphasis was
primarily on the efficiency elements of the Post-Fordist vision rather
than the equity strands. Reduction of organizational hierarchies and the
replacement of conflict with collaboration in the industrial relations
system were the principal workplace elements of this vision. For
learning, the central theme was the development of a synoptic approach
across education and training through the universal use of a competency-
based approach.
All four of these meta-narratives would continue to be deployed in the
period after the 1994 elections.
The evolution of the relationship between learning and work in South
Africa since industrialization began in the late nineteenth century has
seen certain recurrent themes as the above outline has illustrated. Prior
to the 1994 elections there was an on-going process of redefinition of
black, and especially African, involvement in the white core economy
characterised by increased co-optation, rather than a deracialization of
that core. There was also an evolving theme of instrumentalism in the
way that African education was shaped by white South Africa so as to
serve the needs of the white political economy.4
Chapter Five argues that these themes have continued to operate in the
post-election era, although the outward manifestation of a non-racial
South Africa has had the effect of further blurring the intertwined
impacts of race and class. Writing in 1993, King predicted that the
dominance of market ideology globally and the weak nature of the South
African economy would make increased vocationalization almost
4 This is not to deny African agency and resistance in the development of educational
provision in South Africa.
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inevitable after the elections (King 1993) and this has been proved true,
particularly at the level of discourse, although, as has been noted, it is
important to distinguish between different strands of vocationalization.
The power of white vested interests to continue to shape the South
African political economy has of course been strengthened by the global
influence of the market ideology. Nonetheless, internal factors have also
been of great importance. The "commanding heights of the economy"
were not nationalized as per pre-1990 ANC formulations but remain
largely in the hands of local, and increasingly international, capital and
are managed by a predominantly white managerial elite. The influence
of big business in the media, the existence of the Government of National
Unity and the sunset clause protecting the jobs of white civil servants all
served to reinforce the continued influence of the old elite in the first two
years of the Mandela presidency.
Internal tensions within the ANC played a role in excluding ANC
Education chief, John Samuel, from the posts of either Minister or
Director-General of Education. They were also probably an element in
the transfer of control of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme from Jay Naidoo to the more business-friendly Trevor
Manuel and Thabo Mbeki.5 At the same time, the relatively low priority
with which the ANC appeared to view education and training at the time
of the elections resulted not only in the failure to integrate the two
portfolios, but also in the appointment of a Minster (Sibusiso Bengu) and
5 Naidoo, formerly Secretary-General of COSATU was Minister without Portfolio but
charged with responsibility for the RDP. New Minister of Finance, Manuel, had as
Minister of Trade and Industry shown himself to be willing to liberalize faster than
international agreements required and continues to do so (see Chapter Five). Deputy-
President, Mbeki, is frequently criticized for being more in-touch with business opinion
than grassroots sentiments.
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a Director-General (Chabani Manganyi) of Education who conservative
elements of political and civil society would not judge as radicals.
The ANC's ability to transform the learning system has also been
compromized by the institutional culture of the national Department of
Education which is still heavily influenced by the large numbers of
bureaucrats remaining from the old dispensation. Whilst it might be too
strong to talk of cooption, the view that the March 1995 White Paper
largely represents a victory for the old guard seems reasonable (Kallaway
1995). Equally, the pervasive feeling gained from many activists and
academics that technocratic rationality appears to be affecting ANC
bureaucrats also seems plausible.6 As policy continues to be a largely
technical process, so the loss of capacity by both the ANC and COSATU, as
a result of the loss of personnel to parliament and the civil service, has
weakened their ability to intervene pro-actively in the policy debate.
Several of these processes have also weakened progressive elements of
civil society and thus further reduced the chances of the triumph of a
Post-Fordist model. In particular, loss of human and financial resources
by NGOs and civics,7 taken together with the ANC's failure to ensure a
genuinely transparent and participatory policy process, have weakened
the ability of progressive civil society to bolster alliance policy against the
conflicting forces noted above.
6 So pervasive was this feeling in casual conversations with academics and activists that
it is difficult to reference it. The weight given to the opinions of external consultants in





Thus, as Chapter Five argued, it appears that a far less radical vision of
education and training reform than that proposed by the ANC in 1993-4 is
beginning to emerge in South Africa. This narrower model is grounded
in notions of asymmetry and voluntarism and would allow a great
degree of flexibility for providers of education and training to develop
their own niches. This undoubtedly does have some advantages over the
potentially centralised and bureaucratized NQF approach of pre-election
ANC-COSATU formulations. In particular it could conceivably lead to
more scope for the emergence of innovative practice than in a more
regulated version. The lack of enforced symmetry could also be seen as
advantageous given the present situation in which large sections of
training and adult education are far better prepared to take advantage of
an NQF approach than is the formal schooling system.
Elements of progressiveness might be found across multiple sites in such
a system. Curriculum reform, for example, would undoubtedly come to
the school system. In so far as this could be expected to amount to a
move away from content littered with pro-Apartheid propaganda and
from an over-emphasis on knowledge to the detriment of skills and
meta-learning, such reform could be judged as progressive.
It should be noted that there would also probably be a limited pro-equity
dimension to the emergent model. The likely spread of competency-
based modular learning could be expected to make access to learning
easier, particularly for non-traditional clienteles, especially if a credit
accumulation and transfer system was at the heart of the work of SAQA.
Some form of Recognition of Prior Learning also seems inevitable in
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such a scenario. A growing number of employers are attracted to this on
the grounds of efficiency, seeing it as a more rational way of selecting
candidates for training and as a means of speeding up that training. This
of course has an equity pay off as well, given that this means of selection
and training is to the advantage of those lacking high levels of formal
education.
As this model appears to be the likely outcome, we might also view it as
having the benefits of being a feasible approach, in contrast to the Utopian
nature of some other proposals. Certainly it would be far cheaper and
simpler than the more ambitious ANC-COSATU model seen in Chapters
Four and Five. Crucially, given the huge shortage of trainers and
educators in South Africa, a less ambitious model would be far easier to
deliver.
Nonetheless, many of the other advantages only apply in a comparison
with the present system, not with the ANC-COSATU model which takes
many of the elements of the narrow approach and deals with them in
more thorough ways. There are also very strong grounds for criticizing
the narrow model.
At the heart of such criticisms is the way that a marketized, competency-
based model would be likely to entrench privilege. At the pedagogic
level, the competency focus, which would be exported to the public
system of education and which would also tend to cover lower levels of
training (as envisioned by Phillips' proposals for the mining industry, see
Chapter Five), would lead to an impoverished, instrumentalized and
Neo-Taylorist form of provision for the masses, which I have termed
New Improved Vocationalism. At the same time, however, the greater
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use of market forces and the continued existence of a huge private
education system would permit the elite to continue to enjoy a broader
education, followed in most cases by a broad professional training.
Moreover, the possible equity gains noted above which might arise from
improved access would also tend to be opposed by the furtherance of
marketization. In the previous chapter it was noted that there are already
cases where RPL is being used only for those already inside firms, with
ever higher educational qualifications being required from new recruits.
Moreover, a largely market-driven system of provision would be likely to
privilege access to education and training of those with the characteristics
which the market prefers: male, able-bodied, urban and formal sector
employed.
Such a system would also tend to run contrary to many of the central and
laudable positions on which opposition to the Apartheid regime was
based. If the market and the consumer are granted sovereignty, it is
difficult to see how transparency, participation and thorough-going
democratization8 are to be promoted. The transparency of school league
tables and participation through nursery vouchers (as in Britain) are no
substitute for democratic decision-making from the community up to the
national level. There seem to be strong grounds for fearing the
implementation of such a model. What then are the alternatives
available to South Africa?
8 Democratization in this formulation is not the granting of the right to vote every five or
so years for a party to be chosen from a list in which all subscribe to the belief that they
are controlled by the market in any case. Rather, it is about the maximization of societal
involvement in decision-making at all levels.
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A STRONG NQF
The most obvious alternative to the model critiqued above is of course
the vision that appears to emerge from ANC-COSATU policy statements
prior to the 1994 elections. Many of its claims have already been referred
to in the course of Chapters Four and Five. However, it is worth making
a more explicit and concentrated critique here.
The claims made for this model are very impressive. It is asserted that
the model can deliver on both equity and economic development. By
valuing workers as the key productive resource, the workplace allegedly
becomes more humanized and less conflictual. This is reflected in greater
worker involvement in corporate decision-making, and in education and
training which puts greater emphasis on problem-solving and team
work. In so far as this is true, it is an attractive vision. Even for core
workers the Fordist world was often nasty and brutish.
Equity is at the centre of a vision of learning which seeks to do away with
old divisions and inequalities. Through the integration of education and
training, represented by a single qualification structure, the model
proposes an end to class-divided learning. Instead it suggests a system
built upon the principles of high participation and late selection.
Economic benefits are also held to accrue. In the ever more intensely
competitive and globalized market environment, analysts have
identified South Africa's only hope as residing in its ability to develop
areas of high value-added production (e.g. Joffe et al. 1993). It is widely
accepted that high value-added can only come from the best quality
human capital. It is argued that the multi-skilled workers in this vision
can provide South Africa with the improved levels of productivity,
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innovation and competitiveness necessary for the economic growth that
will in turn allow higher employment and greater social expenditure.
This vision of a model which "pursues the goals of individual
development and social equality as well as economic efficiency" (Raffe
1994) is clearly very attractive. Not only does it counter-act the excessive
and atomized individualism of the market model. It also offers a radical
response to the failings of capitalist education which in South Africa was
made even more pernicious through the mechanisms of the Apartheid
system and Bantu and Christian National Education. This alternative
vision harks back to some extent to Dewey in its stress on collaborative
learning and the marriage of the mental and the manual.
Though this model is part of a broader international movement there are
several elements of particular significance and attractiveness in the
South African context. As Michael Young (1992) has argued, an
integrated system of education and training is built on the premise that
there is unity and equality underpinning diversity. This is an important
principle which has too often been ignored in South Africa in the past.
In the 1920s the vision of Loram paid lip-service to equality but stressed
diversity in practice, leading to the disunity of adaptation. In the 1950s
the approach of the Eiselen Report was to downplay even further the
notion of unity in favour of racially-based and legally enforced diversity.
In the 1980s the de Lange Report made some claim for unity around the
issue of a single department (rejected by the state) but vocationalization
and privatization reinforced the primacy of diversity. In the light of this
historical background, a system building diversity upon a strong
foundation of unity is to be applauded.
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Given the collapse of a culture of learning in South African schools in
the two decades since Soweto, the model's proclaimed ability to
remotivate learners and to reward success rather than penalize failure
would be important. This collapse of the culture of learning is related to
the lack of formal learning experiences of large sections of the South
African population. Here too, the ANC-COSATU model offers
important answers. Mechanisms like a credit accumulation and transfer
system (CATS), recognition of prior learning (RPL) and paid education
and training leave (PETL) are all ways to increase access to learning
opportunities for those previously disadvantaged. Moreover, the ability
of an integrated system to shift the vision from a narrow concentration
on formal schooling to incorporate other modes of learning, whether
formal, non-formal or informal, is equally important in the South
African context.
Nonetheless, there remain several major questions regarding the efficacy
and viability of this approach. In general, models of Post-Fordism, and
Post-Fordist education in particular, remain somewhat under-theorized.
Crucially, power is largely absent from such accounts, which as a result
remain rather weak on the processes through which the vision may be
expected to be adopted, implemented, resisted and subverted.
On the question of education-economy links too there is a need for better
theorising. The current education system appears implicitly to be blamed
on the economic structure but this causality can apparently be reversed
with regards to the future. The more rigorous British vision of Finegold
et al. (1990) explicitly argues that changes in the learning system can kick
start changes in the workplace, in the economy and in society:
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The promotion of increased participation and higher
achievement will of itself feed back into economic
development. The opportunities for firms to move into
higher value-added product markets are transformed
when education reaches a large majority of the
population. Education therefore becomes a tool for the
control of economic and social change, rather than a social
instrument driven by economic change, (ibid: 49)
However, this is not entirely persuasive, given the little attempt made to
explain how a society can achieve such a kick-start. In the South African
context such claims remain almost entirely tacit.
The South African model is also weaker than the vision of Finegold et al.
in other important respects. Whereas their model is rooted in
educational concerns and thus maintains a primary concern with
learning as a non-instrumental activity, the South African model is very
much one which has emerged from the trade union movement and the
training arena. Whilst laudably it seeks to address concrete needs of un¬
skilled and semi-skilled workers, its vision is seriously narrowed as a
result.
It has consistently failed to keep the philosophical high ground claimed
by Young above. The weak theoretical underpinning of the South
African version has allowed compromises in key areas. The shift from
an integrated system to an integrated approach is at the centre of these
compromises. Such a shift allows each sub-sector of the education and
training system to pursue its own interests and visions without having
to work cross-sectorally to develop thorough common visions and
practices. The asymmetrical approach accepted by senior ANC
bureaucrats such as Coombe (see Chapter Five) fails to address the key
insight of the British unified systems theorists that a divided, class-based
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system must be replaced by a truly integrated system, not simply
reformed. The asymmetrical approach fails to effect such a
transformation and instead returns South Africa to a position in which
diversity is likely to be privileged over unity.
More concretely, the narrowness of the ANC-COSATU formulation is
seen in its failure to make clear what integration means to the system of
formal schooling. It is also apparent in the tendency to view the world
through formal sector industrial eyes. The formal sector only accounts
for about a half of South African employment, even if we exclude unpaid
household labour. Nonetheless, agriculture and the informal sector are
hardly visible in the NQF vision. Without the fuller consideration of the
needs and aspirations of those within these locations, the NQF model can
never be truly radical and inclusive, regardless of rhetoric to the contrary.
Narrowness is also apparent in the choice of an integrated approach
which is made synoptic through the use of competencies. The first
criticism of this is the vagueness of the definition, which has been subject
to frequent alteration without genuine clarification. The training origins
of the ANC-COSATU approach lead to a tendency to leave this vision
open to a mode of implementation which could be Taylorist and
behaviourist in practice. Moreover, this competency-based version of
integration is potentially highly individualistic (McGrath 1995a) and
throws into question Raffe's balance between the individual and the
social.
The last group of criticisms of the ANC-COSATU model relate to its
feasibility. Questions regarding this issue clearly stem from the apparent
strength of the alternative model. They are also related to the weakness,
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identified above, in theorizing the impact of power relations on the Post-
Fordist underpinnings of the model.
The most usual questions asked of this model relate to its economic
underpinnings. It seems probable that, at least in the foreseeable future,
only pockets of Post-Fordist production can be expected to develop in
South Africa. The country is not likely to become a major foreign
investment draw (Unterhalter and Young 1995), given the still terrible
level of violence and the instability of domestic investor confidence.9
The feasibility of the proposals as regards the capacity of the learning
system is also questionable. Resources, whether human, physical,
administrative or infrastructural, simply do not appear to be available in
anything like the quality and quantity required. In the face of more
pressing problems and strong opposition, state commitment to such a
strategy inevitably is uncertain.
These concerns help to sharpen a focus on two issues which go to the
heart of debates about the future of South African education and training.
I have suggested above that the NQF model is more developed with
respect to the needs of the advanced sectors of the economy and the
workers within those sectors than it is upon those outside formal sector
industry. In this case, should a national learning strategy be based upon
the alleged needs of the future which are as yet manifested in only a tiny
part of the economy, or should it be based on the more immediate needs
of those disadvantaged hitherto? Even if the former approach is deemed
desirable or necessary, what are the practical implications of attempting to
graft a Post-Fordist learning system onto a fundamentally differently
9 This was illustrated by the sharp, if temporary, fall in the value of the rand in response
to the Mandela health scare of March 1996.
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structured political economy? Neither of these questions has as yet been
answered satisfactorily by supporters of the Post-Fordist strategy.
AN ALTERNATIVE VISION?
It is of course easier to criticize than to provide viable alternatives.
However, some attempt to suggest an alternative vision for South
African learning should be attempted here.
What seems to be the most crucial thing to be said is that education needs
to be seen as an important priority in its own right. In spite of much
rhetoric and a handful of Presidential Lead Projects10, it appears that
educational interests have been less important than political and
economic considerations in setting a learning agenda. Both the decision
not to integrate education and training at the departmental level and the
Bengu/Manganyi appointments can be seen as examples of this tendency.
This lack of prioritization of education needs to be tackled.11
In many ways what is most important is a process not a policy. It can of
course be argued that the needs of South Africa are so great that
immediate action is what is required. However, the reality is that there
has often been far more technicist process in evidence since the 1994
elections than clear policy pronouncement or implementation. The
ANC has been committed to principles such as transparency and
participation: these need to be actively addressed as far as education policy
making is concerned.
10 A series of special projects of the RDP have been established which are high-profile
but often low-impact and -sustainability. ABET, school feeding and the culture of learning
have featured here (DE 1996c).
11 The appointment of Mkhatshwa may be an important step in this regard.
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A sign of the possibilities in this regard was the Population Green Paper
(Ministry of Welfare and Population Development 1995) which sought to
outline the possible policy options in a relatively accessible manner and
which offered questions and text around which to structure responses.
Though not perfect, this approach does point to the possibility of being
more transparent and participatory. This can be contrasted with the
argument used by the ANC that debate on the National Education Policy
Bill should take place after it had been passed by parliament (Bot 1996).
There have been moves towards addressing the governance issue and
success in this regard could also further the possibility of a more
democratic learning policy. Not just parents, but also learners must be
not simply permitted, but encouraged and facilitated, to become involved
in setting the learning agenda at all levels.
Teachers and other educators also have an integral role to play. Teacher
training reform has too often been seen as a question of upgrading skills.
Whilst that is individually, professionally and societally desirable, other
considerations are also vital. Reorientation to a new curriculum and,
more particularly, a transformed pedagogy is related to the need to
democratize South African education. However, teacher training (pre- or
in-service) can also help to empower teachers, and through them
communities, to take better control of their own education provision.
Regardless of the finer details of the curriculum or the qualifications
system, it is widely appreciated in South Africa that access to learning
opportunities and the establishment of a culture of learning must
underpin the future system. However, neither of these is as
straightforward as some accounts imagine. Access can be significantly
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increased by such devices as modularization and the plethora of
acronyms such as RPL, PETL and CATS already referred to above.
However, the physical and epistemological12 access to learning
opportunities of hitherto disadvantaged South Africans cannot be fully
addressed by such mechanisms as long as they are controlled and
operated from within the elite. Equally, a culture of learning cannot be
fully established until the learning available is valued by the
communities and individuals to which it is offered. Democratization of
control over learning content is central to such a process.
Much of the above appears consistent with a unified system of education
and training. Many of the arguments which that model has advanced for
the need to break down the barriers between education and training,
mental and manual, academic and vocational, have a long pedigree
which I have no difficulty in endorsing. However, other elements are
based in what appear to be often rather implausible claims for and about
Post-Fordism. The challenge would seem to lie, therefore, in developing
a model of a unified system that was less beholden to Post-Fordist
rhetoric.
However, as stated above, education policy must be democratized and
developed from the grassroots not imposed from above. If it is accepted
both that the NQF model is here to stay for the moment and that there
are positive elements to be found in it, then the challenge becomes one of
opening windows of opportunity through which the model can be made
to empower and facilitate individual and community involvement in
the setting of learning agenda. In such a vision, innovation and
12 This term is used by Morrow (1993) to note that even where physical access to learning
is acquired there are often problems due to the alien nature of the intellectual frame of
reference within which the student is expected to operate.
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networking rather than bureaucratization and regulation would be the
defining principles of NQF operation.
I have already criticised the ANC-COSATU model for not dealing
adequately with issues of realism and the difficulty of overcoming vested
interests. Such charges also can be levelled against the vision above and,
indeed, are hard to deny. There is no strong evidence that even a
moderately progressive vision can succeed in the current climate.
However, in that case it does not seem unreasonable to argue that a
model which seeks to mobilise a broad constituency behind a progressive
vision is no less plausible than one which is primarily based on the good
offices of the ANC-aligned elements of a technocratic elite. Whether the
collapse of cooperation with the National Party and the appointment of
People's Education veteran, Mkhatshwa, as Deputy-Minister will shift the
balance in favour of a more progressive vision remains to be seen.
OUTSTANDING ISSUES
The above discussion has pointed to some of the policy and research
questions that remain unresolved at the end of this study. Most
fundamentally, it is evident that the future shape of the NQF and the
South African learning system as a whole is far from certain. As a
consequence there is a continued need for research to chart the
developments of the national system, initially for the next three years
until the 1999 elections. Adaptation of policy sociology of education
approaches, such as that of Ball (see Chapter One), to South Africa and
the further development of the critical hermeneutic reading begun here
would seem to be particularly fruitful methodologies for such research.
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Such a hermeneutical approach also could be profitably directed at the
type of data which, though crucial, this thesis has not sought to collect.
The history of education and training policy presented here is in need of
complementing with a parallel study which prioritizes the voices (for
example, of teachers, community-based activists, union organisers) that
are left silent by this methodology.13
The constitutional settlement, as it continues to be interpreted, will also
impinge on future policy by moving the provinces to centre stage in the
exploration of educational policy and practice. The early stages of a
research strategy is emerging here (e.g. Donn 1995; Kruss 1996), which is
focused particularly on the Western Cape and which seeks to address the
complex power relationship between centre and province at the various
stages of the policy cycle. In the next three years an extension of such a
focus to other provinces is both probable and desirable.
Equally, it is important to move beyond the overview of education and
training developments presented here and to focus more directly on the
concerns of particular sub-systems. Whilst much of the current attention
is on the high profile school and higher education sectors; other areas
such as further education and adult basic education would benefit from a
new wave of critical research.
Policy is not simply about pronouncement but has to be inscribed in
practices. A further element of a future research strategy regarding the
NQF therefore will have to be based on the exploration and analysis of
13 Moyo's thesis (1995), with its exploration of teacher upgrading programmes through
interviews with the teachers themselves, is an example of the kind of important research
already done in this field.
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emergent practice. The small number of pilot projects centred around
the National Training Board will be one obvious source of valuable data.
Nonetheless, a number of broader issues must be addressed. How can the
NQF reach peripheral individuals and communities? How can they, and
others from outside the elite, take an increasing degree of control over
their learning within an overall, unified framework? The role of the
informal sector as a location of the poor and as a potential engine for
economic growth make the study of its interactions with the NQF of
particular significance. Such a study forms an important part of a
proposed Pan-African research project (King and McGrath 1996).
Some of the issues raised are more theoretical. The present and future
characteristics of the South African economy must be considered in
conjunction with ideas about the linkages between the workplace and the
learning system. The theoretical underpinnings of the unified model are
in need of further elaboration and, crucially, the model needs to be linked
to a theory of implementation. The possibility of developing a truly
progressive model of competencies/outcomes is another important issue
here. So is the feasibility of a unified model which is agnostic regarding
the claims of Post-Fordism.
Indeed, is it possible that the pressures of globalization are in fact not
leading to Post-Fordist solutions reflected in unified education and
training systems of the progressive model? Instead, could it be the case
that a more Neo-Fordist system is emerging which will be reflected in the
far less progressive model of New Improved Vocationalism?
The model of NIV itself is in need of greater development than has been
possible in this thesis. It is necessary to develop a clearer typology that
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would allow a sharp comparison of Vocationalism, New Vocationalism
and New Improved Vocationalism, and which would point to the
environments in which each of them flourishes.
Many of the issues above equally have relevance to the situations of
other countries, particularly those of the Old Commonwealth, also
embarked to varying degrees on integration. The need to interrogate the
theory of implementation implicit in the unified system; to question the
feasibility of a radical model of competency; and to explore the degree to
which integration is tied by necessity to Post-Fordism, can all be learned
from the South African example presented in this thesis. These themes,
and other issues arising from studies in the Old Commonwealth, point to
the need for further research into the broader international trend and
possibly to comparative studies (Donn and McGrath 1996). Here too, it is
to be hoped that the methodological approach adopted in this thesis
might be a useful starting point for this research.
Given that South Africa is far less part of the core global economy than
the other Old Commonwealth countries, such comparisons are of course
particularly problematic. However, South Africa's different status, on the
semi-periphery of the global economy, raises further questions for
comparative research. Can a Post-Fordist learning strategy succeed in
semi-peripheral economies? Instead, is New Improved Vocationalism
probable? Which economies, indeed, are the most similar to South
Africa in terms of their insertion into the global economy? Can any
lessons be drawn from their experiences as well as South Africa's that
would justify the identification of the one best learning system for semi-
peripheral economies, or even the main challenges that would need to be
overcome in improving them?
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END COMMENTS
This thesis has sought to show the tensions that remain at the heart of
education and training policy formulation in South Africa two years after
the first democratic elections. By exploring the historical and
international ideological contexts of South African thinking about
education and training policy, it has been possible to highlight these
tensions as well as suggest some trends that appear to be present in the
attempt to resolve them.
The thesis argues that there is a very great danger that much of the radical
vision of education and training transformation that developed in South
Africa prior to 1990 will increasingly be sidelined in policy formulation
and practice. Both at an ideological and an economic level, there appears
to be a growing belief amongst stakeholders that the pressures of
globalization constrain education and training policy to be largely
economistic.
Even the vision of the ANC-COSATU alliance, with its many positive
elements, is largely constructed within a paradigm which sees education
in instrumental terms. This vision, grounded in what I have termed the
New Times variant of Post-Fordism, sees learning as directed to the
concerns of the workplace, both to the need to increase employment and
incomes on the one hand, and to enhance international competitiveness
on the other. However, the progressive elements of this workers' vision
of Post-Fordism are severely threatened by the facility with which
employers and other less progressive forces have been able to construct
an alternatively nuanced Post-Fordist meta-narrative of Lean Production.
325
Such a vision brings with it the danger of an expansion of Taylorism in
the learning system and managerial power in the workplace.
Whilst certain key elements of the radical formulation of the 1980s, such
as access, remain embedded in the core agenda, the first half of 1996 has
seen a further increase in the usage of managerialist notions such as
labour flexibility. In the aftermath of the National Party's withdrawal
from the GNU and the appointment of Mkhatshwa as Deputy-Minister,
there is perhaps a possibility for some reflection on the desired future
path of learning reform in South Africa. The economic pressures are
immense and must be addressed, and the political realities of the mid-
1990s are very different from those during the first flowering of People's
Education a decade earlier. Nonetheless, there is still a role for critique
and challenge of policy and an opportunity to construct a less
instrumentalized vision of learning and a broader vision of work which
includes the informal sector and household work.
Two years after the first democratic elections many questions remain
regarding South Africa's future, in the spheres of learning, of work and
beyond. The need to produce answers has generated much that should be
applauded in the work of the new government and nation. However, in
the quest for quick solutions to immense challenges it should not be
forgotten that much of the strength of the anti-Apartheid tradition lay in
the asking of hard questions of the past, of the present and of the future.
It is on the nurturing of that questioning spirit that a large part of the
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